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ABSTRACT
Following the opening three chapters, which survey the literature related to knowledge, 
economic growth and firm behavior, I focus on the biotechnology industry to 
understand how firms translate basic scientific ideas into profitable ventures. I find that 
this industry is characterized by two unique stylized facts: first, firms publish the results 
of their scientific research openly in peer reviewed journals, and two, they collaborate 
with universities quite intensively. I explore the private-public nature of biotechnology 
innovation in three separate papers.
In my first paper1,1 find that collaborative research with academics improves research 
quality for biotechnology firms. My results indicated that biotechnology firms seek 
alliances with high status academics with established research reputations so as to gain 
publication in highly ranked journals which is one measure of research quality. One of 
the major policy implications of my paper was that support for public science should be 
strengthened and collaboration across the private-public divide should also be 
encouraged. However, collaboration should not be conflated with co-option or 
appropriation of roles, i.e., the public sector should not be encouraged to emulate 
private sector functions. A strong independent public science nexus is crucial for private 
biotech firms, otherwise valuable signals of research quality may be compromised (as 
we shall see below).
The results of my first paper elicited another important question -  namely, why should 
firms publish the results of their research openly in the first place? I address this 
question in my second paper, by developing an open-science framework of innovation 
which argues that while R&D expenditures reveal the commitment of a firm’s resources 
to innovation and patents record the completion of R&D activity, a firm’s stock of 
scientific papers signals the quality of its innovative efforts. In biotechnology, quality of 
research is a valuable signal and publishing peer-reviewed articles allows firms to 
convince investors and potential collaborators of the worth of their ideas. This 
proposition is tested using unique data of U.K. biotechnology firms during the years 
1988-2000. The findings indicate that research publications bring real financial gains to 
biotechnology firms and that, on average, publishing fourteen scientific papers in 
academic journals has approximately the same impact on a firm’s market value as 
obtaining a single patent. Furthermore, papers which are highly cited, particularly by 
pharmaceutical firms, have a greater impact on market value.
In a third theoretical paper. I show that biotechnology patents can be treated as credence 
goods -  goods/services that require expert opinion to determine quality — insofar as the 
market for biotechnology patents is characterized by an asymmetry of information 
between buyers and sellers. This informational asymmetry is a result of uncertainty 
associated with biotechnology patents. The chief causes of uncertainty are the legal 
substance of the patent document itself, the technological and commercial uncertainty 
associated with patent value and variable quality in screening new innovations at the
This paper was awarded the Best Student Paper Award in the Technology and Innovation Management 
Division (TIM) and was the only student finalist for the Carolyn Dexter Award at the Academy of 
Management (AOM) 2005 Meetings.
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patent office when granting patents. Despite these limitations, firms continue to patent 
in increasing numbers. Thus, the market has evolved mechanisms to more accurately 
ascertain “true” patent value. These mechanisms, that I label, credence verifiers, include 
publishing scientific papers in peer reviewed journals and the practice of clubbing 
patents in patent portfolios. Studying how the market ascertains the value of patents has 
implications for the theory and reality of patenting behavior; and by conceptualizing 
biotechnology patents as credence goods, this paper makes an interdisciplinary 
contribution (combining law and economics) to understanding the incentives that drive 
innovation.
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Introduction
The biotechnology industry can trace its origins to a single scientific paper.
In 1953, in a laboratory at Cambridge University, Francis Crick and James Watson 
discovered the double helix structure of the DNA molecule. In a classic “race to the 
finish”, Watson and Crick submitted a single page paper to the prestigious journal 
Nature, starting with “We wish to suggest a structure for the salt of deoxyribose nucleic 
acid (D.N.A.).” and ending with the subtle British understatement: “It has not escaped 
our notice that the specific pairing mechanism that we have postulated immediately 
suggests a possible copying mechanism for the genetic material.” (Watson and Crick, 
1953). This landmark achievement for which they were awarded the Nobel Prize for 
Chemistry in 1962, triggered a renaissance in the biological sciences. However, it would 
be several decades before this revolution in the “basic” sciences trickled downstream 
into commercial application. By this time the scientific action had moved away from the 
ivy clad halls of academic England to the more bohemian and entrepreneurial environs 
of 1970s California.
It would be nearly twenty-five later, in 1976, that two scientists working on the cutting 
edge of the genetic sciences at the University of California San Francisco are convinced 
by an adventurous venture capitalist to commercialize their ideas. Genentech, the firm 
they found, successfully engineers a synthetic version of the hormone Insulin. On the 
fourteenth of October 1980, Genentech goes public offering one million shares of stock 
for 35 US (1980) dollars a share. By the afternoon, the offering is sold out and by the
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end of the day Genentech’s stock makes market history by hitting a high of 89 US 
(1980) dollars, a record for an initial public offering (IPO) at the time (Wall Street 
Journal, 2005).
Spurred on by Genentech’s success, a host of start-ups follow and the biotechnology 
industry begins to boom. By 2002, the global biotechnology industry comprises of 
approximately 4,300 publicly listed companies posting revenues of nearly $42 billion 
(2002) US dollars (DTI, 2005). The majority of firms are still based in the U.S. and 
offer a positive vision of wealth creation and better living standards based on scientific 
progress that attract countries across the world to emulate the U.S. model. However, 
success does not come easy. For every biotech wonder, a hundred others fall by the 
wayside. What makes some biotech firms more successful than others?
Although, a large literature has emerged devoted to the strategic analysis of the 
biotechnology industry, it primarily focuses on industry structure and the strategic 
nature of R&D to the exclusion of a more nuanced model of scientific innovation. 
Specifically, the bulk of the literature relies on a “linear” view of scientific innovation 
(Rosenberg, 1990). This view assumes that basic scientific knowledge is created by 
universities and public research institutions and exists in the economy as a public good. 
Firms then freely “borrow” from this common pool of knowledge and develop 
technological products by making purposeful investments in research and development 
(R&D). Often times, there are several firms simultaneously racing towards the same 
goal. The “winners” of this R&D race are then awarded restricted monopoly rights to 
their innovations, thus providing incentives for further R&D investment.
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However, this “waterfall” view of scientific innovation has been shown to be inadequate 
(Rosenberg, 1990). The line between basic “upstream” scientific research and 
“downstream” technological development is often blurry. Firms, particularly science 
based high technology firms engage in basic scientific research as well as commercial 
development. Sometimes, firms specialize purely on scientific research and license their 
intellectual property. These high technology firms further mimic open science norms by 
regularly publishing the results of their research in peer-reviewed scientific journals 
(Hicks, 2002). In doing so, they seemingly engage in irrational behavior.
The classic model of scientific innovation presupposes that firms will choose to reveal 
as little information about their activities while engaged in an R&D race with their 
competition (Arrow, 1962; Dasgupta and David, 1994). But yet, we observe that firms 
regularly reveal information about their R&D program in peer-reviewed journals. Why 
should they do so? A number of theorists have suggested that high technology firms 
adopt open science norms in order to develop routines and skills that allow them to 
utilize effectively the advances in publicly funded research (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; 
Cockbum and Henderson, 1998). There is also evidence to suggest that adopting open 
science norms confers labor cost advantages as scientists are often willing to accept a 
lower wage in exchange for permission to continue publishing scientific papers and 
thus, maintaining their links with open research (Stem, 1999). Also, work by Zucker 
and Darby (1998) shows that “star” scientists play a key role in the success of 
biotechnology firms. These scientists often retain their links to academic institutions and 
thus participate in the dual worlds of public and private research. Finally, it may be that
14
publishing scientific papers acts as advertising signal and conveys information to the 
market and a firm’s competitors of its research trajectory and quality.
Thus, while this dual private-public behavior has been well documented, particularly for 
firms in the biotechnology industry (Murray, 2002; Henderson and Cockbum, 2003), 
the process by which these firms navigate the separate domains of public and private 
research remains unexplored. Further, there is a specific lack of empirical literature that 
investigates the private-public nature of knowledge assets. This thesis attempts to fill 
this gap by exploring the interaction between public and private science in the U.K. 
biotechnology sector.
This thesis is structured as follows. The first three chapters provide the background 
literature review that motivates this thesis. In Chapter 1 ,1 review the literature linking 
knowledge and economic growth. However, the proximate cause of growth in the 
economy is directly linked to the action of firms and in Chapter 2 I review the various 
theories of the firm giving special attention to the role of knowledge. In Chapter 3, I 
discuss various issues related to measurement of knowledge within the firm.
Chapters 4, 5, 6 are my substantive analytical chapters which focus on the incentives 
that drive knowledge creation in the biotechnology industry. Specifically, these chapters 
address the following questions:
Chapter 4. What motivates private-public collaboration? A substantial and growing 
body of work points to the increasing value of private-public interaction for the
15
performance and growth of high technology science-based firms and industries. 
However, research on the effect of this interaction on the resulting quality of a firm’s 
scientific output is scarce. In Chapter 4 , 1 address this gap by comparing the effect of 
private-public collaboration on research quality using unique data from the UK 
biotechnology sector from 1988-2001. My findings indicate that collaborative research 
with academics improves research quality, although the status of the academic 
researchers and the nature of the biotechnology firm in question are significant factors 
in determining the strength of positive effect private-public collaboration has on 
research quality. These results suggest that biotechnology firms should seek alliances 
with high status academics with established research reputations. A major policy 
implication is the need to strengthen support for public science and encourage 
collaboration across the private-public divide.
Chapter 5. Why Do Firms Make Private Knowledge Public? Firms regularly publish 
the results of their scientific research in peer-reviewed journals. However, given 
classical models of scientific innovation that assume firms reveal as little information 
about their R&D activities as possible, the motivation for making private knowledge 
public is unclear. In Chapter 5, I develop an open-science model of innovation which 
argues that while R&D expenditures reveal the commitment of a firm’s resources to 
innovation and patents record the completion of R&D activity, firms’ publication of 
scientific papers signals the quality of its innovative efforts. In biotechnology, quality of 
research is a valuable signal and publishing peer-reviewed articles allows firms to 
convince investors and potential collaborators of the worth of their ideas. This 
proposition is tested using unique data of U.K. biotechnology firms during the years
16
1988-2000. My findings indicate that research publications bring real financial gains to 
biotechnology firms and that, on average, publishing fourteen scientific papers in 
academic journals has approximately the same impact on a firm’s market value as 
obtaining a single patent. Furthermore, papers which are highly cited, particularly by 
pharmaceutical firms, have a greater impact on market value.
Chapter 6. Why are scientific papers a credible signal of research quality of 
biotechnology firms? In Chapter 6 ,1 show that biotechnology patents can be treated as 
credence goods insofar as the market for biotechnology patents is characterized by an 
asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers. This informational asymmetry is 
a result of uncertainty associated with biotechnology patents. The chief causes of 
uncertainty are the legal substance of the patent document itself, the technological and 
commercial uncertainty associated with patent value and variable quality in screening 
new innovations at the patent office when granting patents. Despite these limitations, 
firms continue to patent in increasing numbers. Thus, the market has evolved 
mechanisms to more accurately ascertain “true” patent value. These mechanisms, that I 
label, credence verifiers, include publishing scientific papers in peer reviewed journals 
and the practice of clubbing patents in patent portfolios. Studying how the market 
ascertains the value of patents has implications for the theory and reality of patenting 
behavior; and by conceptualizing biotechnology patents as credence goods, this paper 
makes an interdisciplinary contribution (combining law and economics) to 
understanding the incentives that drive innovation.
17
In my final chapter, I conclude the thesis with a summary of my main results with their 
implications for theory and practice and also generate some ideas for future work 
motivated by this thesis.
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CHAPTER 1 
Knowledge and economic growth
1.1. Introduction.
The purpose of this chapter is to review theories of economic growth, with a particular 
view to emphasize the role of knowledge in generation sustainable economic growth 
and development. The central argument that I will develop in this chapter is that ideas 
are the central proximate cause of growth and productivity. In the remainder of my 
thesis, I explore the notion of how we can more precisely quantify and define ideas, 
particularly those that are produced by scientific effort. While in this chapter, I show 
that new ideas and knowledge are central in explaining increasing returns to scale and 
continued growth per capita, there is a gap in our understanding of how to value 
knowledge and how it can be applied by firms. This is a gap that is addressed by my 
thesis.
1.2. Economic models and their ideas
Classical writers such as Mill and Marx speculated that standards of living would not 
rise indefinitely unless advances in technology served to augment the productivity of 
resources (Arrow, 1962). This proposition received analytical support from the neo­
classical growth theorists, who elaborated a model of growth based on capital 
accumulation. If production of output is characterized by diminishing returns to the 
accumulated factors, the incentive to invest may disappear in long run in the absence of
19
productivity gains. The fact that investment has continued for more than two hundred 
years since the industrial revolution suggests that technical change has played a major 
role in the growth process.
The systematic relationship between output and productivity growth rates and a number 
of economic variables suggest moreover that technological progress probably is not a 
purely random process but rather are guided by market forces. Early writers on the 
sources of technological change saw scientific discoveries as a primary, stimulating 
force behind innovation. Since scientific advances largely reflect the interests and 
resources of a community of researchers operating outside profit sector of the economy, 
a scientific basis for most industrial innovation would remove technological progress 
from the realm of economic analysis. But Schmookler (1966) took exception to this 
view of the way that technologies evolve in his influential study of almost a thousand 
inventions in four different studies. Schmookler argued in a great detail that it is the 
expected profitability of inventive activity, reflecting conditions in the relevant factor 
and product markets, that determines the pace and direction of industrial innovation. 
Schumpeter (1942) had expressed a similar more than twenty years earlier. If 
Schumpeter and Schmookler are correct, then it would not be surprising to find 
productivity growth related to an economy’s structure and policies, or to find variation 
in growth experiences in different parts of the world. This paper outlines key economic 
concepts that underlie this intuition and presents empirical evidence that support the 
theory.
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1.2.1. The Solow model: the role of technology
The Solow model is built around two equations, a production function and a capital 
accumulation equation.
The production function is assumed to have the Cobb-Douglas form and is given by:
Y = F(K ,L) = K a *l}~a 
where a  is some number from 0 and 1.
Firms in this economy pay workers a wage, w, for each unit of labor and pay r in order 
to rent a unit of capital for one period. To generate sustained growth in per capita 
income in this world, we need to introduce technological progress. We modify the 
production function so that:
Y = F(K ,AL) = K a(AL)J~a , 
where A is the “technology variable”. Technological progress occurs when A increases 
over time -  a unit of labor, for example, is more productive when the level of 
technology is higher.
An important assumption of the Solow model i s . that technological progress is 
exogenous. Instead of modelling carefully where technology comes from, we simply 
recognize for the moment that there is technological progress and make the assumption 
that A is growing at a constant rate:
— = g  <=> A = A0 • e * ,
A
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where g  is a parameter representing the growth rate of technology.
The crucial implication of this model with technology reveals that technological 
progress is the source of sustained per capita growth. According to the Solow model, 
higher investment rates and lower population growth rates allow more capital to 
accumulate per worker and thus increase labor productivity. However, without 
technological progress, per capita growth will eventually cease as diminishing returns to 
capital sets in. technological progress, however, can offset the tendency for the marginal 
product of capital to fall, and in the long run, countries exhibit per capita growth at the 
rate of technological progress. A more subtle explanation can be found by examining 
the transition dynamics of the growth trajectories. Economies can grow at rates different 
from their long-run growth rates. An economy with a capital-technology ratio below its 
long-run level will grow rapidly until the capital-technology ratio reaches its steady 
state level. However, it is very crucial to note that in Solow’s model technological 
improvements arrive exogenously at a constant rate, g, and differences in technologies 
across economies are unexplained. For a deeper understanding for the sources of growth 
we will need to examine economic models of knowledge and their impact on 
technological change.
1.2.2. The Romer model: the economics of knowledge.
Instead of assuming that growth occurs because of automatic and unmodeled 
(exogenous) improvements in technology as in the Solow model, Romer’s model 
focuses on understanding the economic forces underlying technological progress. The
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key contribution of this work is to explore the economics forces that underlie the 
production of ideas and its consequence for growth.
Basic model
The Romer model endogenizes technological progress by introducing the search for 
new ideas by researchers interested in profiting from their inventions. By modelling 
technological change as driven by research and development (R&D), the model seeks to 
understand how technological frontier is continually pushed forward.
The aggregate production function in the Romer model describes how the capital stock, 
K, and labor, Ly, combine to produce output, 7, using the stock of ideas, A:
Y = K “{ALyY a , 
where a is a parameter between 0 and 1.
For a given level of technology, A , the production function exhibits constant returns to 
scale in K  and Ly. However, when we recognize that ideas (A) are also an input into 
production, then there are increasing returns.2
The key equation that is new relative to the neo-classical model is the equation 
describing technological progress. In the neo-classical model, the productivity term A 
grows exogenously at a constant rate. In the Romer model, growth in A is endogenized. 
According to Romer, A(t) is the stock of knowledge or the number of ideas that have 
been invented over the course of history up till time t. Then, A is the number of new
2 The presence of increasing returns to scale results fundamentally from the non-rivalrous nature o f ideas.
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ideas produced at any given point in time. In the simplest version of this model, A is 
equal to the number of people attempting to discover new ideas, La, multiplied by the 
rate at which they discover new ideas, y  :
A = y -La
Labor is used either to produce new ideas or to produce output, so the economy faces 
the resource constraint:
La + Ly — L
Further,
y = y -A *,
where S, (f> are constants.
In this equation, (f> > 0 indicates that the productivity of research increases with the 
stock of ideas that have already been discovered; ^  < 0 correspond to the situation in 
which the most obvious ideas are discovered first and subsequently ideas are 
increasingly difficult to discover. Finally, (j> = 0 indicates that the tendency for the most 
obvious ideas to be discovered first exactly offsets the fact that old ideas may facilitate 
the discovery of new ideas -  i.e. the productivity of research is independent of the stock 
of knowledge.
Thus, in Romer’s model, the long-run growth rate of this economy is determined by the 
parameters of the production function for ideas and the rate of growth for researchers. 
Intuitively, this means in order to generate growth, the number of ideas must be
24
expanding over time. This occurs if the number of researchers is increasing. More 
researchers means more ideas, sustaining growth in the model.
It is interesting to compare this result to offset of population growth in the neo-classical 
growth model (the Solow model described earlier). These, for example, a higher 
population growth reduces the level of income along a balanced growth path. More 
people means that more capital is needed to keep K /L  constant, but capital runs into 
diminishing returns.
Here, new growth theory (Romer, 1990) and other theorists3 emphasize that ideas are 
very different from other economic goods. Ideas are non-rivalrous: once an idea is 
invented, it can be used by one person or one thousand people, at no additional cost. In 
particular, the non-rivalry of ideas implies that production will be characterized by 
increasing returns to scale. The incentive to create new ideas depends on the profits that 
an inventor can be expected to earn (the private benefit), not on the entire social benefit 
generated by the idea. Whether or not an idea gets created depends on the magnitude of 
the private benefit relative to the invention costs. It is easy to see, then, how ideas that 
are socially very valuable may fail to be invented if private benefits and social benefits 
are too far apart. Patents and copyrights are legal mechanisms that attempt to bring the 
private benefits of invention closer in line with the social benefits. The developments of 
such institutions and of property rights more generally, are thus crucial to sustained 
economic growth.
3 Other notable contributions to the literature on R&D-based growth models include Grossman and 
Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). These models are sometimes called Schumpeterian 
growth models, because they were anticipated by the work of Schumpeter (1942) in the late 30’s and 
early 40’s.
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1.3. Accounting for Prosperity
We have seen in the Solow model that sustained growth occurs only in the presence of 
technological progress. Without technological progress, capital accumulation runs into 
diminishing returns. With technological progress, however, improvements in 
technology continually offset the diminishing returns to capital accumulation. Labor 
productivity grows as a result, both directly because of the improvements in technology 
and indirectly because of the additional capital accumulation these improvements make 
possible.
In 1957, Solow published a second article, Technical Change and the Aggregate 
Production Function, in which he performed a simple accounting exercise to break 
down growth in output into growth in capital, growth in labor, and growth in 
technological change. This “growth accounting” exercise begins by postulating a 
production function such as
Y = BK a •L'~a
where B is a Hicks-neutral productivity term.4 Taking logs and differentiating this 
production function, one derives:
Y K  , \L  B— - a  — + (1 — a )— I—
Y K  v JL B
This equation states that output growth is equal to a weighted average of capital and 
labor growth plus the growth rate of B. this last term, B lB , is commonly referred to as 
total factory productivity growth (TFP). Solow, as well as economists such as Edward
4 In fact, this growth accounting can be done with a much more general production function such as 
B(i )f (K,L)  and the results are very similar (Solow, 1957).
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Denison and Dale Jorgenson who followed Solow’s approach, have used this equation 
to understand the sources of growth in input (see Solow, 1957). Using this approach on 
historical data on the United States, Solow (1957) revealed that accounting for growth 
due to capital formation and that due to growth in the labor force: still left a significant 
share that remains unexplained by growth in inputs to the production function. One 
interpretation of this “residual” growth is that it is due to technological change (see 
Romer, 1989). In an influential paper published in 1992, A Contribution to the Empires 
o f Economic Growth, Gregory Mankiw, David Romer, and David Weil evaluated the 
empirical implications of the Solow model and concluded that it performed very well.5 
Further the fit of the model was greatly improved by extending it to include human 
capital -  that is, by recognizing that labor in different economies may possess different 
levels of education and different skills. Investigating the relationship in Romer’s (1992) 
model of endogenous growth attributable to levels of knowledge stocks, we run against 
some difficulty. As some fundamental level it is difficult to measure both the inputs to 
the production function, the ideas themselves.
However, data such as R&D, the number of scientists and engineers engaged in an 
economy and patent counts are common measures used to proxy the stock of 
“knowledge” in an economy. Various proxies for human capital, such as the literacy 
rate (Azariades and Drazen, 1990; Romer, 1989) and the school enrolment rate (Baumol 
et al 1989, Barro, 1989) correlate positively with real GDP growth. Romer (1989) finds 
a positive correlation between the number of scientists and engineers employed in
5 Mankiw, Romer and Weil allow an economy to accumulated human capital in the same way as physical 
capital -  by foregoing consumption (see Romer, 1990).
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research and the growth rate of output in a sample of 22 of the most developed 
countries.6
There are several well known problems that arise in interesting results from growth 
accounting exercises. First, GDP growth may not accurately measure growth in 
economic output because increases in the quality and variety of goods and services 
available to consumers are only imperfectly related in the national income accounts. 
The measurement of the contribution of new and improved varieties to real output 
growth requires the implementation of sophisticated index number procedures. It is 
generally believed that reported price indexes often underestimate the economic benefits 
from product innovations (e.g., see Griliches, 1973; Bresnahan, 1986; Trajtenberg, 
1990), in which growth accounting will understate the extent output growth attributable 
to technology. In separating the contribution of “knowledge stocks” to output growth, 
knowledge (i.e., the accumulation of R&D investment less estimated depreciation) is 
heated as an ordinary, accumulated input, along with tangible factors such as capital and 
labor. Of course one cannot directly observe the reward paid to the knowledge stock as 
most of the returns are hidden in data on corporate profits. So an independent estimate 
of the rate of return is estimated econometrically using cross-sectional data on firms or 
industries. However, only the “direct returns” to R&D (i.e., the returns that accrue to the 
firm or industry that conducts the R&D) are captured by these methods. Various 
empirical work (for a review see, Mansfield et al 1977; Scherer, 1982) has shown that 
research effort often generate sizeable spill over benefits. Further, those external
6 Griliches (1979) reviews the approaches that have been used to measure the contribution of R&D to 
economic growth, and discusses the methodological and data problems associated with each one —»■ more 
empirical reviews.
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benefits may not be concentrated in a single industry but rather may be spread to many 
sectors in the economy.
1.4. Concluding Remarks
New growth theory clearly places knowledge centre stage as the primary driver of 
economic growth. As suggested by the Solow model: growth ceases unless the 
technology of production increases exponentially. The Romer model reveals that it is 
the production and dissemination of ideas that makes this possible. Particularly, it is the 
non-rivalrous property of ideas that causes increasing returns to production. The 
presence of increasing returns to scale means that we cannot model that economics of 
ideas using perfect competition.
Firms must be able to charge prices greater than marginal cost to cover the one-time 
expense required to create an idea. It is this wedge between price and marginal cost that 
provides the economic “fuel” for the engine of growth. The non-rivalrous property of 
ideas thus requires institutions such as intellectual property rights to provide incentives 
for firms to invest in the production of new knowledge. Thus, we find that management 
is always the proximate cause of growth and productivity. In other words, even with 
Adam Smith’s invisible hand, a competitive system produces optimal results because a 
competitive market is always rewarding well-managed firms at the expense of poorly 
managed firms. One distinguishing feature therefore, between a good and a bad firm 
may be the knowledge that they possess. In the next chapter I explore this idea more 
fully.
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Chapter 2 
Knowledge and the firm
2.1. Introduction
While the previous chapter set the stage by establishing the role of knowledge and 
innovation in economic growth, the search for the internal determinants of innovative 
activity is in its infancy. The task of this chapter is to survey various knowledge-based 
theories of the firm. I begin by reviewing various classical theories of the firm and 
outlining their shortcomings. It goes on to describe more recent theories of the firm, 
particularly those built on knowledge-based perspectives. The chapter concludes by 
summarizing the main conclusions of the existing literature while suggesting 
possibilities for future development. The analytical goal of this chapter is to establish 
the importance of knowledge as a resource in firm capability and sets the stage for my 
empirical research in the subsequent chapter on how firms in the biotechnology industry 
build and sustain their competitive advantage.
2.2. Theories of the firm
The cornerstone of formal economic theory is a price mechanism. An economic theorist 
thinks of the economic system as a being coordinated by the price mechanism wherein 
price movements direct decisions of production and consumption through a series of 
market transactions. Traditionally neo-classical economics worked within a strict 
dichotomy - in the long run all factors of production (i.e. all resources) are variable and
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there is no distinctive role for intuitions such as firms. In the short run, when at least one 
factor, usually capital, is fixed, the firm has a role but this is usually confined to making 
an optimal price/output decision with regard to prevailing factor and product prices. 
Thus the neo-classical theory of the firm, at least in its standard manifestations, turns 
out to be something of a misnomer for a theory of the short run behaviour of markets.
One of the earliest theorists to grapple with this fundamental dichotomy presented by 
the neo-classical of the firm was Coase (1937). In his classic article, “The theory of the 
firm”, he poses the question asked earlier by Adam Smith, “How is the cooperation of 
the vast numbers of people in counties all over the world, which is necessary for even a 
modest standard of living, to be brought about?”. Coase argues that there are two 
possibilities for the economic organization of productivity -  contracts with independent 
contractors over the market and contracts with employees organized within a business 
firm; and whichever is cheaper will be adopted.
In Coase’s words, “there would be an optimum of planning since a firm, that little 
planned society, could only continue to exist if it performed its coordination function at 
a lower cost than this same function could be performed by another firm”. Thus it may 
be profitable to establish a firm if the cost of sing the price mechanism exceeds that of 
organizing the allocation of factor inputs internally within a firm. This will be so if the 
workings of economic markets are not costless. The most obvious cost of “organising” 
production through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices
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are7. Further the costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each 
exchange transaction which takes place on a market must also be taken into account.
While it is true, that contracts are not eliminated when there is a firm, they are greatly 
reduced. Also, a firm allows for long-term contracts for the supply of some factor input, 
thus reducing the need for repeated short term market based transactions. There is 
considerable evidence to support this argument. For example, the classical economic 
analysis of a vertical integration hinges on the idea that vertical integration is a 
monopolizing device that is employed to create barriers to entry that extend or protect 
monopoly power. Coase (1937) claimed that vertical integration can be understood 
more clearly if one took into account transaction costs rather than focusing on classic 
monopoly and cartel economic analyses. He argues that businessmen bring a part of the 
process of production within the firm, rather than arranging for it by contract with other 
producers, when the cost of co-ordinating the firm’s inputs by market transactions 
exceeds the cost of co-ordinating them hierarchically.
Following on the fundamental work of Coase, theorists (Williamson, 1975, Demsetz, 
1982) conceptualized a theory of transaction costs on the basis of employment contracts 
within the firm being more efficient then contracting on the external market. Thus, this 
stream of research is concerned with the costs of search, metering and monitoring 
associated with the transfer of resources and products across markets and within 
organizations. Particularly, asset specificity with its implications of small numbers 
bargaining, co-dependence and vulnerability to hold-up has emerged as the most
7 This cost may be reduced but not eliminated by the emergence of specialists who sell this information.
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important impediment to contractual relations among opportunistic agents. Further, 
there is now a vibrant empirical tradition that reports strong support for the role of 
transaction cost drivers in determining a wide variety of institutional outcomes 
(Shelanski and Klein 1995).
This stream of research that seeks to explain the existence of firms in light of their
apparent irrelevance in the neo-classical system has come to be classified more broadly
as organizational economics. This school of thought has developed as a collection of
partially overlapping schools including evolutionary theory (Nelson and Winter, 1982),
property rights theory (Demsetz, 1974), transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975)
£
and the positive theory of agency (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
However, the two branches of organizational economics most directly concerned with 
firm organization are transaction cost economics and positive theory of agency. Both 
approaches share the assumption of opportunism and each defines an efficient set of 
institutional arrangements as one that minimizes the sum of organizational and 
production costs. Particularly, the positive theory of agency identifies costs of 
monitoring and bonding as necessary in making viable economic relations between a 
self-interested, opportunistic agent and principal. It suggests that organizational 
evolution will favour the emergence of arrangements that minimize the sum of these
8 Detailed comparisons between several or all of them are available elsewhere. For an extensive review 
see Mahoney and Pandian, 1992. Note: Organizational economics is interchangeably referred to as “new- 
institutional economics” (Williamson, 1975).
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incurred costs plus deadweight costs that arise from potentially useful collaborative 
relations rendered non-viable by the agency problem (Fama and Jensen, 1983).9
Although both transaction cost minimization and agency cost minimization have strong 
methodological similarities, each has tended to be applied to somewhat different 
problems. Transaction cost economics has been used extensively to explain the location 
of the appropriate boundaries for the firm. Thus decisions on vertical integration are the 
“make/buy” choice, the use of franchising or company outlets the use of joint- versus 
wholly-owned ventures have been analyzed extensively in transaction terms. Since 
these are key strategic decisions of managers, much of this work has appeared within 
the strategy literature (see Mahoney and Pandian, 1992). By contrast, much work with 
the principal theory of agency framework concentrates upon the important agency 
relationship between stockholders and managers. It typically centres on the success of 
market and non-market governance arrangements in securing an alignment of interest 
between the two groups.
While those theories dealt with the fundamental paradox of the neo-classical theory of
the firm (i.e. why should it exist) by taking a static equilibrium approach, they fail to
address a central concern of strategy research -  how do firms build and sustain
competitive advantage? To do so, newer theories have placed the accumulation and
deployment of knowledge as a key strategic asset. For example, recent work by
Kretschmer and Puranam (2005) examines how firms secure competitive advantage via
managing their firm boundaries. In tandem, newer theories have also arisen that place
9 It is distinguished from the more formal research of principal-agent theory that typically looks to derive 
an optimal contract, one that maximizes the principal’s welfare whilst securing the agent’s continuing 
participation.
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the accumulation and deployment of knowledge as a key strategic asset. I discuss these 
theories and their implications in the following section.
2.3. Knowledge-based prescriptions in the search for rent
2.3.1. The search for rent
According to Penrose (1959) and Rumelt (1984, 1987) the primary purpose of a firm is 
to create, exploit and defend sources of economic rent, where rent is defined as return in 
excess of a resource owner’s opportunity costs (Tollison, 1982). The field of strategy 
research is concerned with this question. Broadly speaking, there are two sets of ideas 
that contribute in this debate. The first set of ideas come under the rubric of industrial 
organisation theory and can trace their roots in the early work of the economics of 
imperfect competition by Chamberlain (1933) and was ultimately popularized by 
Michael Porter in his now classic book, Competitive Strategy (1990).
The field of industrial organization can arguably be divided into two camps; the 
Harvard school after Bain (1954, 1968) and the Chicago School (Stigler, 1968). While 
both those firms emphasize that the rent behavior of firms is largely determined by the 
“structure” of competition, they differ on their views of the sustainability of these rents.
The sustainability of rents in the IO framework is supported by the concept of entry 
barriers at the industry level and mobility barriers at the strategic group level (Caves and 
Porter, 1977; McGee and Thomas, 1986). These entry and mobility barriers are a private
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collective asset of an industry’s (strategic group’s) incumbents, and investments to 
augment these assets are subject to free-riding and under provision. These rent 
generating barriers can take the form of investments that entail high exit barriers and 
high switching (Porter, 1986); high sunk cost investments that advantage incumbents 
(Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982); legal restrictions to entry (Stigler, 1968); economies 
of scale that might combine with imperfect markets (Bain, 1968) or learning and 
experience curve advantages that are kept proprietary (Lieberman, 1987; Spence, 1981).
The Chicago school views questions whether economies of scale, advertising and R&D 
expenditure can ever be a sustainable barrier to entry (Demsetz, 1974, 1982; Stigler, 
1968) whereas the Porter-Bain framework of the Harvard school posits sustainable 
monopoly rents. However, neither school grapples directly with firm heterogeneity 
(such as differential worker ability and managerial strategies) as a source sustainable 
competitive advantage focusing instead on industry level effects on firm performance.
A contrasting set of ideas come under the heading of “the resource based view of the 
firm” (RBV) suggest rents are owed to the internal structure of assets within the firm10. 
An asset can be physical or it can be intangible (and indeed it can be even impossible to 
isolate and understand). Further development of RBV has led to the notion that assets 
that can be imitated or duplicated cannot yield rent owing to the forces of competition 
and imitation. To simplify the case: with imitability rents disappear; without it, rents 
continue. Further, RBV theorists suggest that knowledge may be the key source of rent,
10 In addition rents can accrue from start-up costs and sunk cost effects which prevent existing firms from 
adopting new and better technologies. Therefore rents are not only related to RBV theories but also the 
theories of procrastination and slow diffusion of ideas and technology (see Penrose, 1959).
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and the process by which knowledge is created and utilized in organizations may be the 
key inimitable resource that could create sustainable rents (Spender and Grant, 1996).
2.3.2 The “Resource-based view” (RBV) model and Knowledge
The notion that firms are fundamentally heterogeneous, in terms of their resources and 
internal capabilities has long been at the heart of strategic management beginning with 
Penrose’s classic work, The theory o f strategic growth o f the firm (1959). Those firms 
which are superior relative to those of rival in terms of organizational competencies and 
resources achieve superior returns if they are matched appropriately to environmental 
opportunities (Barney, 1991). Those ideas may be thought of as the basic principles 
upon which resource-based research continues to build. However, the major 
contribution of the resource-based model is that it explicitly seeks to theoretically 
explain persistent differences in inter-firm profitability that cannot be attributed to 
differences in industry conditions. Indeed several econometric and empirical studies 
have indicated that firm-effects are substantial (Mueller, 1986; Hansen and Wemerfelt, 
1989; Rumelt, 1991). The resource-based model is a theoretical complement to this 
work.
In its search for firm specific resources that could sustain competitive advantage, the 
resource based view places “knowledge” centre stage. Winter (1988) holds that business 
firms are fundamentally organizations that know how to do things and that they perform 
their functions as “repositories of knowledge” (pp. 175). Prahalad and Hamel (1990), in 
developing the concept of core competencies emphasize that core competencies are the
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collective learning in the organization, especially their ability to coordinate diverse 
production skills and integrate multiple streams of technologies.11 Further, Kogut and 
Zander (1992) comment that the crucial contribution of the RBV is the realisation that 
knowledge underlies the set of capabilities that sustain firms’ competitive advantage. 
Lippman and Rumelt (1982) formally link the existence of privately held knowledge, in 
the form of causal ambiguity, to a firms’ ability to learn above-normal returns through 
productive activity. Thus it is the existence of knowledge in the hands of a small 
number of firms that creates the market imperfections necessary to generate rents for the 
firm. Put another way, it is proprietary knowledge that creates comparative knowledge 
for the firm (Cyert et al, 1993).
It can thus be argued that most firms rely on knowledge, be it process, product or 
otherwise, in order to deliver a sustainable competitive advantage in the marketplace. 
Oftentimes, the ability to convey this information to the marketplace or to competitors 
can be advantageous. In contract theory, signalling is the idea that one party (called the 
agent) conveys some meaningful information about itself to another party (called the 
principal). The seminal work in this area is Spence’s job-market signalling model 
(Spence, 2002) where employees successfully signal the level of their skill by acquiring 
education rather than entering the job market earlier on (thus forsaking wages for 
education).
Like the job market, there are numerous other examples in which inequalities in access
to information upset the normal market for the exchange of goods and services.
11 Also see Teece et al (1990): “ ...It is not only the bundle o f resources that matter but the mechanisms by 
which firms leam and accumulate new skills and capabilities, and the forces that limit the rate and 
direction of this process.” (p. 11)
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Signalling theory solves this problem by proposing that two parties could get around the 
problem of asymmetric information by having one party send a signal that would reveal 
some piece of information to the other party thus bridging the informational gap. Thus, 
the market evolves a signalling equilibrium in which the sender signals honestly and the 
receiver trusts that information.
This insight is particularly relevant in knowledge intensive industries such as science 
based firms (ex., biotechnology firms). Typically, these firms, in their early years, do 
not have strong profits or products. Instead, they have a portfolio of patents backed by 
R&D. In such circumstances, it is crucial for the firm to accurately convey to the market 
(be it potential investors, the stock market, or potential customers) the worth of their 
knowledge. How might firms do this? Later in this thesis, I argue that by publishing 
scientific papers firms signal the worth of their knowledge to the marketplace. Scientific 
publications are peer reviewed and hence act as an independent verifier of knowledge 
that the market can trust as an honest and accurate account of a firm’s knowledge base.
Placing knowledge centre stage still leaves the problem of how we identify and measure 
such knowledge resources. Much of the earlier empirical research focused upon R&D 
expenditure as inputs into knowledge creation and patents as outputs. Although patents 
are very satisfactory indicators of knowledge creation in terms of being documented 
knowledge whose novelty has been verified by a meticulous, legalistic research process, 
not only are patents a very partial measure of production of organizational knowledge, 
but patenting is itself a strategic choice. Griliches (1990) noted that industries varied 
widely in their propensity to patent. At the firm level, success at patenting does not 
necessarily correspond to success in translating patents into competitive advantage.
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Likewise Narin, Noma and Perry (1987) have shown that much patenting activity is 
defensive and strategic, not fitting into the simpler model of the patent as a 
straightforward transitional step between R&D and production. Strategic patenting may 
be less to do with building up knowledge than with sealing off an area from exploitation 
by other, so adding value to patents already held.
Broadening ideas about what constitutes knowledge within the firm has been associated 
closely with the work of Michael Polanyi (1962) on tacit knowledge and Nelson and 
Winter (1982) on organizational routines. This work has been especially influential in 
directing attention to knowledge which is embodied in individual and organizational 
practices that cannot be readily articulated. Such knowledge is of critical strategic 
importance because, unlike explicit knowledge, it is both inimitable and appropriable. 
However, these very variables which are most theoretically interesting are those which 
are at least identifiable and measurable. Polanyi (1962) reaches into this contradiction 
with his notion of tacit knowledge, implying that a knowledge-based theory of the firm 
differs from all previous theories in that it must grasp the potentially unknowable.
Despite the epistemological difficulties that pinning down definitions of knowledge 
entails, there is a growing body of literature that explores how firms create and exploit 
knowledge in their search for rents. It has been shown that despite the “weightless” 
(Quah, 1992) nature of ideas and their potential to diffuse widely, the production and 
spread of knowledge tends to be spatially concentrated (Jaffe, Trajtenberg and 
Henderson, 1993; Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Krugman, 1983). Thus, innovative high 
technology firms exploring new areas of technology tend to cluster geographically tied
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to specific institutional variables. These clusters arise out of “spillovers” that result in 
the production of new knowledge given that for new technology based firms often 
working on the cutting edge of their field; proximity among partners such as other new 
technology based firms, universities and research institutes allows for face-to-face
19interaction and unplanned communication which is often a crucial factor for success 
(Jensen and Thusby, 2001). Further, a great deal of knowledge is created and 
transmitted in the context of communities of individuals linked by common 
identification to their work. The role of these “epistemic” communities in generating 
knowledge has been studied in the context of physicists and molecular biologists 
(Knorr-Cetina, 1999)13; researchers engaged in the design of a new technological 
artefact (Garud and Rappa, 1994); and aerospace engineers (Knorr-Cetina, 1999)14.
These scholars suggest that the “stickiness” of knowledge is not so much a function of 
its underlying degree of tacitness, but reflects its embedded-ness in epistemic 
communities who share common cognitive frames, norms of communication, and rules 
governing the creation, validation, and selection of new ideas and artefacts. Thus the 
strategic dimension of knowledge flows is conditioned by the social organization of the 
individuals who collectively generate the knowledge. Firms accrue dependable 
advantages when social identification within the firm is strong and firm-specific 
organizing principles guide the development and application of new knowledge (Kogut 
and Zander, 1992). But the identification of employees with wider work-based
12 Reflecting the “tacit” nature of knowledge (Polanyi, 1962; Dosi, Teece and Winter, 1992).
13 Epistemic cultures is Knorr-Cetina’s term to describe communities identified with the process of 
creating knowledge itself, e.g., research scientists.
14 The idea of epistemic communities is echoed in technological communities to describe populations 
engaged in the construction of complex, interdependent technologies (Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Garud and 
Rappa, 1994).
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communities increases the porosity of firm boundaries around the creation and 
transmission of knowledge. Brown and Duguid (2001) point out that “as a result of the 
two strands of identification -  one in the organization, one in the network -  members of 
a particular community are likely to have divided loyalties... which strand communities 
favour or disfavour will have a significant effect on the direction in which knowledge 
flows”.
The problem of knowledge creation and exploitation in the context of work-based 
communities has recently resurfaced in studies in studies of science-based firms, which 
primarily depend on research scientists to innovate. Rather there being clear distinctions 
between proprietary knowledge created by rent-seeking firms and the “open” 
knowledge of academic communities, there is evidence to show that there are complex 
interdependencies linking their co-evolution (Murray 2002). Firm scientists collaborate 
with university scientists to “remain in the flow” of scientific information and improve 
the productivity of their own research (Cockbum and Henderson, 1998). Conversely, 
university scientists (often “star scientists”) are a strong driver in the biotech industry as 
they start-up or link closely with biotech firms while maintaining their employment in 
academe. Given this intense cross-fertilization it is interesting to note conflicting 
tensions between the logic of the rent-seeking firm and the norms of the epistemic 
communities to which the researchers belong. The mechanisms by which knowledge is 
jointly created by these overlapping communities of science and technology are just 
beginning to be explored and their future elucidation hold significant promise for the 
theory of the firm.
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2.4. Conclusions
This chapter began by reviewing the classical theory of the firm and its shortcomings. In 
particular, the role of management and firm heterogeneity paved the way for a more 
realistic theory of the business firm. Following on Coase’s (1937) seminal work 
developed by transaction cost theorists; we reviewed various theories in organizational 
and industrial economics that attempts to build a theory of the firm with the explicit 
motivation of understanding how heterogeneous firms build and sustain competitive 
advantage. Of these theories, the resource based view is seen as the most promising with 
the emphasis on the role of knowledge as a rent bearing resource. While there is 
significant empirical evidence to support its overall thesis, work lies ahead in 
delineating the specific mechanisms by which firms create and deploy resources in their 
search for economic rent. Particularly, challenges lie in unlocking the processes that 
govern knowledge-based resources. As a first step, it is necessary to understand how 
knowledge can be measured at the level of the firm. I expand upon this topic in the next 
chapter.
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Chapter 3 
Measuring Knowledge
3.1. Introduction
Economic theory has firmly placed “knowledge” centre-stage as the key economic asset 
that drives long-run economic performance. Yet “knowledge”, “innovation” and 
“technological change” are elusive notions, difficult to conceptualize and even harder to 
measure in a consistent, systematic way. Thus while economists from Adam Smith on 
have amply recognized their crucial role in shaping the process of economic growth, our 
ability to study these phenomena has been rather limited. The last several decades have 
seen a number of pioneering attempts to overcome these measurement problems and 
gather data that can be used for the systematic empirical analysis of technological 
change. This paper reviews the progress made in this direction. Section 3.2 reviews the 
use of patent data focusing on its use in determining corporate performance in high 
technology industries. A major contribution of this thesis is to extend the analysis of 
innovation to include bibliometric measures of scientific publications as a measure of 
the science-base in high technology, science-heavy industries such as biotechnology. I 
review the use of bibliometric measures of innovation in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 
concludes.
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3.2. The use of patent data
3.2.1. An overview
The origins of the quantitative analysis of technological change lie in the immediate 
post WW2 period. The path-breaking findings of Abramowitz (1956) and Solow (1957) 
that there was a large “residual” of aggregate productivity growth that could not be 
explained by capital accumulation opened up a whole new and exciting research 
frontier. In parallel, and responding to the challenge posed by the productivity black box 
identified in those studies, empirical microeconomic analysis of the underlying 
phenomena of invention and innovation were also undertaken. A landmark volume, 
edited by Richard Nelson (1962). The Rate and Direction o f Inventive Activity, brought 
together these early lives of enquiry and set the agenda for future work in this area. 
Nelson’s volume (1962), best known perhaps for the classic paper by Kenneth Arrow 
that formalized the market failure inherent in research, contains also a less-cited but 
visionary paper by Simon Kuznets15 on the difficulties of measuring the results of the 
results of the inventive process. Kuznets’ paper raised many of the issues that permeate 
the study of technological change to this day. He discussed the problems of defining and 
measuring the magnitude of inventions; the relationship between the technological and 
economic significance of an invention; the distinction between the cost of producing an 
invention and the value it creates; and the consequences of the highly skewed 
distribution of invention values.
15 Kuznets, S., 1962. Inventive activity: Problems of definition and measurement. In Nelson, R.R. (ed), 
The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity. Princeton University Press.
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A parallel pioneering stream of literature can be seen in the work of Jacob Schmookler 
(1966). Schmookler methodically went through (non-computerized) patent records to 
compile hundreds of the time-series of patent totals by industry, going back over a 
century. He also gave careful attention to the methodological issues arising from the use 
of these data, particularly the difficulty of identifying patents with particular industries 
based on their technological classification by the patent office. Using these data, 
Schmookler provide strong evidence for the role of market forces in shaping the rate 
and direction of inventive activity. More important in the long run, he demonstrated that 
patent statistics, though perhaps cumbersome to accumulate and subject to issues of 
misinterpretation, provide a unique source of systematic information about the incentive 
process.
Building on those early pioneers, in the late 1970’s, Zvi Griliches took advantage of the 
computerization of the US Patent Office records, to launch a major research initiative on 
the innovation process. This research produced important conceptual developments in 
modelling the research process and the role of patents over the next ten years. In an 
important step that brought theory closer to the empirical world, Griliches (1979) and 
Griliches and Pakes (1984) extended and refined the concept of “the knowledge 
production function”, a stochastic relationship in which current R&D investment, the 
firm’s existing stock of knowledge, and the knowledge from other sources combine to 
produce new knowledge. Patents can be viewed as a noisy indicator of the success of 
this stochastic knowledge production process, with the “propensity to patent” -  the ratio 
of patents to the unobservable knowledge production -  possibility varying over time and
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institutions. Griliches (1979) also suggested that the possibility of excess social returns 
in research should be explicitly modelled in relationship to flows of knowledge between 
and among different economic agents.
Schankerman and Pakes (1985, 1986) took another original track, using information on 
fees paid for the renewal of patents in European countries. These data allowed them to 
estimate the distribution of (private) patent values, as induced by the frequencies of 
renewal and the magnitude of renewal fees at every stage. This line of research provided 
firm empirical evidence on the extent of heterogeneity in patent values, and also stimuli 
for further research using novel aspects of patent data (Pakes and Simpson, 1989).
3.2.2. Patents
A patent is a document, issued by an authorized governmental agency, granting the right 
to exclude anyone else from the production or use of a specific new advice, apparatus, 
or process for a stated number of years. The grant is issued to the inventor of this device 
or process after an examination that focuses on both the novelty of the claimed item and 
its potential utility. The right embedded in the patent can be assigned by the inventor to 
somebody else, usually to his employer, a corporation, and/or sold to or licensed for use 
by any interested party. This right can be enforced only by the potential threat of or and 
actual suit in the courts for infringement damages. The stated purpose of the patent 
system is to encourage invention and technical progress both by providing a temporary 
monopoly for the inventor and by forcing the early disclosure of the information
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necessary for production of this item or the operation of the new process.16 The standard 
of novelty and utility imposed on the granting of such a right is not very high. Although 
there is some variation across countries and through time, roughly speaking two out of 
three applications are eventually granted (Griliches, 1990). Thus the number of patents 
is currently in excess of 6 million, and the flow is over 150,000 patents per year (as of 
1999-2000).
Each patent produces a highly structured document containing detailed information on 
the innovation itself, the technological area to which it belongs, the inventors (e.g., their 
geographical location), and the organization (if any) to which the inventors assign the 
patent property right. Patents also include references or citations to previous patents and 
to the scientific literature. Unlike bibliographic citations, patent citations perform an 
important legal function, in helping to delimit the patent grant by identifying “prior art” 
that is not covered by a given patent grant.
Several problems crop up in using patents for economic analysis. The first is primarily a 
technical problem. How does one allocate patent data organized by firms or by 
substantive patent classes into economically relevant industry or product groupings? 
The second problem is fundamentally much harder to resolve: it refers to the obvious 
fact that patents differ greatly in their technical and economic significance. Many of 
them reflect minor improvements of little economic value. Some of them, however, 
prove, extremely valuable. How does one then attach “weights” to patents that capture 
this heterogeneity?
16 There is an extensive literature on the relative merits and demerits of the patent system as a means of 
encouraging innovation. However, this discussion is outside the scope o f this paper. See Oddi, 1996.
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In resolving the first problem, one has to face the inherent ambiguity in the task. Do we 
want to assign the invention to the industry in which it was made (“origin”), to the 
industry that is likely to produce it, or to the industry that will use the resulting product 
or process and whose productivity may benefit thereby (destination or industry of 
“use”)? Consider, as an example, the case of a new plow invented in a chemical firm’s 
research laboratory as part of its project on new combined fertilizer and tillage systems. 
It depends on what questions is to be asked of the data. If we want to study the returns 
to R&D expenditures we may wish to count it in the chemical industry whence the 
money came to develop it. If  we want to analyze the impact of technological change on 
the rate of investment, on the sale of new equipment, we may want to count it in the 
form of equipment industry. If  we are interested in its effects on measured productivity 
we are more likely to count it as being relevant to agriculture.
The analysis of firm-level data; for example, relating patents to R&D investment and 
the subsequent fortunes of the firms where they had been originally developed; presents 
its own problems. The extensive diversification of many firms and also the various 
merger waves create severe technical problems in trying to use the patent data even at 
the individual firm level. What is noted on the patent is the name of the organization to 
which it has been assigned. This organization can easily be a subsidiary or a separate 
division of a larger company. Further, a company may change its name and/or may 
merge. In high technology industries such as biotechnology; patents are often licensed 
to third parties or owned by individual inventors or universities who license them to
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biotech firm and/or pharma. This overlapping network of ownership makes it difficult to 
assign patents to individual firms in a straightforward way.
The second, more fundamental difficulty arises because the economic significance of 
individual patents is so variable making it hard to estimate the average value of patent 
rights, the average value of the invention represented by a particular patent, and the 
dispersion in both these concepts. Looking at patents as indicators of success of the 
underlying inventive activity, we are mainly interested in the second concept (i.e. 
average value of the invention represented by a particular patent). The available data, 
however, are mostly informative only about the first: the value associated with the 
differential legal situation created by the possession of the patent.
There are basically three sources of data on this topic: 1. Results of direct surveys of 
patent owners or assignees about past returns and the potential market value of those 
rights, 2. The valuation implicit in the decision, whether to pay a fee to renew the 
patent, 3. Econometric analyses of the relationship of some other value-denominated 
variable, such as profits of stock market value, to the number of patents (An example is 
the use of patent numbers as a proxy for “intangible” capital in stock market value of 
the firm regressions). It is this last line of research that this paper will focus on.
The use of stock market values as an “output” indicator of the research process has one 
major advantage. All other indicators of success, such as profits or productivity, are 
only likely to reflect it slowly and erratically. On the other hand, when an event occurs 
that causes the market to re-evaluate the accumulated output of a firm’s research
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endeavours, its full effect on the expected present vale of a firm’s future net cash flows 
is recorded immediately. This, of course, need not equal what will eventually 
materialize. The downside of this type of measurement is the large volatility in stock 
market measures. The needle might be there but the haystack can be very large.
The simplest market value model starts from the market valuation identity, with the 
market value of the firm proportional to its physical (“tangible”) and intangible capital, 
the latter being in the part the product of its past R&D investments and possibly also 
reflected in its accumulated patent position (Griliches, 1981; Ben-Zion, 1984; Cockbum 
and Griliches, 1988). The model, in its simplest form, can be written as:
V = q(A + gK) = qA(\ + g K/A)  (Equation 3.1)
where V is the market value of the firm, A is the current replacement cost of its 
intangible assets, K  is the level of intangible (“knowledge”) capital and g  is the relative 
shadow price, and q is the current premium or discount of market value over the 
replacement cost of tangible assets.17
Writing q as exp(a+u); where a represents individual firm differences in average 
valuation due to the exclusion of other unmeasured capital components or market 
position variables, taking logarithms, and approximating log(l+x) = x, we can rewrite 
the estimating equation as:
ln£? = ln(F/A)= a + qK/ A + u (Equation 3.2)
17 This equation would hold exactly in a world in which all assets were fully traded in the same market. 
More generally, such an equation is valid in a multi-capital setting only under very stringent conditions, 
such as the linear homogeneity of the profit function. See Wildasin (1984) and Hayashi and Inoue (1990) 
for more discussion.
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where the dependent variable is now defined as the logarithm of Tobin’s O (Wildasen, 
1984).
Using different measures of current and past patents and current and past R&D 
expenditures as proxies for K , it is possible to estimate this kind of equation. It has been 
observed that for the most part, R&D is the “stronger” variable. The evidence for 
additional information in the patent variable varies from sample to sample and depends 
on which variables are included in the equation (Griliches, 1990). Further, patents are 
estimated to contain a significant noise component (a component whose variance is not 
related to either the R&D or the stock market rate of return. This noise component 
accounts for only a small fraction of the large differences in the number of patent 
applications of different firms (about 25% in study by Pakes, 1985) but plays a much 
larger role among the smaller fluctuations that occur in the patent applications of a 
given firm over time (about 95%). Similarly, the effect of unexpected increases in 
patents on market value is highly variable. Nevertheless, there is still some information 
in the time-series dimension. If we were to observe, for example, a sudden large burst in 
the patent applications of a given firm, we would be quite sure that events have occurred 
to cause a large change in the market value of its R&D program. By the same token, 
smaller changes in the patent application of a given firm are not likely to be very 
informative.
The timing of the response patents and R&D to events that change the value of a firm’s 
R&D effort is quite similar. One gets the impression from the estimates that such events 
cause a chain reaction, including an increase in R&D expenditures far into the future,
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and that firms patent around the links of this chain almost as quickly as they are 
completed, resulting in a rather close relationship between R&D expenditures and the 
number of patents applied for. Perhaps surprisingly, Pakes (1985, 1995) finds no 
evidence that independent charges in the number of patents applied for (independent of 
current and earlier R&D expenditures) produce significant effects on the market’s 
valuation of the firm. Hence it is not possible to distinguish between demand shocks 
(where demand shocks are defined as events that cause increases in patenting only 
through the R&D expenditures they induce, and technology or supply shocks that may 
have direct effect on patents as well as indirect effect via induced R&D demand.
It is not at all obvious whether one can separate “demand” from “supply” factors in this 
area. Patent data is thus useful if one were willing to assume that independent, 
“unanticipated” shifts in the level of patenting by firms represent shifts in technological 
opportunities and not responses to external shocks. That is, the identifying assumption 
is that the “news” component in the patent statistics reflects technological “news”, the 
information that a particular line of research has turned out to be more (or less) fruitful 
or easier (harder) than expected when the decision to invest in it was originally made. 
Changes in technological opportunity are thus identified with “abnormal”, “unexpected” 
bursts (or declines) in the number of patents applied for.
Several implications of this analysis are immediate. Id patent statistics contain 
additional information about shifts in technological opportunity, then they should be 
correlated with current changes in market value above and beyond their current 
relationship with R&D and they should affect R&D levels in the future, even in the
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presence of the change in market value variable because the latter variable is measured 
with much error: in other words, patents should “cause” R&D (Pakes, 1985). The 
available evidence on this point is not very encouraging. Griliches (1981) did find a 
significant independent effect of patents on the market value of firms, above and beyond 
their R&D expenditures, but Pakes did not detect a significant influence of lagged 
patents on R&D in the presence of lagged R&D and the stock market rate of return 
variables. Nor did Hall, Griliches and Hausman (1986) find future R&D affecting 
current patenting as the “causality” argument might have implied. Griliches, Hall and 
Pakes (1990) replicate some of Pakes’ computations on a larger sample (340 firms) and 
expand his equation system to add equations for sales, employment, and investment. 
Their results indicate that the addition of the latter variables is helpful, in the sense that 
fluctuations in their growth rates are related to fluctuations in both the growth rate of 
R&D and the stock market rate of return and hence should help in identifying the 
relationship we are interested in. but the expansion of the sample to include many small 
firms with low levels of patenting deteriorates significantly the informational content of 
this variable, raising its noise to signal ratio, and making it hard to discern a feedback 
from the independent variability in patenting to any of other variables.
In order to improve the “signal strength” of patent data, more recent approaches have 
capitalized on the computerization of patents to more fully exploit patent information. 
As noted previously, patent documents also contain citations to other previous patents. 
Advanced computational techniques now allow the search for all subsequent citations of
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a particular patent.18 The potential significance of patent citations can be inferred from 
the following citation:
“During the examination process, the examiner searches the pertinent portion of the 
“classified” patent file. This purpose is to identify any prior disclosures of technology 
... which might anticipate the claimed invention and preclude the issuance of a patent; 
which might be similar to the claimed invention and limit the scope of patent protection 
...; or which, generally reveal the state of the technology to which the invention is 
directed ... If such documents are found they are made known to the inventor and are 
“cited” in any patent which matures from the application ... Thus, the number of times a 
patent document is cited may be a measure of its technological significance”
- OECD Report, Benchmarking Science-Industry Relationships, 2002, p. 87.
Moreover, there is a legal dimension to patent citations, since they represent a limitation 
on the scope of the property rights established by a patent’s claims which are 
enforceable in a court of law. Equally important, the process of arriving at the final list 
of references, which involves the applicant and his attorney as well as the examiner, 
does generate the right incentives to have all relevant patents cited, and only those (see 
Campbell and Nieves, 1979). Thus, the presumption that citation counts are potentially 
informative of something like the technological importance of patents is thus well 
grounded.
18 It is important to note that this process sets up what is classically known as the “inverse problem”. To 
count the citations a patent receives; it becomes necessary to check aU subsequent patents issued to check 
if the patent in question has been cited.
55
The question is whether citation counts may also be indicative of the (ex-post) value of 
the innovations disclosed in the cited patents.19 While this question can be only resolved 
empirically, one can examine the theoretical arguments that underlie this claim. Most 
patents cited are referenced in patents issued within the same narrowly defined field of 
innovation as the cited patent. The very existence of the those later patents attests to the 
fact that the cited patents opened the way to technologically successful line of 
innovation. Moreover, it presumably attests also to economic success (at least in 
expected value terms), since those subsequent patents are the result of costly innovation 
efforts undertaken mostly by profit seeking agents. Given that citations to a patent are 
counted for a period of years following its issuance, there should be enough time for the 
uncertainty regarding the economic value of the innovation to resolve itself. Thus, if 
citations keep coming, it must be that the innovation originating in the cited patent had 
indeed proven to be valuable.
We have previously seen that in the relationship between patents, patent citations and 
the stock market valuation of firms, patent counts add little to market value after R&D 
is included in a Tobin-Q type equation.
However, a significant relationship is found between citation-weighted patent stocks 
and the market value of firms (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001). The market premium 
associated with citations appears to be mostly to the high increase in value as citation 
intensity increases. Hall et al (2001) showed that after controlling for R&D and the un­
weighted stock of patents, there is no difference in value between firms whose patents
19 This clearly need not be the same as technological importance: the latter could be thought of as having 
to do with the supply side o f innovations, whereas value obviously reflects a market equilibrium.
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have no citations, and those firms whose patent portfolio has approximately the median 
number of citations per patent. There is, however, a significant increase in value 
associated with having above-median citation intensity, and a substantial value premium 
associated with having a citation intensity in the upper quartile of distribution. Further, 
it is interesting to note that self-citations (i.e., citations from patents assigned to the 
same firm) are, on average, associated with about twice as much market value as 
citations from others (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2000). This supports the argument that self 
citations, because they represent subsequent building on the invention by the original 
firm, are indicative of the firm’s capturing a larger share of the overall social value of 
the invention. Thus, the evidence shows that both social and private values are 
increasing in the citations intensity, apparently with increasing returns, and that a high 
rate of self-citation is indicative of a larger fraction of social returns occurring to the 
innovating firm.
More recent work has gone beyond stock market valuations in estimating patent value. 
Harhoff et al (1999) have confirmed the relationship between patent citations and 
“value” using survey-based measures of the value of specific important inventions. In 
the study conducted by Harhoff and his co-authors 1999, economic value estimates 
were obtained on 962 inventions made in the United States and Germany. Patent value 
was found to hinge on two factors -  1) patents that are renewed to full term expiration 
in environments such as Germany (which have highly progressive annual maintenance 
fees) are more valuable and more highly cited than patents which are allowed to expire 
before running to full term, and 2) within the relatively exclusive cohort of full-term
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patents, citation frequency rises with economic value, although with considerable noise 
in the relationship.
Recent work by Jenny Lanjouw and Mark Schankerman (1999) explores the 
information content of patent citations relative to other indicators also derived from 
patent data, and examines the relationship of these measures to other economic 
variables. They construct composite measures of patent “quality” based on the number 
of citations received, the number of citations made by the patent, the number of claims 
in the patent, and the number of countries in which patent protection is sought (“family 
size”). They show that this measure is related to the likelihood of patent renewal and 
patent litigation, and to measures of the economic significance of a patent to its owner. 
Finally, they show that the quality-adjusted rate of patenting by firms exhibits a more 
stable relationship to firm’s R&D expenditure than simple patent counts.
There is clearly room for further work on the meaning of and relationships among these 
different indicators of quality importance, and value. An important issue are the inter­
relationships among the technological significance of an invention, the spillovers that it 
generates for future innovators (firms), and the value of the invention to its owner 
(firm). It remains to be seen whether the different measures of patent quality can shed 
light on these issues (beyond the self-citation effect mentioned above). One aspect of 
this is variations in patent “size”, in the sense of different uses or applications for a 
single idea, as distinct from the intrinsic significance of the idea. Jaffe and Trajtenberg 
(2001) have shown that citations exhibit an interesting geographic pattern: initial 
localization that fades over time. But there is much more that could be done to further
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explore these patterns. How important are “border” effects (continents, countries, 
regional districts) as distinct from physical distance? Does language matter 
systematically? How about historical, social and cultural connections? For example, 
recent work by Hu and Jaffe (2001) shows that Korea is “closer” (in terms of frequency 
of patent citations) to Japan than it is to the United States, and Korea is much closer to 
Japan than Taiwan is to Japan. These relationships appear to be consistent with patterns 
of institutional and historical connections in these pairs of economies.
Another idea raised by Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) is endogenous obsolescence. A 
patent that is highly cited is presumed “important”, but it would also seem that the 
accumulation over time of many patents building on a given invention would eventually 
make it less valuable, at least in the private sense. In principal, it should be possible to 
implement a dynamic model of the process that might be able to shed light on the rate of 
private obsolescence of knowledge, and how that varies across different technologies or 
industries, as well as over time.
Finally, patents contain references to scientific literature as well as to other patents. 
Work by Fiona Murray (2002) has shown that there is a “co-evolution” of scientific and 
technical knowledge. In the next section, this chapter reviews recent work being 
pioneered in exploring how these interlinked networks of science and technology 
overlap.
3.3. Using Bibliometric Measures to map Innovation
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Recent work, building on the early theorizing of Nathan Rosenberg (1982), has shown 
that technological and scientific knowledge co-evolve in overlapping networks. A 
recent paper by Murray (2002) makes a detailed examination of how two worlds 
overlap and interact. Murray’s methodology examines the field of tissue engineering 
and uses patent analysis to create a map of people and institutions that develop the key 
ideas. The patent data reference both “prior art”, patented ideas that the inventor has 
built his or her work upon and “forward citations”, later inventions built on the ideas in 
the current patent. The study then extends its analysis to references of scientific papers 
cites on the patent to further understand the link of the patented idea to “public” 
scientific knowledge.20 The study revealed that scientific and commercial progress arise 
in two distinctive yet overlapping networks -  one predominantly scientific; the other a 
blend of individuals and institutions in science and business. The findings suggest that 
the links between the two communities are shaped by key scientists who engage in the 
practices of both in the range of activities that span patenting, consulting, advisory 
board membership, sponsored research licensing, joint publication and entrepreneurial 
ventures. According to Murray, these synaptic activities play a significant role in 
translating scientific progress into technological (and commercial) knowledge.
However, the use of scientific references listed on a plot as an indicator of the scientific 
knowledge it links to, is not without its methodological problems. Campbell and Nieves 
(1979) argue that due to their specific legal functions, citations in patents are less 
valuable as signals of cognitive debt than citations in journal papers. Thus, a major
20 The study encompassed the detailed analysis o f 76 patents and 158 peer-reviewed scientific papers, 
supplemented by in-depth interviews.
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concern is that scientific references are arbitrarily chosen to complete a set of legal
2 1
formalities, favouring a tendency to cite by role rather than relevance.
Two recent studies, Meyer (2000) and Tijssen et al (2000), debate the relevance and 
reasons of scientific references in patents. Meyer investigated the reasons for citing 
scientific literature through a case study of ten patents in the field of nanotechnology. 
Among his major conclusions were that non-patent references cited on a patent do not 
accurately reflect their cognitive contribution to the invention. Thus in the case of 
references to scientific literature, there is little direct “antecedent” relationship between 
cited paper and citing paper. However, scientific references do line the patent to a wider 
body of scientific knowledge, even there is no explicit causal link. This conclusion is 
supported by Tijssen et al (2000) whose study on a set of Dutch USPTO (United States 
Patents and Trademark Office) patents confirm that non-patent citations are likely to 
indicate a cognitive debt but not necessarily a causal relationship between the patented 
technology and scientific knowledge.
Another measure of science and technology interaction are scientific publications by 
industry. As can be expected, traditionally companies patent more than they publish,
O') * •and conversely university researchers publish more than they patent. Despite this 
skew23, a considerable number of papers result from scientific co-operation and are
21 Patel and Pavitt (1997) report that business firms are granted about 80% of all patents and many of the 
remaining 20% go to individual owners or small businesses.
22 Within the patent system, the legal responsibility of the applicant is to describe the prior art and the 
“originality” of the patents (Meyer, 2000). This conditionality requires the applicant to describe the 
background of the patent in such a way as to show that the claimed invention relates to, but is 
innovatively different from what was already public knowledge.
23 According to De Solla Price (1965), science and technology differ substantially in their central 
activities due to the different ultimate objectives that motivate these activities. Scientists publish to
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often co-authored by scientists who work in both academia and industry. Firms publish 
scientific research in order to signal their attractiveness as a research environment in the 
labour marker as well as to maintain links with the cutting edge of academic knowledge 
(Hall 2000). This behaviour is particularly relevant to “science-based” industries such as 
biotechnology where the distinction between university and corporate laboratories are 
often blurred (Hicks and Katz, 1996).
Other research supports the notion that industrial publications are an indicator of 
competitive advantage that contributes to the overall performance of the firm. In their 
study of pharmaceutical firms, Decarolis and his colleagues use scientific publications 
as one of several measures (products under development is another example of these 
measures), to track the performance of individual firms. Citation counts of papers 
written by a firm’s researchers appear to be positively correlated with a firm’s overall 
performance (Decarolis and Leeds, 1999).
However, the analyses of industry’s or business firm’s scientific output suffer from 
shortcomings generally associated with bibliometric indicators. Hicks and Katz (1996) 
outline these shortcomings: The key drawback of bibliometric data as an output signal 
of scientific activity is that scientific knowledge rapidly becomes common knowledge 
and thus key results are often referred to in the literature without citation. Conversely; 
often scientific work is not always acknowledged by contemporaries of rival “camps” 
(Price, 1965). Further scientific fields vary intensely and thus the probability of being 
cited varies as well. This is further accentuated by the fact that the propensity to publish
maximize their visibility and recognition whereas the technologist’s objective is to construct or design a 
proprietary artefact from which he can extract rent.
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and cite varies significantly between scientific disciplines (Katz, 1996). Lastly; scientific 
activity does not proceed on a linear curve but rather in “bursts” of scientific advance 
(Kuhn, 1962) and subsequently both the value of scientific papers and the number of 
citations they gamer do not follow a linear rate over time making time-series 
comparison problematic. Lastly, scientific papers represent only one output of scientific 
activity. More informal exchanges that form the bulk of the “tacit” knowledge-base that 
moves scientific progress forward goes un-detected in bibliometric measures.
3.4. Conclusion
This chapter reviewed the different ways by which knowledge can be measured 
focusing on the firm as a unit of analysis. The primary data available to do so is patent 
data as well as bibliometric data of scientific publications by firms. Of these, the former 
has been more thoroughly explored. The latter measure, while still in its infancy of use 
points to an important methodological signpost; increasingly scientific and 
technologically knowledge are interwoven in an intricate matrix and understanding of 
how scientific knowledge spurs industrial innovation and finally, economic growth. 
While the work of Murray and others has opened up this rich and exciting area of 
research: this work is still in its infancy. Extending and integrating this work from the 
“frontline” of industrial innovation to fundamental epistemological notions of 
knowledge is a challenge that has not been fully realized. It is this interdisciplinary co- 
mingling of theory and empiricism that is the focus of this thesis.
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Chapter 4
Private-Public Collaboration and Research Quality: Do Firms Produce Better 
Quality Research with Greater Academic Collaboration?
4.1. Introduction
As seen in Chapter 1, economic models of technological change have traditionally 
assumed the relationship between basic scientific research and technological invention 
to be unidirectional (Romer, 1990). Publicly funded universities and research institutes 
advance basic science by producing ideas. This body of knowledge is freely accessible 
in scientific journals and has the attributes of a public good. Business firms, drawing 
from this resource, engage in research and development in the search for technological 
inventions. These inventions, protected by patents, then generate rents for the firm 
(Rosenberg, 1988). However, recent literature exploring the interaction of science and 
technology has altered this fairly simplistic picture by highlighting the blurred 
boundaries between scientific research and technological invention (Murray, 2002; 
Rosenberg 1988).
Biotechnology is a science-based industry (Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch, 1998) 
characterized by collaboration between academic24 institutions and firm-based scientists 
(e.g. Blumenthal et al., 1996; Gittelman and Kogut, 2003; Liebeskind et al., 1996; 
Zucker and Darby, 1997). On the one hand, traditional repositories of scientific 
knowledge such as universities and research institutes have shifted along the basic-
24 In this paper, the terms “academic,” “public” and “open” are used interchangeably to refer to scientific 
research performed outside of business firms.
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applied spectrum and are increasingly involved in commercializing their science via 
patenting, licensing and high technology spin-offs (Hicks, 2002). Parallel to this trend, 
high technology firms have adopted “open science” academic norms and now routinely 
engage in basic scientific research and employ scientists who regularly publish in 
scientific journals. In doing so, industry scientists often collaborate with university 
researchers in solving particular scientific problems.
Explorations of the co-mingling of scientific and technological networks in biomedicine 
indicate co-evolution via interlinked networks of scientists that bridge the private-public 
divide (Murray, 2002). More recent work by Murray (2004) highlights the critical role 
of academic inventors’ social networks to entrepreneurial firm growth. Zucker et al. 
(1998), in their study of the US biotechnology industry, show that university-based star 
scientists played a key role in the birth and growth of the industry through dual roles as 
entrepreneurs and research scientists. See Carayol (2003) for a survey of the literature 
on both firm and scientist motivations, a typology of collaboration and the matching 
process and Mora-Valentin et al (2004) for the different success factors of firms and 
research organizations. Thus, there exists a substantial and growing body of work that 
points to the increasing value of private-public interaction in the evolution of science 
and technology and in the performance of firms and industries.
What is still missing, however, is research that delves into the effects of this private- 
public interaction on the resulting quality of scientific output. By quality, I refer to the 
impact of research on the academic community as measured by citation counts of the 
article and the journal. This constitutes an important gap in the literature since the
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specific mechanisms by which private-public collaboration might improve firm, 
industry or even region-level performance are not well known. Clearly, improvements 
to research quality brought about by private-public collaboration is one obvious channel 
by which firms and industry may benefit from co-mingling with academic expertise. It 
is this assertion, therefore, that is in need of further exploration.
This chapter attempts to answer the question of whether private-public collaboration 
produces better quality research by comparing the effect on research quality of private- 
public collaboration using unique data from the UK biotechnology sector from 1988- 
2001. Specifically, I test whether the quality of scientific research undertaken by UK 
biotechnology firms is improved by more intensive collaboration with academic 
institutions. My findings suggest that collaborative research involving greater shares of 
academic participation does indeed improve research quality, although the nature of the 
biotechnology firm in question is an equally important factor in determining how strong 
a positive effect private-public collaboration has on research quality.
This study makes a number of contributions. First, it strengthens arguments for the tacit 
nature of knowledge (Polanyi, 1967), particularly in science-based industries such as 
biotechnology (Pisano, 1997). If knowledge in the biotechnology sector were not tacit in 
nature, then it would not matter who collaborates with whom. To the extent that it is 
tacit, then the strength of the quality leap when private sector science works with public 
sector science will be comparatively large.
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Second, the gains from collaboration are evidence not only of the tacit nature of 
knowledge but also its heterogeneity across private and public sectors. If scientists in 
both sectors possess largely the same set of skills and technical know-how, I would not 
expect the strong gains from collaboration that I see. This suggests that the “markets of 
knowledge” in the academic and private sector are sharply heterogeneous. Thus the 
scientific labour market can be thought of as composed of two distinct markets: one 
composed of academic scientists and another of scientists employed in industry, sorted 
on the basis of individual preferences. (For example, Stem (1999) suggests that 
academic scientists could trade off salary for scientific autonomy by working in 
academia.) Modem public policy increasingly ignores this distinction by encouraging 
universities to raise capital by working as de-facto external research and development 
(R&D) labs for business firms (Dasgupta and David, 1994). This study extends this 
market driven approach to science by highlighting the gains that result from 
collaborating across the divide not by eliminating the borders altogether. For a deeper 
discussion of the policy debate see Hicks and Katz (1996). Finally, this study answers 
recent calls for research on private-public collaboration (Carayol, 2003; Mora-Valentin 
et al., 2004) and the usefulness of scientists’ knowledge (Murray, 2004; Sorenson and 
Fleming, 2004).
This chapter is organized as follows: Section two provides a literature review of the 
competing incentives for “open science” versus that of private R&D, the issues that 
arise in measuring their interaction and the UK biotechnology industry. Section three 
describes an empirical model used to estimate the impact of private-public collaboration 
on research quality. Section four provides a description of the data and variables.
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Section five discusses results with tests of robustness. Section six concludes with 
implications for R&D policy and practice and suggestions for future research.
4.2. Literature Review
4.2.1. Open Science Versus Private R&D
Economic debate on the role of publicly funded science begins with the observation that 
there is a substantial gap between social and private returns to R&D, particularly in the 
case of “basic” research. Many researchers have identified externalities arising from the 
public good aspects of knowledge as the source of the gap (Arrow, 1962). The idea that 
the inability of profit maximizing firms to appropriate the full economic returns from 
R&D is likely to lead to under-investment in research relative to the social optimum 
remains the basis for substantial public support of R&D in general, and basic scientific 
research in particular (Arora et al., 1995).
This broad logic could explain the scientific division of labor wherein universities 
(largely subsidized by the government) working under the “open science” paradigm, 
publish scientific articles that are freely available in publicly accessible journals. Firms 
on the other hand, drawing from this “public” body of scientific know-how, invest in 
R&D, mostly in areas of applied research, in order to secure valuable patents that would 
generate rent.
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Recently this “waterfall” model has come under criticism, with the distinction between 
university “open” science and firm level R&D increasingly seen as a blurred one 
(Murray, 2002). The biggest problem for the “waterfall” model is that some for-profit 
firms organize their research in ways that mimic the practices found in universities or 
publicly funded organizations (Cockbum and Henderson, 1998; Dasgupta and David, 
1994; Gittelman and Kogut 2003). In particular, large pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology firms have been found to rely heavily on collaboration with academic 
scientists to improve research productivity and regularly publish scientific articles in the 
open science paradigm (Paula, 1996; Rosenberg, 1990). These findings challenge the 
traditional understanding of the distinction between public and private science and raise 
the question of why would companies allow their work (or the work of their scientists) 
to be freely available?
4.2.2. Why Do Private Firms Adopt Public-Science Norms?
Several strategic advantages have been identified with the private sector adoption of 
open science, including the development of absorptive capacity (Cockbum and 
Henderson, 1998), labor costs reduction (Stem, 1999), and enhancing firms’ 
competitive position in a patent race (Lichtman et al., 2000; Parchomovsky, 2000). 
Drawing upon Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) “absorptive capacity” argument, Cockbum 
and Henderson (1998) suggest that firms use pro-open-science incentives to develop 
routines and skills that allow them to utilize effectively the advances in publicly funded 
research. The interviews with senior scientists and management of pharmaceutical firms 
conducted by Cockbum and Henderson (1998) indicated that firms strived to develop
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such a capacity by recruiting and rewarding scientific employees based on their standing 
in the hierarchy of public-sector science and by encouraging them to actively engage 
themselves in the academic community.
Ties to the academic community have also been found to underlie the innovative 
activities of biotechnology firms (Zucker et al., 1998). Assuming university-affiliated 
scientists prefer research projects that will lead to publications, adoption of open science 
may help firms attract high-quality academic collaborators. In addition, Stem (1999) 
suggested that there might be a labor cost advantage associated with pro-publication 
firms. Based on the analysis of offers accepted by a sample of postdoctoral job 
applicants, he showed that scientists are willing to accept a lower wage in exchange for 
permission to keep up with research in high quality basic science. Game theorists have 
suggested that publishing discoveries may be used by firms engaged in a patent race to 
establish a convincing history of prior art in competing claims of discoveries (Lichtman 
et al., 2000; Parchomovsky, 2000).
While there is a significant and growing body of literature that investigates the 
theoretical forces driving the private-public interaction in the production of scientific 
knowledge, the empirical literature is less well developed. Though measuring the 
research output of “open science” and its impact on the rest of the economy presents 
enormous challenges, both quantitative and qualitative estimates suggest that the rate of 
return to basic research is probably quite high. Direct quantitative estimates rate of 
return on the order of 25 to 40 percent (Adams, 1990; Griliches, 1994; Mansfield,
1989). Also studies of university-industry relations have found a positive effect of
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university research on private sector R&D (Jaffe, 1986; Mansfield, 1989). However, 
most of these models focus on the training and education function of the university 
sector rather than its research output.
There is also a stream of literature in economic history that points to the critical role of 
public sector research in laying the foundation for technological advances that have had 
enormous impact on the economy (see, for example, David et al., 1992). An example of 
this is the US pharmaceutical industry, one of the most science-intensive sectors of the 
economy and one where public support for research has been very substantial 
(Cockbum and Henderson, 1996). Further, the biotechnology industry was incubated 
within academic science and close links between academic science and industry 
continue to be commonplace in this industry. While it seems clear that the industry’s 
rapid rate of technological change and impressive economic performance rests on a 
foundation of long term publicly funded investments in basic science (Comroe and 
Dripps, 1976; Ward and Dranove, 1995), attributing specific tangible payoffs to these 
investments is difficult. Furthermore, there has been no work that I could identify in the 
literature measuring the impact of private-public collaboration in producing scientific 
knowledge on research quality, a question that I address using evidence from the UK 
biotechnology industry.
4.2.3. How to Measure Private-Public Collaboration?
Unpacking the relationship between “open science” and industry R&D poses several 
methodological challenges. Pioneering work by Narin and Rozek (1988), Narin and
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Olivastro (1992) and Penan (1996) used citation patterns very successfully to trace 
interaction among researchers and across organizational boundaries. However, citation 
analyses present a number of difficulties. Citation is often highly ritualized, occurs with 
variable and often very long lags, and may represent negative as well as positive 
acknowledgement of previous research. Another more direct measure of interaction is 
joint-authorship of papers. Often, scientists working in industry collaborate with 
academics on research publications. This pattern of co-authorship probably represents 
the strongest empirical record of the interaction of private firms and academic science 
(see Zucker and Darby, 1995; Zucker, et al., 1998 and Liebeskind et al., 1996).
Furthermore, as it is often pointed out, citation in the age of the word processor and 
computerized databases is extremely cheap and easy. By contrast, as many researchers 
can testify from personal experience, joint authorship is costly in terms of effort as well 
as other resources. In order to be willing to collaborate on a paper, all authors must be 
willing to incur these costs, making an instance of co-authorship a stronger empirical 
signal than a citation. Further, I believe that co-authorship is also evidence of a 
qualitatively different kind of interaction than does citation. Joint authorship often 
reflects joint research, which is an opportunity for the exchange of tacit knowledge 
(Katz and Martin, 1997). By contrast, citation may be seen as an acknowledgement of 
the exchange of codified knowledge. Citation also refers to old knowledge, whereas co­
authorship reflects generation and exchange of new or current knowledge. Thus while 
citations can often be an impersonal referencing to existing knowledge, I see co­
authorship as evidence of joint problem solving and something that represents a much 
more significant investment on the part of the firm.
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Naturally, there are some difficulties with this interpretation. Clearly, co-authorship 
does not capture the entire range of active knowledge exchange among scientists. 
Academic researchers and industry scientists often read each others’ work, correspond 
informally, listen to conference presentations, serve on professional committees 
together and so on, which all may serve as legitimate conduits for knowledge exchange. 
Further, co-authorship may also reflect a variety of things other than exchange of 
information and joint problem solving. It may be offered as a quid pro quo for supplying 
information or resources such as money or research materials (Cockbum and 
Henderson, 1996). It may also serve as a way to acknowledge intellectual debts and in 
the physical and biological sciences to list laboratory directors or other senior project 
leaders as authors on papers which they may have had very little involvement in writing 
(Murray, 2002). Notwithstanding these issues, this study proceeds on the assumption 
that co-authorships represent evidence of a significant investment on the part of the firm 
in developing connections to publicly funded “open science” research.
4.2.4. U.K. Biotechnology Industry
Biotechnology is the industrial application of biological processes. The biotechnology 
industry has been a source of both controversy and excitement over the last two 
decades. Whilst the origins of modem biotechnology lie in scientific advances made in 
the UK, such as discovery of the double helix by Watson and Crick in 1953 and the 
development of monoclonal antibodies by Milstein and Koehler in 1978, it was in the 
U.S. that commercial biotechnology emerged as an industry in the late 1970s. The UK 
was the next country to follow when commercial biotechnology was developed
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following a governmental push-policy led by the new conservative government under 
Margaret Thatcher during the 1980s (see DTI, 2005).
The early lead established by the U.S. continues till today. However, since the 1980s, 
the United Kingdom (UK) has established itself as the European market leader in the 
biotechnology industry and remains the second largest in the world market, after the 
United States. Its leading position in biotechnology is based on a long-established 
reputation for excellence in research in the biosciences in its universities, teaching 
hospitals and research institutes. Scientifically, the primary strengths of the industry 
include therapeutics and human health applications with a particular emphasis on 
genomics and gene therapy, stem cell research, and drug discovery. In 2002, the UK 
Parliament voted to allow therapeutic cloning and end a ban on stem cell research using 
human embryos. As a result, additional funding to support research is expected from 
both government and private sources and the UK is now positioned to lead the world in 
stem cell research. The UK pharmaceutical industry is also the fourth largest in the 
world, accounting for 12% of the world market (House of Commons, 2003).
Biotechnology in the UK is characterized by strong multinational corporations and a 
vibrant SME sector reliant on mergers and partnerships with large pharmaceutical firms. 
As of 2003, the UK biotechnology industry comprised of 455 companies employing a 
total of 9,600 people in research and development and generating .3.6 billion in 
revenues (DTI, 2005). Some comparative statistics are provided in Table 4.A.
74
Table 4. A. The Biotechnology Industry in Selected Countries in 2002.
UK Germany France USA
Revenue
(£M) 2860 665
515 16,099
Employees 23,650 14,408 unavailable 141,000
No. companies 481 430 330 1467
No. public 
companies
46 17 3 380
Source: Data co lated by author from OECD, 2002; House o f Commons, 2003; DTI.
2005.
It is through the emergence o f scientific discoveries, primarily from academic 
institutions, that potential products and techniques for commercial biotechnology are 
identified. It is also at the level o f basic research that government involvement and 
funding is at its most visible; despite the involvement o f charitable foundations, 
government funding o f basic research remains the bedrock o f the industry. That the UK 
was able to make an early start in commercial biotechnology is in no small part due to 
its traditional strength in research in the biosciences. UK universities and research 
institutes have established themselves at the forefront o f biotechnology research; for 
example, the MRC Laboratory o f Molecular Biology in Cambridge (and its forerunners) 
alone has had 13 Nobel Laureates as members of its faculty.
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In the UK, government expenditure on biomedical research and has fall in real terms 
and private investment plays an expanding role in funding public domain science 
(Lewison, 1997). On the private side, business expenditure on R&D in the UK in the 
late 1990s was 7.2 percent, above the US (6%) and Japan (2.4%), but below Germany 
(9.7%) and Belgium (10.6%) (OECD, 2002). However, the UK government has recently 
announced plans to reverse years of under investment in higher education and basic 
research (House of Commons, 2003).
One area where the UK has a clear advantage over countries such as Germany and the 
USA is the regulatory framework within which biotechnology research is conducted. A 
major constraint on the development of biotechnology in Germany in the past, for 
instance, was the restrictive regulatory regime that made certain areas of research very 
difficult. Although regulation has been liberalized recently, areas like stem cell research 
are still far more strictly regulated in other countries as compared to the UK. In contrast, 
the UK can be seen to have a comparatively liberal framework of regulation. Many 
scientists and that I interviewed informally as part of my research based in the US were 
envious of the relative freedom enjoyed by British scientists. The prospect of tight 
restrictions being imposed on biotechnology research is seen by scientists as a real 
threat and it appears that they are prepared to move to avoid these restrictions. For 
example, I was told of a prominent biotechnology research team that had abandoned 
Massachusetts for California for this reason. If tighter restrictions were imposed more 
generally in the USA, the UK would presumably prove a reasonably attractive 
alternative and a migration of research expertise could take place. However, the more 
liberal regime in the UK cannot be taken for granted and countries such as Singapore
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now form a genuine alternative. Regulation of aspects of biotechnology research has 
recently been discussed at European Union level and public opinion in a number of 
member states favors stricter regulation — or even outright bans — on some types of 
research. Whilst the UK has so far preserved its right to impose its own regulatory 
regime, pressure for the setting of standards at European level is likely to continue. 
Policies vary across the EU and it remains a contentious issue for some 
member states.
Whilst excellence in research is a necessary condition for a flourishing biotechnology 
industry, it is not a sufficient one. Ultimately, success depends on commercialization of 
good science. The key factors that underlie successful commercialization in 
biotechnology are 1) entrepreneurial culture among scientists, 2) presence of venture 
capital, 3) support of public markets for biotechnology firms and 4) government support 
(such as choosing the correct regulatory framework).
While culture is a difficult variable to capture, in my interactions with several scientists 
across a range of institutions indicate that in the university environment going the 
“commercial route” is frowned upon. This is in contrast to the US where commercial 
activity by leading edge research scientists is the norm.
The biotechnology industry relies on venture capital for its survival. In a sector 
dominated by firms with little in the way of tangible assets to act as collateral for loans 
— their intellectual property and the know-how of their staff are their primary assets — 
and which require a considerable quantity of money to sustain themselves, venture
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capital provides the main route of funding. The venture capital support for the UK 
biotech sector is relatively (relative to other European countries) robust and raised £392 
million in equity investment which was more than any other European country (House 
of Commons, 2003).
The conventional route by which venture capitalists have sought to exit their 
biotechnology investments has been either through trade sales or through IPOs (Initial 
Public Offering) which is the preferred route. The UK has a robust financial market that 
is welcoming to biotechnology firms. Further, since 1993, under pressure from the 
growing industry, the London Stock Exchange agreed to make special provisions for 
biotechnology companies allowing them a fast-tract to secure a listing on the exchange.
4.3. Empirical Model
I seek to answer the following question: Is the quality of scientific research by UK 
biotechnology firms improved by collaboration with academic institutions? In other 
words, does the quality of collaborative research (between biotechnology firms and 
academic institutions) as measured by citations and journal prestige tend to be of higher 
quality with increasing shares of academic participation?
In order to test this proposition I use a dataset of scientific publications in biotechnology 
that include at least one author from a biotechnology firm. However, this set of papers 
does not include purely academic papers, i.e. those set of papers with no biotechnology 
presence. Thus, in order to specify a robust econometric model, a study would have to
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control for any bias that might exist from this sample selection. Specifically, it requires 
the teasing out of a prior question -  namely, what characteristics mark out papers that 
involve some public and biotechnology firm interaction rather than those composed 
purely of academic scientists? Contingent on this selection, I then test for the effect of 
increased academic participation on research quality.
4.3.1. Model Specification
This research begins with a simple specification:
yt = X fi + £j (Equation 4.1)
where y i is some measure of research quality (defined in Section 4.) and X  is the
vector of characteristics that include co-authorship, research level and other predictors 
of quality. However, as noted before, the papers included in the sample are those that 
include at least one biotechnology author and therefore may not be a random sample of 
research publications. This “selectivity” may bias the co-efficients in a standard OLS 
estimation of Eq.(2) (Green, 1981). A solution to this sample selectivity bias was found 
by Heckmann (1979). First, I write down a participation equation:
Tj = 1 (Zi y + £oi> 0) (Equation 4.2)
where Z includes variables that predict whether a paper has biotechnology involvement 
or not. Note that Z and X  may include common variables. Thus a paper is included in 
the sample if Z,y > £oi. The selectivity problem is made apparent by taking expectations 
of Eq. (1) over the sample of papers with at least one biotechnology author:
(Equation 4.3)
If £0 and e] are jointly distributed I can write
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£Xi = e0i + t)j (Equation 4.4)
where is uncorrelated with £oi, cr0. is the covariance between £oi and £u , and is 
the variance of e0j. This last observation is pertinent, because I can now write:
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where ^( ) is the standard normal density and <$(•) its cumulative distribution function. 
It is now evident why OLS estimates of Eq. (4.1) may be biased. In particular, the last 
expectation in Eq. (4.3) may not be zero. Selectivity bias is said to occur whenever cr01
is not zero. Heckman (1979) noted that the problem with using Eq. (4.3) is that p  is 
generally biased owing to the presence of an omitted variable, where the quantity
(usually referred to as the inverse Mills ratio) — is the omitted variable. If  this
o)
variable were now to be included in the original specification as:
y, = X fi+  5  (Equation 4.6)
then consistent estimates would be straightforward. An estimate of cr01 /cr0 can be read
off as the coefficient cr on the inverse Mills ratio. Essentially, Heckman (1979) noted 
that such a model could easily be estimated with the following steps: First to run a 
probit of the treatment on the vector Z to obtain estimates of //<70. Then, these
estimates are used to construct the inverse Mills ratio and finally, OLS regressions can 
then be run on Fusing the estimated inverse Mills ratio as an additional regressor.
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Standard errors are more complicated because the resulting model is heteroskedastic 
and uses estimated values. Merely adjusting the standard errors for heteroskedasticity 
will not be adequate in general, because such a correction fails to account for the loss in 
precision resulting from estimates of the inverse Mills ratio instead of actual values. 
One solution to obtain the correct errors is to use a maximum likelihood solution in the 
empirical estimation. This approach is used in the model. See Greene (1981) for a fuller 
treatment.
4.4. Data and Variables
4.4.1. Data Collection
The dataset of scientific articles analyzed in this analysis is sourced from the Research 
Output Database (ROD) that contains a record of published research outputs for all of 
UK biomedicine and for 32 biomedical sub-fields during the years 1988-2001. These
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data are sourced from CD-ROM versions of both the Science Citation Index (SCI) and 
the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) produced by the Institute for Scientific 
Information in Philadelphia. The SCI is an excellent source because it covers a broad 
range of basic and applied scientific journals. Moreover it lists up to 255 authors and 
addresses for each publication, unlike other databases, which only include the 
institutional affiliation of the first author (e.g. Compendex, INSPEC and Biosis). Thus it 
is possible to construct data regarding the number of authors and addresses on 
individual papers, leading postcode areas on the paper, domestic and international
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collaboration details as defined by author’s addresses. Further, the SCI also lists any 
research funding sources.
The methodology whereby UK biomedical papers are identified and downloaded from 
the SCI and the SSCI is discussed in Lewison and Paraje (2004). Briefly, all papers with 
a UK address in biomedical and relevant social science journals are included, as are 
those with a biomedical address keyword in other journals. The dataset can reliably be 
said to contain the majority of UK biomedical papers published during 1988-2001 and 
comprises (no. of) 355 183 individual scientific papers (Lewison et al., 2003). Of these, 
2 915 papers listed at least one author from a biotechnology firm as a contributing 
author (as identified by the address field) and are included in the analysis. The number 
of firms in my dataset is 203.
4.4.2. Variables
4.4.2.1 Dependent Variables
Research Quality. Research quality is the dependent variable and the most difficult and 
contentious item to measure. In the broadest terms, research quality may be defined in 
terms of how funded research feeds through to the welfare of society through health and 
wealth creation. Wealth might be reflected in the development of, for example, new 
pharmaceuticals, diagnostic regents or other medical technology. Health benefits, 
however, are manifest in better patient care and preventive measures based on 
regulation or advice. Therefore, the routes to health creation may be considered in terms 
of research papers leading to, for example, new techniques for diagnosis and treatment, 
improved medical education and training or better clinical care based on clear evidence-
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based guidelines and recommendations (See Lewison et al., 2003). For impacts on 
wealth creation, one could examine rent seeking activities of firms as linked to their 
research and publishing activity. However, in my analysis I seek to determine how the 
community of researchers engaged in biomedical research might benefit from private- 
public collaboration and hence research quality is defined as the effect of research on 
other researchers. Thus, it may reflect the importance or quality of the research qua 
research but it is not necessarily an indicator of clinical utility or wealth creation.
If one defines research quality in this way, one can assess the importance of a paper by 
several measures -  of which the two strongest indicators are its actual impact as 
determined by citation counts to the individual paper and its potential impact as judged 
by the journal in which it is published. The first and second measures are 
complementary but not identical, although papers in high impact journals tend to have 
more citations. Both are useful indicators and show how a paper has been judged by two 
different readerships: the general body of researchers and, in the second case; a journal 
editor plus a few specialized reviewers.
Research quality is signaled by citations (Trajtenberg, 1990). In the first estimate of 
research quality, the number of citation counts to individual papers over a five year 
period, from the year in which the paper is published is totaled and denoted by CIT. 
Previous research indicates that most citations occur in the first five years (Trajtenberg,
1990). The citations are tracked across scientific publications present in the ISI Science 
Citation Index (SCI). Only citations from original research articles were included, 
eliminating meeting notes, review articles and book reviews, to more accurately gauge
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genuine impact. However, a better system may be to estimate citation scores received 
by individual papers on a log scale and use the transformation:
log citations = 1 + 2 log,0 (<citations +1) (Equation 4.7)
where citations is a five-year citation count for the individual paper. This variable is 
LOGCIT. Thus when citations = 0 , then LOGCIT = 1, and for a high prestige journal 
like Nature, it equals about 5. This roughly corresponds to the relative subjective weight 
that scientists and scientific administrators give to papers in different journals in the two 
instances, which is not 100:1 but more nearly 5:1 (Lewison et al., 2003). I use this 
definition as a baseline estimation but also run the regressions with the simpler 
definition of citation counts as a test of robustness.
Journal quality. The quality of the journal is measured by an impact-weighted citation 
index (Laband and Piette, 1994). This index depends on the citations per character 
generated by articles in these journals, and weights the citations according to the citing 
journal. Thus the quality measure used is equivalent to an expected impact-adjusted 
citations measure. (See Laband and Piette, 1994, for a fuller discussion of the impact 
weighted citation measures).
To create a research quality variable based on journal quality (denoted PIC -  Potential 
Impact Category), I use a simple system in which journals are put into four categories 
(which take values between 1-4) based on the mean number of citations to papers 
published in the journal in a given year that are received in the year of publication 
through the fourth year after publication. Journals with mean citation scores greater than 
20 are classed PIC=4; 11 to 20 as PIC=3; 6 to 11 as PIC=2 and less than 6 as PIC=1.
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These values were chosen so that approximately 10% of biomedical papers from the UK 
would have PIC=4, 20% would be PIC=3, 30% would be PIC=2 and 40% would be 
PIC=1 (Lewison et al., 2003). These measures were used in preference to “raw” impact 
factors (average number of citations in a given time period to papers published in a 
journal) because they are more likely to reflect the perceptions of scientific 
administrators and medical researchers. In two separate polls (Lewison et al., 2003), 
scientific administrators and researchers in the biomedical sciences, voted the relative 
importance of papers in “excellent” journals about four to five times that of papers in 
“ordinary” journals, and that of paper in “good” journals about two to three times of the 
latter.
4.4.1.2 Independent Variables
Collaboration. As discussed earlier, the primary measure of private-public collaboration 
is co-authorship, the joint authoring of research papers by individuals at business firms 
and from academia. Two measures of co-authorship are used: one aggregated at the 
level of the institution and another at the individual. First, the count of biotechnology 
firms present on a research paper (denoted by BIOTECH), and the number of 
collaborating academic institutions (ACAD). The number of individual authors from 
biotechnology firms is counted and denoted (AUTBIOTECH), as are the number of 
authors from academia (AUT ACAD). There are two measures of the impact of 
academic contribution on a biotechnology research paper: first, an estimate of the 
academic contribution at the institutional level as a simple ratio of academic institutions 
to the total number of institutions (denoted by ACADRATIO INST). I then construct
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the ratio of academic authors to the total number of authors (ACADRATIO AUT) to 
capture the academic contribution to a publication at the individual level. There is also 
evidence that papers with greater number of total authors are associated with increased 
potential impact due to the both citation networks of individual authors as well as a self 
citation effect (Lewison and Devey, 1999). To control for this, I count the total number 
of authors on a paper (AUT). Further, to gauge diminishing returns for number of 
authors on an academic paper, I calculate the square of AUT (AUTSQ). The idea here is 
that too many “cooks” may spoil the broth.
Research level. There is evidence that research of a more “basic” nature tend to receive 
more citations than those of a more “applied” character (Cockbum and Henderson 1996; 
Lim, 2004). Therefore, a method is needed to capture the “basic” or “applied” nature of 
the research article. The prevailing trend in the literature is to use classification schemes 
based on the journal in which the article is published (Lewison et al., 2003; Lim, 2004). 
However, the price paid by this approach is the inability to capture heterogeneity among 
papers within each journal. This is a problem in a cutting edge area of research such as 
biomedical technology. Often, there is a blurring of boundaries between “basic” and 
“applied” papers and high prestige journals such as Nature or Science are highly 
multidisciplinary and cover both basic and applied topics. To overcome this limitation, I 
use the categorization developed by Lewison and Paraje (2004), based on the presence 
of one or more of about 100 “clinical” or “basic” words in the titles of papers in a given 
journal and year. This gives a decimal number between 1.00 (most applied) and 4.00 
(most basic).
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Institutional Affiliation. The institution to which an academic belongs can influence 
the quality of his research. Thus, academics of high status institutions might deliver 
greater quality gains in private-public collaboration than those in lower status 
institutions. In order to control for this effect, I need to record the status scores of 
institutions to which academic scientists might belong. Fortunately, research 
publications record post-codes (codes of letters and digits used as part of the postal 
address to sort mail) on the paper. A single publication usually yields several postcodes. 
Each postcode then corresponds to an address for a collaborating institution (either 
biotechnology or academic). While it is possible that two institutions might share a 
single postcode, I assume that each institution is identified by a unique postcode. This 
assumption stands up to scrutiny, as the number of postcode areas generated is equal to 
the total number of collaborating institutions in the sample. This generates a list of 160 
UK postcode addresses active in biomedical research. Further, I record a measure of the 
research quality associated with each postcode address over time. This captures the 
intuition that institutions have different “status” that could be mirrored in the research 
quality of the papers associated with it. Following the definition of CIT (citations) 
outlined earlier, I estimate the mean number of citations of all the papers published in a 
year that include the relevant postcode in the address field. This information is then 
used to construct LEADACADGEOGCIT and LEADAUT GEOGCIT to capture the 
status of the lead academic author and the lead author25 respectively as measured by 
their institutional affiliation (Note: the lead academic author need not necessarily be the 
lead author).
25 The lead author is the first author listed on a research paper who by convention is the seniormost or 
“lead” scientist on the research team.
87
International Collaboration. There is evidence to suggest that foreign collaborations 
can impact positively impact on research quality (Zucker and Darby, 1995). To control 
for this, the presence of foreign collaborators present on a publication is estimated by 
counting the number of foreign addresses (FOR).
Author Characteristics. Perhaps the strongest predictor of research quality are the 
individual characteristics of the scientists that author a research paper. In his classic 
work on the sociology of scientists, Merton (1968) outlined the “Matthew Effect” 
where, scientists of higher prestige tend to draw resources such as research funding, 
grants and international collaborations towards themselves, which gives them further 
advantages thus strengthening their status in self reinforcing loop. Thus status can be a 
powerful predictor of research quality as measured by impact (citations and journal 
prestige). To capture the “status” of authors present on a paper, as before, I record the 
total number of citations received by and individual author as AUT CIT, for all his 
publications. In my database, this resulted in 9,445 citations. In order to estimate the 
average impact of an author as measured by journal impact, I calculate the mean PIC 
(potential impact category) of the author (AUT PIC). These variables are constructed 
by calculating the respective means for that set of papers on which a particular author is 
present. Particularly, I record LEADAUT_CIT as well as LEADAUT PIC for the lead 
author of a paper and LEADACADCIT for that of the lead academic author. 
LEADACADCIT and LEADAUT CIT can be the same, although not necessarily so.
4.4.1.3 Control Variables
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Whether or not a particular research effort receives support from government funding 
bodies could influence its potential impact. The Science Citation Index (SCI) records 
funding sources present on a paper, and which is captured by a simple categorical 
(yes/no) variable for the presence of the key funding bodies (denoted by FUNDING). 
These are (in order of total number of papers funded): Medical Research Council 
(denoted by MED), Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council 
(BBSRC), the Department of Health (HEALTH), Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food (MAFF), National Environment Research Council (NERC), British Council (BC), 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), Overseas Development 
Administration (ODA) and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). 
Funding acknowledgements were also found to the Agricultural and Food Research 
Council and the Science and Engineering Research Council. However, both these 
bodies been largely taken over by the BBSRC and are recorded as such. Finally, to 
account for firm effects, I record the firm variable (FIRM) by whom the principal 
biotechnology author is employed. There are 114 firms present in the dataset. The year 
of publication (YEAR) is also captured to account for learning effects in doing research 
by biotechnology firms. It could be, for instance, that there is an overall increasing trend 
in research quality over time for the firms in the dataset. A full listing of the key 
variables and their definitions can be found in Table 4.1.
4.5. Results
4.5.1. Descriptive Statistics
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Table 4.2 provides some basic descriptive information on the analytical variables of 
interest. On average, the papers received 11.47 citations. There were 5.6 total authors 
for each paper with an average of just 1.08 from industry and 4.51 from academia. The 
average count of biotechnology firms and academic institutions is 1.03 and 1.94 
respectively. On average, the lead academic author has 23.65 citations, the lead author 
institution 19.28 citations, and the lead author 19.63 citations. The research is generally 
more applied than basic. Fifty-six percent of the total sample includes some foreign 
collaboration.
In Tables 4.3 through 4.5, the descriptive statistics found in Table 4.2 are split by 
research level, research quality and academic contribution. The data in Table 4.3 
suggests that the more basic the nature of the research, the higher is the research quality. 
There is some evidence in the literature to support this tendency. It has been 
documented that in many fields of research, papers that concern fundamental or basic 
research tend to have greater impact than papers of a more applied nature (Lewison et 
al., 2003; Lewison and Devey, 1999).
In Table 4.4, it is interesting to note that there is no discemable increase in the ratio of 
academic collaboration as I move from applied to basic research level. This is not so 
counter-intuitive, however, since this dataset, by definition, has only selected papers 
which have at least one co-author from a biotechnology firm that presumably is 
interested in more applied work to begin with.
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Finally, Table 4.5 shows some descriptive evidence that increased academic 
contribution on a research paper is correlated to higher research quality. The ratio of 
academic co-authors rises from 67 percent to 78 percent as one moves from lowest to 
highest research quality publications, meaning that more academic input is positively 
correlated with private-public research quality. I formally test whether this result is 
robust to the inclusion of control variables, firm fixed effects and different model 
specifications.
4.5.2. Stage 1: Controlling For Selection Bias
In this section, I control for any biases that might arise in my study by excluding 
research publications with pure academics. There are several ways in which I can do 
solve this problem. The most straightforward method would be to include all the 
research publications including those authored purely by academics in my dataset. 
However, to do so, I would have to individually sort out 355, 183 scientific papers that 
exist in an unprocessed format from the original database. This is a very labor and time 
intensive exercise that is beyond the scope of my thesis. Also, in this thesis, I am more 
interested in the actions offirms and how they might improve their research quality by 
collaborating with academics. Thus, I limit my dataset to include only those papers that 
have at least one biotech author.
To overcome any potential biases, two approaches are most commonly used: 1. to find 
instrumental variables, 2. to use an econometric adjustment to the baseline regression.
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Of these two methods, the use of instrumental variables is usually preferable. However, 
good instruments are hard to find. Given my own dataset, I found it hard to justify the 
use of instrumental variables that do not influence outcomes in my regression equation. 
Thus, in this chapter, I use an econometric technique used widely in studies of this kind 
(the Heckman selection model) to control for any biases that might arise. Below, I 
discuss the motivation for the inclusion of these variables in my Heckman selection 
equation.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable (denoted as BIAS) is 1 in the presence of a biotechnology firm 
on the research paper, and 0 otherwise.
Independent variables
Status of lead author. High status authors are more likely to form partnerships across 
institutional divides. Scientists at biotechnology firms tend to collaborate primarily with 
high status authors from academia. When biotechnology firms collaborate with 
academia they usually do so if the incentives are high. Thus they undertake 
collaboration with academic scientists to obtain crucial know-how from cutting edge 
science, or to gain credibility (in the eyes of investors, financial markets and large 
pharmaceutical firms) by association with a prestigious scientist or research laboratory. 
Both these incentives will direct them to work with academic scientists of high prestige 
(Cockbum and Henderson, 1998; Stem, 1999). By the mechanism of homophily 
(Lazarsfeld, 1972), high status academic scientists, in turn, are more likely to 
collaborate with high status scientists at biotechnology firms. Also, high status 
academic scientists are more likely to have links with industry and form research
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partnerships across the private-public divide (Murray, 2002).Thus, the status of the 
authors on a paper could be powerful predictor of biotechnology presence. In the 
specification, the status of the lead author as a key dependent variable is included and 
recorded as LEADAUT_CIT (the average number of citations received by a paper 
authored by the lead author), LEADAUTPIC (the average journal impact achieved by 
the author) and LEADGEOG CIT (the average citation score of the papers produced by 
the institution to which the lead author belongs).
Research Level. It is reasonable to assume that papers of a more applied nature might 
be more likely to have biotechnology presence than more basic papers, given the 
applied nature of the science pursued at biotechnology firms. The research level (RL) is 
included in the selection equation.
Government funding. The UK government funds public science via a grant system 
through a variety of funding agencies. These agencies typically encourage private- 
public collaboration as part of the UK government’s effort to strengthen the knowledge 
based economy. I found evidence of this intent in the literature (Lewison et al., 2003) 
that suggests although funding is not strictly contingent on collaboration, it is a strongly 
encouraged by informal practice as well as formal declaration. Publications produced by 
funded research programs are required to list sources of funding that support their 
research. I record this variable as FUNDING (0/1).
The empirical specification (See Table 4.6 for a listing of variable definitions and some 
basic descriptives) of the selection Equation 4.4 is:
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Prob (Ti = l ) = a +  ft jLEADA UTJOITj + fcLEADAUTPICj
+P4LEADA UT_GEOGCITj+ 04RLi+ fcDFUNDING,
(Equation 4.8)
The subscript i denotes paper characteristics, j  denotes author characteristics and k 
denotes institutional characteristics.
The regression was run on the entire set of scientific publications (i.e. including those 
including no biotechnology involvement) in the database (355 183 papers). Table 4.7 
shows results of the PROBIT estimation of Equation 4.8. The status of the lead author 
and the presence of government body influence biotechnology participation in research. 
This result is consistent with the existing literature and the empirical specification.
4.5 J . Stage 2: The Effect Of Co-authorship On Research Quality
In the second stage, I exclude research publications that have no biotechnology presence 
from the dataset leading to a sample of 2915 papers.
4.5.3.1 The Baseline Estimate
In order to measure the impact of private-public co-authorship on research quality, I 
begin with a simple baseline specification:
LOGCITij = a +  fiiACADRA TI OA  UTt + frAUT, + fcRLi + P4DFOR1 
+ p5LEADACAD_CITj+p6LEADACAD_GEOGCITk 
+ PsDFUNDINGi
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(Model 4.1)
This specification captures the effect of academic input (ACADRATIO_AUT) on the 
quality of the research paper (LOGCIT), i published in year t , controlling for total 
number of authors (AUT), the presence of foreign collaborators (DFOR), the level of 
research on the basic-applied spectrum (RL), the status of the lead academic author as 
measured by his individual citation score as well as his institutional affiliation and the 
presence of funding bodies (DFUNDING). Table 4.8, column (1) presents OLS 
estimates for Model 4.1. In column (1) I find statistically significant evidence that 
higher levels of academic involvement result in higher research quality, controlling for 
the total number of authors, research level foreign collaboration, author status and 
funding presence.
4.5.3.2. Are There Diminishing Returns To Total Number of Authors?
A question not answered by Model 4.1 is at what point (if at all) do diminishing returns 
set in with increased total authorship (i.e., do too many researchers spoil the broth?). 
This is estimated in Model 4.2 below. Specifically, to test for diminishing returns of 
total number of authors, I add a squared term for number of authors, AUTSQ, and 
specify the following:
LOGCITit = a + PiACADRA TI OA UTj + p2AUTi + yM UTSQf + fi5RLi 
+ PeLEADACADCITj+fijLEADACADGEOGCITk 
+ PsDFUNDINGi
(Model 4.2)
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After removing 29 outliers (.009% of sample) in the total number of authors (some 
papers had upwards of 60 authors), there is a significant curvilinear effect associated 
with adding co-authors and research quality. The threshold number of total authors, 
after which additional authors result in decreasing quality, can be calculated from the 
co-efficients for AUT and AUTSQ in Table 4.8, column (2). This value turns out to be 
11. Thus, including more than eleven authors actually decreases quality of the resulting 
publication. It is important to note that although the co-efficient for 
ACADRATIO INST falls by a third, it remains significantly positive.
4.5.3.3. Time Trends
There is some evidence to suggest (Cockbum and Henderson, 1994) that, with time, 
firms get better at doing research. Controlling for these learning effects, I modify Model 
(4.1) to include year dummies (YEARDUM):
LOGCITi't = a+  p  jA CADRA TI OA UT, + frAUTj + ft3RLi + faDFORi 
+ PtLEADA CAD_CITj+p7LEADA CAD_GEOGCITk 
+ psDFUNDINGi + p9DYEARi
(Model 4.3)
From the Table 4.8, column (3), I can see that the model specification, as judged by the 
R-squared, improves on this addition. The individual year dummies, however, reveal no 
overall rising time trend in research level nor do they dampen my ACADRATIO_INST 
coefficient.
4.5.3.4. Does Controlling For Firm Effects Improve My Results?
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Finally, the firm dummies FIRMDUM are included in the model specification (Model 
4.1):
LOGCITji = a +  p 1ACADRATIO_AUTi + fcAUTi + p 3RLi + fi&FORi 
+ PtLEADA CAD_CITj+fi7LEADA CAD_GEOGCITk 
+ psDFUNDINGi + p 9DFIRMi
(Model 4.4)
This is an important addition as not all private involvement is of the same quality. By 
not including some control for the firm from which the private researcher is drawn 
from, I may be excluding valuable information which would improve my estimates of 
the effect of academic co-authorship. Indeed, given that I assumed that co-authorship is 
not random, it is likely that the best firms attract better and more numerous academic 
collaboration. From Table 4.8, column (4), I can see that the model specification is 
further improved, with an R-squared that is double my baseline results. Moreover, as 
expected, the effect of academic co-authorship increases in size and significance with 
the inclusion of firm dummies. I also estimated the same model with standard errors 
clustered around individual biotechnology firms, which only marginally refined the 
results.
4.5.3.5. Are There Diminishing Returns To Academic Participation?
In my baseline regression, I allow for team composition with at least one biotech author 
excluding those papers that are authored purely by academics. Thus, I do not test for a 
combined academic-industry team to have better citation performance than a purely 
academic one. While this is an important question, the unit of my research is the biotech 
firm and the action these firms might take. Thus, I am more concerned with how biotech
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firms might improve research quality by collaborating with academics. I control for the 
fact that my database excludes papers by pure academics by using a Heckman selection 
model to control for potential biases. I find that adding academic authors improves 
research quality of papers authored by industry.
One question raised by this result is whether there is a limit to this effect? Does adding 
more academic authors continuously improve research quality or is there a ceiling on 
the gains to be had from academic involvement? In Table 4.8a, I split my academic 
authorship variable (AUTACAD) into 3 categories with increasing levels of academic 
participation . I find that the adding a single academic author results in a significant 
jump in research quality. However, after this initial jump, the gains from adding more 
authors increases at a decreasing rate. This effect is visually presented in Fig. 4.8a.
In Table 4.8b, I pin down this decreasing gains effect more precisely by adding a 
squared term (ACADRATIOSQ) to my baseline regression (Model 4.1).
Thus, I run the regression:
LOGCITjt = a + p 1ACADRATIO_AUTi + p2AUTi + jM  CADRA TIO_A UTSQ, + psRLi 
+ p6LEADACAD_CITj +p7LEADACAD_GEOGCITk 
+ PsDFUNDINGi
(Model 4.5)
From Table 4.8b, Col (2), by using the coefficients for AC AD RATIO and 
ACAD RATIOSQ, we can calculate the threshold number of academic authors after
26 1. Pure Industry: no academic authors, 2. Low: 0 < AUT ACAD <= 1,3. Medium: 1 < AUT ACAD 
>=4, High: AUT_ACAD>4.
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which adding more academic authors result in decreasing quality. I calculate this value 
as 4. Thus, we find adding academic authors do not result in better research once this 
threshold has been crossed. In the previous section (4.5.3.2) we find that there are 
diminishing returns to total authors as well once this number crosses 11. Thus, we find, 
in fact, that once the share of academic participation crosses a third (36.35% to be 
precise), the gains drop off.
To investigate the effects of team composition in more detail, I re-run my baseline 
regression by defining ACADRATIO as a categorical variable. To do so, I break my 
ACADRATIO variable (which ranges from 0 to 1) which is the share of academics to 
total number of authors into three groups with the cutoff ratios as < 0.33, 0.33 -  0.67, > 
0.67 and include dummy variables for each (the omitted reference category is a pure 
industry team with no academics). The results are shown in Table 4.8c. I find that even 
having low academic participation results in significant gains in research quality. These 
gains rise slowly with medium level of academic participation. Interestingly, high levels 
of academic participation seem to lower the effect of academic participation on research 
quality which is consistent with the result I obtained previously by including a squared 
term for academic participation in the baseline regression.
4.5.3.6. Impact of Academic Input on Private-public Research Quality Split 
by Research Level
The baseline is estimated (Model 4.1) after splitting the data set into three research level 
(RL) categories: Basic, Medium and Applied. Results are shown in Table 4.9. The
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results in the Applied category closely mirror those for the entire sample. This is not 
very counter-intuitive as “applied” papers dominate the sample. However, when I run 
the estimation on the “basic” papers, I find an even stronger advantage in collaborating 
with academia. This result is bome out by the intuitive idea that academic scientists are 
more likely to possess expertise and skills in basic rather than applied fields and are 
therefore most likely to boost private-public research quality on topics of basic research.
4.5.4. Alternative Definitions of Key Variables
4.5.4.I. Different Measures of Research Quality
As discussed earlier, measuring research quality is highly contentious. A broad 
definition of research quality would include effects on wealth creation and health 
benefits. However, for the purposes of this paper, I defined research quality as the 
impact of research on other researchers. Even this measure, can be specified in 
alternative ways. In the baseline estimation (Model 4.1), I measure research quality as a 
logarithm transform (Equation 4.7.) of the number of citations received by the 
publication over a five year period from the year of publication (LOGCIT). 
Alternatively, I could have used a simple five year citation count to measure quality. I 
do so in estimating the equation:
CITit = a+  P ]A CADRA TI OA UTt + p2AUTi + p3RLi + PPDFORt 
+ poLEADA CAD_CITj+p7LEADA CAD_GEOGCITk 
+ pgDFUNDINGj
(Model 4.6)
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Table 4.10, Col (2) shows that while the basic interpretation remains unaltered, 
specifying the model with the logarithm transform nearly doubles the R-square of the 
model, justifying its use as the baseline definition.
As noted earlier, the status of the journal in which a paper is published is an alternative 
measure of research quality. Lewison and Devey (1999) suggest that journal prestige 
captures the quality of a research paper as judged by a journal editor and a few 
specialized reviewers as opposed to the general body of researchers. Lewison et al. 
(2003) argue that this makes it a more stable measure of research quality as it might 
reflect more consistent standards of judging quality, rather than reflect the scientific 
trends and fads that could influence citation scores. To check whether this impacts my 
earlier results, the baseline regression is estimated with the dependent variable as the 
potential impact category (PIC) of the research paper. Thus,
PIC^ = a+  fijACADRATIO_AUTi + fcAUTj + p3RLi + faDFORi 
+ PePEADA CAD_CITj+p7LEADGEOGCITk 
+ figDFUNDINGj
(Model 4.7)
In Table 4.10, Col (3), I find that while the R-squared is roughly equivalent to the 
baseline estimate (using raw citation scores), it is not as powerful as using the logarithm 
transformation of the citation score (Model 4.1). This might be true as noted earlier that 
logarithm measures of citation scores might more closely reflect research quality as 
judged by the scientific community. The results show that quality gains by increased 
academic participation are more keenly reflected in this measure. Also, it is interesting
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to note that using the potential impact category (PIC) of the journal is roughly 
equivalent to using raw citation scores (Model 4.8). The two measures are seen to be 
roughly equivalent. This could mean that papers in high status journals get cited more 
often because they appear in them or alternatively, because high status journals are good 
filters of high quality research.
4.5.4.2. Measuring Co-authorship At The Institutional Level
In the baseline estimate, the principal measure of co-authorship was aggregated at the 
level of the institution. I found that, other things being equal, research quality increases 
with increasing shares of academic participation as measured by the ratio of academic 
authors to the total number of authors. However, one could specify co-authorship at the 
level of the institution and record shares of academic participation as the ratio of 
academic institutions present on a publication to the total number of institutions 
(industry + academy). I re-specify the baseline regression with this altered definition of 
co-authorship as:
LOGCITit = a +  Pi ACADRATIOJNSTi + p2AUTi + p3RLi + P^F O R ,
+ PeLEADACADjCITj+PyLEADACADjGEOGCITk 
+ PsDFUNDINGi
(Model 4.8)
Table 4.10, Col (4) shows that while the results are robust to this measure of co­
authorship, the R-square is higher when co-authorship is measured at the institutional 
level. This is because there could be more than a single author from a particular
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institution and adding authors from the same institution may not significantly influence 
research quality.
4.5.5. Multicollinearity, Endogeneity And Remaining Biases
The main biases that need to be addressed by the use of my empirical design are: any 
selection bias that might exist by excluding research papers purely authored by
97academics, multicollinearity between my exogenous variables and endogeneity 
between my dependent and independent variables.
I address the selection bias in an earlier section (Section 4.5.2.) and control for this bias 
by using a Heckman selection model.
I test for multicollinearity, and report the cross-correlation of exogenous variables in 
Table 4.11. The results suggest that my estimates do not suffer much from 
multicollinearity. With the exception of the correlation between funding support and 
research level, no correlation appears to be high enough to render the obtained z-values
98unreliable . This strengthens the claim for accuracy of the reported standard errors in 
my analysis.
27 Leung and Yu (1996, p.201) explain that “models with few exclusion restrictions, a high degree of 
censoring and a low variability among the regressors, or a larger error variance in the choice equation, can 
all contribute to near collinearity between the regressors and the inverse Mills ratio, rendering the two- 
step estimator ineffective”.
28 Note that multicollinearity has no impact on the coefficients. Even if  two or more variables were 
collinear, the estimated coefficients would remain unbiased. Therefore, our inferences are not hampered 
by collinearity problems (Greene, 1997).
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Secondly, there could be a problem of endogeneity between the measured dependent 
variable, research quality, and the central independent variable, private-public 
collaboration. It could be possible that the level of research quality impacts the level of 
collaboration, instead of the other way around. For example, projects of higher research 
potential might attract funding from a variety of sources, both private and public, and 
hence reflect a greater degree of collaboration. However, disentangling this causality is 
difficult. I have tried to do so, by controlling for individual author characteristics, such 
as their individual status and the institution to which they belong, the presence of 
international collaborations and support from governmental funding bodies.
To achieve a true ex-ante separation of variables, one possibility would be to use more 
sophisticated matching methods or the use of an experimental design that would control 
for such two-way causality. To do so, I would either have to find a naturally occurring 
experiment where I am certain of the causality or to construct a more elaborate dataset 
where I may ’’match" industry authors seeking academic collaboration against a set of 
otherwise similar industry authors that do not. Though this empirical framework lies 
outside the scope of this thesis, I hope to incorporate these ideas in future work with the 
dataset, investigate the matching methods literature more closely in an effort to more 
precisely identify my main effects.
4.6. Conclusion and Implications for R&D Process and Policy
In this chapter, I have used unique data on UK biotechnology research output from 1988 
to 2001 to investigate the impact of private-public collaboration on research quality.
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Specifically, I tested whether research quality of private-public research output is 
improved by increased academic input. I find clear evidence for this in the data that is 
robust to the inclusion of control variables, firm fixed effects and different model 
specifications. To some extent, my results mirror studies in the US in which star 
scientists have been found to impact firm research productivity (Zucker and Darby, 
1995).
This study also suggests that science and technology policies geared to “corporatize” 
academic research might be misplaced. The results indicate that researchers in academia 
and industry might possess very distinct skills developed over a path-dependent process. 
Collaborating across this divide then provides real gains for industry which might be 
lost if the academic “market” were to lose its unique identity. Recent research on 
biotechnology firms by Gittelman and Kogut (2003) and Murray (2003) support this 
contention that collaboration between academics and industry is crucial to the success of 
the biotechnology industry. By uniquely measuring the quality gains to be had from 
collaboration, the research deepens our understanding of this process. As noted earlier, 
this research provides evidence for the tacit nature of knowledge in the biotechnology 
sector and further suggests that the public and private sectors have heterogeneous 
knowledge bases which could explain the quality increase as a result of collaboration.
My results offer a number of implications for R&D process and policy for firms and 
institutions. First, for firms, this study suggests that firms in the biotechnology sector 
produce better quality research, as measured by journal impact and citations, by 
collaborating with academic researchers.
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Even discounting “club effects”, these quality gains can provide clear benefits to 
biotechnology firms. However, irrespective of whether club-effects, as opposed to 
“true” improvements in research quality, are the cause of getting published in 
prestigious journals, getting published, in and of itself, might bring private firms other 
benefits. For example, getting published in top journals might allow young 
biotechnology firms to more easily raise money, attract better human capital and form 
alliances with large pharmaceutical firms. Collaboration with academia is one avenue 
by which biotechnology firms can achieve this goal. The greatest impact of 
collaboration is felt in “basic” research although the results hold across the “basic- 
applied” spectrum. Further, the research indicates that these quality gains are 
accentuated by collaborating with more than one laboratory and across disciplines, 
particularly seeking out alliances with academics with established research reputations. 
Firms may wish to consolidate their academic relationships to a smaller number of high 
performing university researchers and build long term relationships.
The theoretical literature reviewed in Section 4.2 suggests that a variety of competing 
mechanisms might be at work to explain these quality gains to be had from private- 
public collaboration. However, it must be noted that instead of “true” quality gains that 
result from collaboration, an alternative mechanism could be that academic co­
authorship may act as a form of “club membership” required for getting published in 
more prestigious journals. Further, if  club effects do influence research quality, it may 
be that academic authors at prestigious universities and research institutes can more 
easily publish in prestigious journals. In fact, in the empirical estimation, this study
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finds evidence for this as a strong predictor of research quality is the status of the lead 
author..
On the policy side, the study suggests a number of implications for government efforts 
at spurring biotechnology research and industry. Publication is an important means of 
increasing the rates of technical innovation (Sorenson and Fleming, 2004), a key focus 
of the UK and other national governments’ policies.
As UK government spend on R&D lags that of other countries with strong 
biotechnology competence, namely the US, it is important that these funds be invested 
wisely. The Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) is a census designed to assess the 
research quality of universities and colleges across the UK. The RAE measures the 
research of individuals and aggregates these to the institutional level. The results are 
used by higher education funding bodies to distribute public funds for research, 
including Quality Related (QR), the most important source of funding for universities 
due to its size and block nature. Since 1997, the Research Councils have invested over 
£7 billion in 130 higher education institutions in the UK (HM Treasury, 2004).
My results suggest that mechanisms may be useful as predictors of higher quality 
research. To encourage higher quality outputs, it would seem that public funding to 
lower-performing individual academics and institutions might be better directed to 
higher performing academics. Just as market forces have driven consolidation among 
biotechnology firms over the past few years, it may be that the UK government can only 
afford to fund a smaller number of truly high performing research institutions. The
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additional resources provided to these laboratories could fund research students and 
post-doctoral fellows who would receive top level training. From the university 
perspective, those institutions seeking high rankings in the next RAE cycle (2008) may 
wish to consider setting aside resources to attract and retain highly productive research 
scientists.
While this study dealt with research from biotechnology firms based in the UK, my 
results offer policy implications for other countries keen to develop biotechnology 
competence at academic and firm levels. In particular, national governments may wish 
to encourage their ambitious biotechnology firms to seek collaborations with the most 
high status academics, at home or abroad.
My findings suggest several directions for future research. First, future studies could 
examine how research quality impacts firm performance and through what mechanisms. 
It could be interesting to explore how research quality of these collaborations is linked 
to government and industry funding. Further work could also examine this trend in 
other disciplinary fields characterized by academic-firm research collaboration and co­
authorship, such as business management.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge the limitations of this study. I did not take into self 
citations. Also, co-authorship can entail any number of different forms of collaboration 
which I do not take into account.
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Table 4.1
Variables for Analysis of Collaboration Effect on Research Quality
Variable Name Definitions
Research Oualitv 
Citation score (CIT)
Potential Impact Category (PIC) 
Log Citation Scores (LOGCIT)
Total number of citation count to individual papers over a 
five year period from the year of publication.
Potential impact of a research publication. Ranked variable 
from lowest to highest quality (1 to 4).
Uses log CIT = l + 21og]0(C7T + 1) to more accurately gauge 
relative citation scores as perceived by researchers.
Collaboration 
Total authors (AUT)
Academic authors (AUT ACAD)
Biotechnology
authors(AUTBIOTECH)
Biotechnology firms (BIOTECH)
Academic institutions (ACAD)
Academic author ratio 
(ACADRATIOAUT)
Academic institution ratio 
(ACADRATIOINST)
Square of total authors (AUTSQ)
Number of authors listed on a paper.
Number of authors from academia listed on a paper. 
Number of industry authors listed on a paper.
Number of biotechnology firms present on a paper.
Number of academic institutions present on a paper.
Ratio of academic authors to total number of authors per 
paper.
Ratio of academic institutions to total number of institutions 
per paper.
The square of total number of authors.
Research Level 
Research Level (RL)
Research level on basic/applied scale of a research paper. 
Ranked from 1 (most applied) to 4 (most basic).
Institutional Affiliation 
Status of Lead Academic Author: 
Institutional Affiliation 
(LEADACAD GEOGCIT)
Mean citation score of institution to which the lead academic 
author belongs.
International Collaboration 
Foreign addresses (FOR)
Foreign dummy (DFOR)
Number of foreign addresses listed on a paper.
Presence of foreign addresses listed on a paper. 1 if foreign 
presence and 0 otherwise.
Author characteristics 
Author citation score (AUT CIT)
Status Of Lead Academic Author: 
Citation Score (LEADACAD CIT)
Mean citation score of all publications by a particular author. 
Mean citation score of lead academic author.
Other
Funding body presence (FUNDING) 
Year (DYEAR)
Firm (DFIRM)
Presence of UK government funding body listed on a paper. 
1 if funding present and 0 otherwise.
Year of publication dummy.
Firm dummy.
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Table 4.2 
Descriptive Statistics
Variable name Mean SD Min Max Obs
Research Oualitv
Citation Score 11.473 3.02 0 432 2915
Log Citation Score 3.192 0.321 1 6.27 2915
Potential Impact Category 2.467 1.032 1 4 2915
Collaboration3
Total authors 5.600 1.798 1 11 2915
Industry authors 1.086 0.302 1 4 2915
Academic authors 4.514 1.795 0 7 2915
Biotechnology firms 1.03 0.008 1 3 2915
Academic inst. 1.942 0.118 0 6 2915
Academic author ratio 0.722 0.209 0 0.98 2915
Academic institution ratio 0.394 0.105 0 5 2915
Square of total authors 45.791 13.54 1 7 2915
Research level
Research level 3.067 0.902 0 3.98 2915
Author characteristics
Status Of Lead Academic 23.653 2.494 5 432 2915
Author: Citation Score
Status Of Lead Academic 19.285 1.863 17 76 2915
Author: Institutional
Affiliation
Status Of Lead Author: 19.638 1.903 7 432 2915
Citation Score
Other
Foreign addresses 0.566 1.306 0 21 2915
Year - - 1988 2001 2915
an individual paper
Table 4.3
Research Level by Category and Research Quality
Research
Level
Research Quality
ObsPIC Citations
Applied 2.02 11.02 2062
Medium 2.24 11.38 659
Basic 2.58 12.07 194
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Table 4.4
Research Level by Category and Academic Contribution
Research
Level
Academic Contribution Obs
Institution Ratioa (mean) Author Ratio b (mean)
Applied 0.31 0.70 2 062
Medium 0.38 0.73 659
Basic 0.37 0.72 194
a Ratio of academic institutions to total number of institutions (biotechnology firms 
and academic institutions) present on a paper.
b Ratio of academic authors to total number of authors (biotechnology and academic) 
present on a paper.
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Table 4.5
Research Quality and Academic Contribution
Research Quality 
PIC 1-4 
(Number of 
citations)
Academic Contribution Obs
Institution Ratio a (mean) Author Ratio b (mean)
1. Less than 6 0.29 0.67 631
2. 6-11 0.35 0.71 850
3. 12-19 0.37 0.73 874
4. 20 0.41 0.78 560
a Ratio of academic institutions to total number of institutions (biotec inology firms
and academic institutions) present on a paper.
b Ratio of academic authors to total number of authors (biotechnology and academic) 
present on a paper
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Table 4.6
Variables For Controlling Selection Bias
Variable Name Definitions Mean STD Obs.
Dependent
Prediction of biotechnology 
participation (BIAS)
Selection variable: 1 if a 
paper is likely to be included 
in the sample, 0 otherwise.
- - -
Independent 
Status of lead author 
a)Citation Score 
(LEADAUTCIT)
Mean citation score of all 
publications of the lead 
author on the paper. Derived 
from AUTCIT.
17.657 2.347 355,183
b)Potential Impact Category 
(LEADAUTPIC)
Mean PIC (potential impact 
category of journal) of lead 
author.
2.962 0.287 355, 183
Research Level (RL)
Government funding 
(DFUNDING)
Publication Research Level
Presence of UK government 
funding body listed on a 
paper. 1 if funding; 0 none.
3.621 0.915 355,183
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Table 4.7 
Probit Participation Estimation
Dependent Variable: BIAS (0/1) Coefficient Standard Error
Lead Author Status: Citation Score 0.302** 0.027
(LEADAUTCIT)
Lead Author Status: Institutional Affiliation ~  -  -  ~*** 0.513 0.049
(LEADAUT GEOGCIT)
Lead Author PIC (LEADAUT PIC) 0.335** 0.051
Research Level (RL) 0.285* 0.016
Funding Body Presence (DFUNDING) 0.113** 0.011
log(A) 0.584** 0.035
- Log Likelihood 2.423
Wald %2 89.37
F -  Statistic 0.606
Obs 3,55,183
Note: ***significant at 1-percent level; ** significant at 5-percent level; * significant
10-percent level
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Table 4.8
The Effect of Academic Input on Private-Public Research Quality
Dependent Variable: 
Quality of Research 
(LOGCIT)
Heckman 
OLS 
Baseline 
Model 1
Heckman 
OLS 
Model 2
Heckman 
OLS 
Model 3
Heckman 
OLS 
Model 4
Academic Ratio 0.745*** 0.715*** 0.674*** 0.795***
(0.117) (0.129) (0.229) (0.283)
Total Authors
_  _  .  _  * * * 
0.043
♦ ♦♦
0.082 0.058*** 0.037***
(0.034) (0.061) (0.011) (0.005)
Total Authors Squared —
.  .  #** 
-0.004
(0.001)
— —
Foreign Address Dummy 0.138** 0.145*** 0.156 0.182***
(0.072) (0.043) (0.015) (0.054)
Research Level 0.633*** 0.516*** ~  — — ***0.652 0.493***
(0.159) (0.169) (0.134) (0.115)
Status O f Lead Academic 0.678***
_ *** 
0.613 0.714*** 0.781***
Author: Citation Score 
Status o f Lead Academic
(0.244) (0.184) (0.209) (0.214)
Author: Institutional
.  ^  . ***
0.618 0.527 0.509*** 0.622
Affiliation (0.213) (0.104) (0.121) (0.227)
Funding Body Dummy 0.314** 0.285** 0.313** 0.267**
(0.115) (0.156) (0.102) (0.054)
Mills Ratio 0.795** 0.862** 0.814** 0.833**
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes
Firm Dummies No No No Yes
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.42
Observations 2,915 2,915 2,915 2,915
Note: ***significant at 1-percent level; ** significant at 5-percent level; * significant 10- 
percent level. Standard errors in parentheses.
1. OLS regression with research quality as dependent variable and academic author ratio, 
total number of authors, number of foreign collaborators and research level as 
independent variables.
2. There is also a specification as in Model 1 but with standard errors clustered around 
individual biotechnology firms. The results are similar and available upon request.
3. The R-Squares is presented from the standard OLS regression after correction in the 
two-step Heckman estimation.
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Table 4.8a
Returns To Research Quality On Adding Academic Authors
Level of Academic Participation
(No. o f academic authors)
Research Quality
(Citation Score)
[pure industry] 3.442
Low 11.172
Medium 12.243
High 12.342
Fig. 4.8a
Returns To Research Quality On Adding Academic Authors
14
Citation Score
1 2  3 4
No. Of Academic Authors
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Table 4.8b
The Effect of Increasing Academic Input on Private-Public Research Quality
Dependent Variable: 
Quality o f Research 
(LOGCIT)
Heckman 
OLS 
Baseline 
Model 1
Heckman 
OLS 
Model 5
Academic Ratio 0.745***
(0.117)
0.812***
(0.213)
Academic Ratio squared — 0.103
(0.016)
Total Authors 0.043***
(0.034)
0.033
(0.002)
Foreign Address Dummy 0.138**
(0.072)
0.179***
(0.044)
Research Level 0.633***
(0.159)
0.487***
(0.128)
Status O f Lead Academic 
Author: Citation Score 
Status o f Lead Academic 
Author: Institutional 
Affiliation
0.678***
(0.244)
0.618***
(0.213)
0.722
(0.232)
_ _ _ *+* 
0.634
(0.217)
Funding Body Dummy 0.314**
(0.115)
0.258**
(0.044)
Mills Ratio 
Year Dummies 
Firm Dummies 
R-squared 
Observations
0.795**
No
No
0.27
2,915
0.811**
Yes
Yes
0.44
2,915
Note: ***significant at 1-percent level; ** significant at 5-percent level; * significant 10- 
percent level. Standard errors in parentheses.
1. Estimation method: Ordinary Least Squares.
2. The R-Squares is presented from the standard OLS regression after correction in the 
two-step Heckman estimation.
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Table 4.8c
The Effect of Increasing Academic Input on Private-Public Research Quality
Dependent Variable: 
Quality o f Research 
(LOGCIT)
Heckman 
OLS 
Model 1
Heckman 
OLS 
Model 1
Academic Ratio 0.745***
(0.117)
—
Dummies for Academic 
Ratio
[pure industry]
Low 0.773
(0.137)
Medium 0.811***
(0.202)
High 0.117***
(.022)
Total Authors 0.043
(0.034)
0.037
(0.005)
Research Level
_  _-_*** 
0.633
(0.159)
0.493
(0.115)
Status O f Lead Academic 
Author: Citation Score
0.678***
(0.244)
0.781***
(0.214)
Status o f Lead Academic 
Author: Institutional 
Affiliation
0.618***
(0.213)
0.622
(0.227)
R-squared 0.27 0.42
Observations 2,915 2,915
Note: ***significant at 1-percent level; ** significant at 5-percent level; * significant 10- 
percent level. Standard errors in parentheses.
1. Estimation method: Ordinary Least Squares.
2. [] refers to omitted reference category.
3. The R-Squares is presented from the standard OLS regression after correction in the 
two-step Heckman estimation.
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Table 4.9
Baseline Estim ation Across Research Level
Dependent 
Variable: Quality 
O f Research 
(LOGCIT)
Baseline Estimation (Model 1) 
Applied (RL) Medium (RL) Basic (RL)
Academic Ratio 0.642 0.682*” 0.692
(0.197) (0.214) (0.223)
Total Authors
^  ^  ,  ,*** 
0.046 0.049*** 0.069
(0.013) (0.017) (0.028)
Total Authors
Squared — — —
Foreign Address 0.137*** 0.174*** 0.147***
Dummy (0.028) (0.031) (0.029)
Research Level 0.602 0.589***
*  . _  _  *** 
0.493
(0.217) (0.161) (0.143)
Status O f Lead
Academic Author: 0.665*** 0.581*** 0.812***
Citation Score (0.201) (0.124) (0.267)
Status o f Lead
Academic Author: 0.613*** 0.597*** 0.634
Institutional (0.192) (0.102) (0.203)
Affiliation
Funding Body
Dummy 0.303*** 0.292*** 0.213***
(0.067) (0.056) (0.023)
Mills Ratio 0.762 0.722*** 0.745***
R-squared 0.27 0.20 0.38
Observations 2,062 659 194
Note: ***significant at 1-percent level; ** significant at 5-percent level; * significant 10- 
percent level. Standard errors in parentheses.
1. The R-Squares is presented from the standard OLS regression after correction in the 
two-step Heckman estimation.
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Table 4.10
Tests of Robustness: Estimation Using Alternate Measures of Quality &
Collaboration
Dependent Variable: Quality 
of Research
Standard 
Baseline 
OLS 
Model 1
Dependent 
as CIT 
OLS 
Model 6
Dependent
as
PIC OLS 
Model 7
Individual 
Collaboration 
OLS 
Model 8
0.745 0.693 0.657” * 0.639
Academic Ratio (0.117) _  ^ _ * * * (0.213) _  ^ , * * * (0.187)_ *** (0.313) ^ _ * * *
0.043 0.064 0.102 0.653
Total Authors (0.034) (0.012) (0.078) (0.212)
Total Authors Squared ___ — ___ ___
0.138" 0.197**
♦  ♦ ♦
0.148 0.141***
Foreign Address Dummy (0.072) (0.061) (0.045) (0.038)
0.633"* 0.643*** 0.524*** 0.492***
Research Level (0.159) (0.168) (0.179) (0.112)
Status O f Lead Academic 0.678*** 0.432*** 0.625*** 0.417***
Author: Citation Score (0.244) (0.124) (0.202) (0.108)
Status of Lead Academic
Author: Institutional 0.618*" 0.538*** 0.732 0.517***
Affiliation (0.213) (0.133) (0.203) (0.112)
Funding Body Dummy 0.314" 0.234** 0.287** 0.301**
(0.115) (0.085) (0.151) (0.067)
Mills Ratio 0.795** 0.662** 0.811** 0.634**
R-squaredb 0.27 0.14 0.13 0.24
Observations 2,915 2,915 2,915 2,915
Note: ***significant at 1-percent level; ** significant at 5-percent level; * significant 10- 
percent level. Standard errors in parentheses.
1. OLS regression with research quality as dependent variable and academic author ratio, 
total number o f authors, number of foreign collaborators and research level as 
independent variables.
2. The R-Squares is presented from the standard OLS regression after correction in the 
two-step Heckman estimation.
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Table 4.11
Cross C orrelation of Key Exogenous Variables In  Stage 2
Academic
Ratio
Research
Level
Foreign
Address
Dummy
Funding
Body
Dummy
Status O f 
Lead
Academic
Author:
Citation
Score
Status of 
Lead
Academic
Author:
Institutional
Affiliation
Academic
Ratio
.  ___*** 1.000
Research
Level 0.272* 1.000
Foreign
Address
Dummy
0.132* 0.348*
-  ^ ^  *** 1.000
Funding
Body
Dummy
0.219* 0.555* -0.049* 1.000***
Status O f
Lead
Academic
Author:
Citation
Score
0.277* 0.203* 0.242* 0.432* 1.000***
Status of
Lead
Academic
Author:
Institutional
Affiliation
0.331* 0.187* 0.311** 0.407* 0.512** 1.000
Note: ***significant at 1-percent level of significance; ** significant at 5-percent level o f 
significance; * significant 10-percent level o f significance.
Note: A shorter version o f this chapter appears in the Academy o f Management 2005 
Best Paper Proceedings.
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Chapter 5
Why Do Biotechnology Firms Make Private Knowledge Public?
5.1. Introduction
An emerging body of research focuses on the importance of partnerships between public 
organizations and private firms (here after private-public) in the growth of high 
technology industries (Pisano, 1997; Cockbum and Henderson, 1998; Gittelman and 
Kogut, 2004; Murray, 2004). In this literature, the traditional distinction between 
“upstream” basic science produced in the public sector and “downstream” technological 
development undertaken by private firms is blurred. High technology firms engage in 
basic scientific research, the traditional preserve of the public sector. These firms 
sometimes specialize purely in scientific research, licensing their intellectual property 
rather than directly engaging in commercial development. This is particularly evident in 
the biotechnology industry (Financial Times, 2005).
Private firms organize their research in ways that mimic the practices found in 
universities and publicly funded organizations (Cockbum and Henderson, 1998; 
Dasgupta and David, 1994; Gittelman and Kogut, 2003). Further blurring the distinction 
between the public and private spheres is the fact that many high technology firms mimic 
open-science norms by regularly publishing the results of their research in peer-reviewed 
scientific journals (Hicks, 2002). In doing so, these firms engage in seemingly irrational 
behavior. This is because the classic economic models o f scientific innovation
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presuppose that firms will reveal as little information about their scientific activities as 
possible, especially while engaged in a research and development (R&D) race with their 
competition (Arrow, 1964; Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990; Bhattacharya et al., 1992; 
Dasgupta, 2000). There is, thus, a decided lack of empirical literature exploring the open- 
science behavior of firms. We have little understanding of why firms undertake pure 
science research and then proceed to publish the results from basic research activity. We 
are also unsure o f what benefits, if  any, do firms derive from engaging in upstream basic 
science and making their efforts public?
I address these two questions by first proposing a model of open-science innovation that 
includes three separate measures o f innovative activity: R&D expenditure, patent counts 
and published scientific publications. I argue that while R&D expenditures signal the 
commitment o f a firm’s resources towards innovation, and patents record the completion 
o f R&D activity, the stock o f scientific papers, which up to now have never been used as 
a predictor o f financial success, play a crucial role in that they signal the quality of a 
firm’s R&D to a public audience.
Unlike large R&D led conglomerates, biotechnology firms, at least in their early years, 
are fairly small and rely on speculative venture capital, collaborative and contractual 
R&D, and the support o f capital markets to finance their operations. By publishing 
scientific papers, biotechnology firms are credited for the quality o f their R&D efforts.
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The question o f how firms benefit from open science is also an important one. In this 
chapter, I undertake a study o f the financial performance o f U.K. based biotechnology 
firms during the years 1988-2000 and focus attention on the stock o f peer-reviewed 
published scientific papers produced by firms. My results indicate that publishing 
scientific papers brings real financial gains to biotechnology firms and that, on average, 
publishing fourteen scientific papers in academic journals has approximately the same 
impact on a firm’s market value as obtaining a single patent. In addition, collaboration 
can result in better research, which in turn leads to better products. In other words, R&D 
can indeed have causal effects on performance.
I use financial market valuation as a proxy for firm performance for several reasons. This 
measure is particularly germane in the case o f entrepreneurial biotechnology firms, given 
that they that often lack profits or sales in their early years. Furthermore, equity financing 
is o f particular strategic importance to biotechnology firms (Wall Street Journal, 2005) 
and market valuation is thus highly relevant in its own right (Financial Times, 2005).
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 surveys the previous literature on 
innovation. Section 5.3 builds my theoretical model and Section 5.4 outlines the 
empirical model used in the estimation. Section 5.5 describes the data set and provides a 
description o f the variables used in my empirical analysis. Section 5.6 presents the 
results. Section 5.7 concludes by presenting the key implications o f this analysis with 
suggestions for future research.
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5.2. Literature Review
5.2.1. Innovation and Measurement
Scholars have noted the role of science and innovation in generating technological 
change and firm and national wealth (e.g. see Schumpeter, 1942), but have been 
challenged by the difficulty o f measuring knowledge flows (Krugman, 1991) and their 
economic impact (Kuznets, 1962; Cohen & Levin, 1989).
The starting point in measuring innovation is the knowledge production function as 
formalized by Zvi Griliches (1979) in which firms exist exogenously and then engage in 
the pursuit o f new knowledge as an input into innovative activity. In its classical form, 
Griliches (1979) model sought to predict the performance o f knowledge intensive firms 
(most often, its market valuation) as a function of various measures o f its innovative 
capability. The empirical estimation of the knowledge function however was problematic 
from the start primarily due to the difficulty in measuring and obtaining data on inventive 
activity.
Until recently, the state o f the art (Trajtenberg and Jaffe, 2002) in estimating the 
knowledge function in knowledge intensive industries has used R&D expenditures, 
patent counts and citation-weighted patent counts as traditional measures o f inventive 
activity. I outline the usage and limitations of these measures below.
5.2.2. Traditional Innovation Measures
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R&D Expenditures. The original analyses of inventive activity focused on R&D 
investments as a proxy for a firms’ knowledge capability (Griliches, 1979). As R&D is 
considered to be the greatest source o f new economic knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990), a stream of research has analyzed the contribution o f R&D expenditure to 
economic impact. However, the use o f R&D to measure technological change is limited 
for a number of reasons. First, quantitative reporting o f R&D expenditures is required in 
only a few countries (most prominently the UK and US). Second, R&D is a measure of 
innovation input rather than output (akin to measuring how many have worked rather 
how much is produced). Furthermore, R&D measures reflect only those formal efforts to 
generate innovation (e.g. budgets for labs, see Kleinknecht and Verspagen, 1989), and do 
not take into consideration the important informal activities (Santarelli and Sterlachinni, 
1990). Finally, R&D labs’ budgets are dedicated not only to new innovation, but also to 
imitation and technology transfer (Mansfield, 1989). Despite these limitations, a 
consistent finding in the empirical evidence is that R&D expenditures explain a 
reasonable fraction of market value variation after controlling for ordinary assets 
(Griliches, 1981; Ben-Zion, 1984; Jaffe, 1986; Hall, 1993b, Blundell et al., 1995; Oriani 
and Sobrero, 2003).
Paten t Counts. A second means o f measuring innovation is the use o f patent counts. 
Since the data became publicly available in the 1960s, scholars have used patents and 
patent counts as a measure o f innovation output. Recent developments including the 
digitization of patent documents in electronic format and the creation o f free databases 
(Hall et al., 2002) have prompted further studies. Patents were initially seen as a solution
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to the problems of measurement in R&D expenditure, as patents provide detailed 
information about the innovation output (e.g. area o f technology, inventors), are 
numerous, and have been reported in the same manner for over 100 years (Hall et al., 
2002).
However, patents also suffer from a number o f problems. First, simple patent counts do 
not reflect the heterogeneity in patent quality (Hall et al., 2002). Second, patents are a 
measure of intermediate output as patents reflect new knowledge o f innovation, but not 
economic value. Most patented inventions do not result in innovation and furthermore, 
indeed most inventions which do result in innovations are not patented (Gittelman and 
Alcacer, 2004). The weakness o f using patents as an independent measure o f innovation 
has been noted over time (Scherer, 1983; Mansfield, 1989) and is perhaps best articulated 
by Griliches (1990: 1999) who pioneered their use: “Ideally, we might hope that patent 
statistics would provide a measure o f the (innovative) output. . . the reality, however, is 
far from it. The dream o f getting hold of an output indicator of inventive activity is one 
of the strong motivating forces for economic research in this area.” A consistent finding 
in the patents literature is that they offer a weaker correlation to market value than R&D 
(for a thorough review o f this literature, see Jaffe and Trajtenberg., 2005).
C itation W eighted Patents. Since the National Bureau o f Economic Research (NBER)’s 
recent public release o f citation-weighted patents data (detailed in Hall et al., 2002), a 
number o f scholars have made use of this new measure (Narin et al., 1997; Scherer et al., 
1998). These citations identify prior art and provide a map o f linkages among inventions,
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inventors, scientists, firm and geographic locations. Citation-weighted patents were 
thought to be a good measure of quality, which would be reflected in market value. 
Indeed, received citations have been said to be an indicator o f the size o f the 
technological footprint of the patent (Hall et al, 2002) and a number o f studies 
demonstrate citation-weighted patent counts to be a measure o f research quality (for a 
review of these studies see Trajtenberg, 1990). More recent research, however has 
highlighted a number of weaknesses associated with citation weighted patents. First, 
patents must be considered within the multifaceted legal and institutional environment for 
which they were designed, and as such are meant to classify and assert the patentability 
and property rights for an innovation. Patents make claims to intellectual property and 
citations are often used to scope the claims o f earlier citations. Indeed, forty percent o f 
patent citations have been found to have been added by the patent examiner (Alcacer & 
Gittelman, 2004).
5.2.3. New Measures of Innovation Output
Taken together, although R&D expenditures, patent counts and citation weighted patent 
counts have been used to explain market value, we have seen that there are numerous 
problems inherent in this approach. These problems are further compounded by their 
inadequacy to address the increasingly blurred divide between private-public 
collaboration. While previous research has described the spillover o f knowledge from 
universities to private firms (e.g. Acs, Audretsch and Feldman, 1992), more recent 
studies explore the interactions between the two spheres, including collaborative research
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and co-authorship of publications (e.g. Murray, 2002; Chapter 4). Indeed, this new mode 
o f knowledge production at the interface o f public and private organizations requires new 
measures o f the quality of innovative activities, including scientific publication counts 
and citation-weighted publications (described below).
Citation-W eighted Scientific Publication Counts. The use of scientific publications in 
a market value equation o f biotechnology firms to value knowledge assets is a key 
innovation in my research. That firms publish scientific papers in academic journals is 
well documented (Murray, 2004; Gittelman and Kogut, 2005; Chapter 4). What is less 
well understood is how publishing papers impacts performance. To the extent o f the 
knowledge of this author, this is the first analysis to include scientific publications in a 
traditional market value estimation in biotechnology.
The simplest measure o f scientific research output is to count the number o f papers 
published by researchers employed in a biotechnology firm in a given time period. 
However, as in the case o f patents, these a simple count measure does not account for 
quality and the impact o f a scientific paper varies tremendously (Meyer, 2000). A range 
of bibliometric techniques have been developed in classifying, and measuring the impact 
o f scientific papers. In the simplest form, the citations received by a scientific paper is a 
measure o f its impact on the scientific community (for a more extensive discussion see 
Chapter 4). A deeper discussion of the use o f citations follows later in this chapter.
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In the next section, I outline a model o f Open-Science Innovation that includes these new 
measures of innovative activity (i.e., paper counts and citation-weighted papers), along 
with traditional R&D expenditures, patent counts and citation-weighted patents measures.
5.3. Theoretical F ram ew ork
9QIn this chapter I propose an open science framework of innovation , whereby firms make 
investments in R&D to develop their innovative capability. En route, they not only obtain 
patents but also participate in public science by publishing scientific papers. Thus, at any 
given time, we are able to record three dimensions of a firm’s innovative activity:
1. R&D investment stocks
2. Citation-weighted patent stocks
3. Citation-weighted publication stocks
In the remainder o f this section, I outline the information contained in each of these 
measures and then show why the latter dimension, despite having never been used until 
now as a predictor o f financial success, is a crucial independent measure o f innovation in 
its own right.
1. R& D Stocks. At time r  there is a component of a firm’s R&D investment (its most 
recent expenditure) that has not yet had a chance to produce either patents, scientific 
papers or tangible products. Thus, the total R&D stock observed at time r  has two
29 A similar model may be found in the community o f open-source software. Work by von Hippel (1987, 
2001) and others have shown that rivals or competitors in the software labor market can willingly co­
operate and trade-know in return for acceptance and status in the community. Similar norms o f practice 
exist in other areas o f  science including biotechnology.
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components: the old R&D whose output can be readily judged, and new R&D that is still 
unproven . In this chapter, I argue that this stock of unproven R&D reveals the 
commitment o f a firm’s resources to innovation. This interpretation is strengthened by 
the findings o f Toivanen, Stoneman and Bosworth (2002) who report, using a fourteen 
year panel data set, that R&D has a stronger effect in the market value regression in the 
time period following the release o f its R&D budget (i.e., when it first announces the
 ^ t
figures publicly). Further, in their annual reports, biotech firms typically use phrasing 
that signals commitment when reporting their R&D budget for the upcoming year.
2. C itation-W eighted Paten t Stocks. The goal o f a successful R&D program is to secure 
valuable patents that translate into products and services that would earn a firm revenues. 
However, as noted earlier, when we observe R&D stocks at time r ,  due to the lag 
inherent in research work, the stock o f new R&D investment has not yet had an 
opportunity to produce patents.
However, by observing the stock of citation-weighted32 patents previously accumulated 
by a firm, we obtain a measure of a firm’s past innovative success. Thus, notwithstanding 
any major structural changes within the firm, it is reasonable to expect that its previous
30 There is no way, ex ante, to separate old and new stocks o f R&D with any degree o f accuracy. Thus the 
separation o f  R&D stocks into “old” and “new” R&D is a purely notional concept rather than an empirical 
distinction.
31 Hedge funds and other financial institutions also use a similar language. For example, when discussing 
the prospects o f a portfolio biotech firm, the Annual Report 2005 o f  the International Biotechnology Trust 
interprets its R&D outlay for the following year as “(X firm)...commits $485.34 million dollars to research 
and development” (International Biotechnology Trust 2005).
32 As noted earlier citations listed on a patent are primarily listed as markers o f ‘prior art’. Thus, patent 
citations play an important legal function rather than accurately record the relative importance o f  patents. 
We find that even after weighting patents by the citations they receive, patents remain highly skewed in 
their economic value (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2000).
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patenting success (represented by its patent stocks) are a guide to the patenting 
productivity o f a firm’s new R&D stock.
3. Citation-W eighted Publication Stocks. While patent counts are a measure o f 
innovative success, they are incomplete due to the variability in their economic value. I 
argue that the citation-weighted stock o f scientific papers authored by a firm provides a 
valuable signal o f the future economic value of its patent stock by measuring the quality 
o f its tacit scientific knowledge base.
Scientific papers are read and cited by other scientists. By citing a paper, scientists 
acknowledge a direct scientific debt. Therefore, the more citations a paper receives, the 
greater has been its impact in the scientific community. Thus, by weighting publication 
counts by citations, we obtain a measure for the quality o f science produced by a biotech 
firm as judged by a cohort of fellow scientific experts who are who are usually defined in 
a niche area o f specialization.
Thus, I argue that the three measures o f innovation discussed above (R&D, citation- 
weighted patents and citation-weighted publications) are not interchangeable measures o f 
innovation but rather reveal different dimensions o f a firm’s innovative effort. I f  this 
assertion is true, entering R&D, patents and citation-weighted publications into a single 
market value equation should reveal separately the information contained by them. 
Therefore, in the next section, I construct an empirical model on this basis and rigorously 
test this assertion using unique data from the U.K. biotech industry during the years
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1988-2000, in order to flush out the theoretical and empirical implications of this open- 
science model of innovation.
5.4. Em pirical Model
Using firm market value as the measure o f firm performance relies on the fact that firms 
are composed of bundles of assets (both tangible as well as intangible) whose values are 
determined by trading o f the firm’s shares on the financial market. The typical model o f 
market value hypothesizes that the market value of a firm is a function of the set of assets 
that it comprises:
V(AvA2,A 3,...) = f { A x,A 2,A3)...) (Equation 5.1)
where f  is an unknown function that describes how the assets combine to create market 
value. I f  the firm invests in the various assets A1,A2,A3... according to a value 
maximizing dynamic program, and if  the stock market is efficient, the function /  will be 
the value function associated with that dynamic program.
However, in estimating Equation 5.1 we run against a problem: its functional form is not 
well understood, nor is it easy to compute from an explicit dynamic program or 
maximization model (Hayashi and Inoue 1991). There are two predominant 
specifications o f the value function, an additively separable linear specification and a 
multiplicative separable specification o f the Cobb-Douglas form.
33 For theoretical development o f  this usage, see Hall (2000). For the first empirical usage see Griliches 
(1981), later developed by Hall (1998).
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O f these, the linear specification is more commonly used for two reasons. In the linear, 
additively separable version, the marginal shadow value o f the assets is equalized across 
firms, while the Cobb-Douglas form assumes that the value elasticity is equalized. While 
the constant elasticity form tends to fit the data better, a constant shadow value across 
firms is more defensible from a market efficiency point o f view. The better fit provided 
by the Cobb-Douglas form is because this specification is less sensitive to outliers. 
However, outliers are important in knowledge-based industries. Thus, to discount the 
importance o f high value patents or highly cited publications weakens the interpretation 
o f the market value equation in the context of high tech.
For these reasons, in my analysis, I adopt the linear specification34 as was first used by 
Griliches (1979). This model is given by:
Vi.XA’K )  = 1iAA,> + (Equation 5.2)
In general, q may vary across firms and time. Thus,
qit = exp( / .  + mt + uit) (Equation 5.3)
where f i is a firm effect, mt is the market effect at time /, and ujt is an independently 
distributed error term. Hence the term q allows for the fact that the market valuation may
vary across firms and time, and that there also may be ‘noise’ in the valuation.
Substituting Equation (5.2) in Equation (5.3) , I obtain 
Vu (A,K)=  +"'*“u )(AII + yKtt f  (Equation 5.4)
Taking logarithms both sides, I arrive at
34 In contrast, the log-linear model has the Cobb-Douglas form Vit(A,K) = qtA jt . I also run the 
model using this specification, and find, that the broad results remain unchanged. The results are available 
from the author upon request.
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log K, = f ,  + m, + ar, log(A„ + yrK„) + (Equation 5.5)
By re-arranging the terms, I can rewrite (5.5) as
>0g V„ = f l + ml + crl log [A„ (1 + y,Ku /A ,)]  + w,, (Equation 5.6)
which gives,
log Vit = f i + mt + crt logAit + cr, log(l + y f i it/A it) + uit (Equation 5.7)
which is the formal model that I estimate in my analysis.
Griliches (1981) takes the log A term to the left hand side o f Equation 5.7 and uses 
lo g ( % )  as a dependent variable. Other studies include the logyf as an explanatory
variable (Hall 1993a, Bosworth and Rogers 1998). These variations are all essentially 
modifications o f Equation 5.7 and do not challenge the basic empirical relationship being 
tested in any fundamental way.
The variable which captures firm effects, can be proxied by other explanatory 
variables. Past revenue or profit growth for the firm are sometimes taken to imply high 
future profits and hence high market values. Firms may also have different risk premiums 
depending on their exposure to debt and shareholder’s equity. I describe set o f variables 
that capture this firm heterogeneity in section 5 .5 .2 .3 .1 capture the effect o f variable mt 
by including year dummies. Estimating Ait is a relatively straightforward affair as data 
on tangible assets o f a firm are readily available from business databases and annual 
reports (see 5.4.1).
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In the market value equation (5.7), the impact o f firms’ innovation is measured by K i t 
which I proxy by R&D expenditures, patent counts and citation-weighted counts o f 
scientific publications as described in Section 5.2.3 and 5.5.2.2. In order to assess the 
relative quantitative impacts o f the three measures o f innovation on market value, I need
and similarly I derive the semi-elasticities for the patent and citation-weighted 
publication stocks.
5.5.1. Data
I obtained a list o f 113 U.K. biotechnology firms from surveying the financial press and 
an exhaustive biotechnology industry report prepared by the Department o f Trade and 
Industry (2005). The financial and accounting data o f these firms was sourced from the 
Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database. FAME contains a comprehensive list o f 
2.9 million U.K. and Republic o f Ireland companies. It has a clear advantage over other 
competing databases such as DataStream by focusing purely on U.K. and Irish companies
35 This is a partial derivative, holding the other ratios constant.
to compute the semi-elasticities for the different stocks. For R&D stocks, I obtain,
PAPERS_CITES
A
(Equation 5.8)
5.5. Data and Variables
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(including those that are not publicly listed) and offering a greater breadth of information 
on these firms. FAME includes not only standard financial and accounting data 
(including R&D expenditures) but also information on the composition o f the board and 
senior management, the holding structure of the company, its main competitors, the most 
profitable companies in its peer group and the latest news about the company from the 
business press. This information is very useful for constructing a wider range o f 
performance variables as well as building a deeper intuition for the mechanics o f the 
industry acquired whilst constructing the dataset.
The dataset of scientific papers produced by U.K. biotechnology firms during the years 
1988-2001 is obtained from the Research Output Database (ROD) and from a tally o f 
355,183 individual scientific papers in the original ROD database, I obtain 2,915 papers 
firms that list at least one author from a biotechnology firm as a contributing author (as 
identified by the address field). I have described this dataset in more detail previously in 
Chapter 4.
The patent data are sourced from the computerized database available from the U.S. 
Patent Office. The decision to use U.S. as opposed to U.K. patents was motivated by the 
desire to screen out the numerous low value patents taken out each year. Given the 
strategic importance o f the U.S. market, all patents seen as important, are patented in the 
U.S. (Kretschmer et al., 2005). Using U.S. patents only also sidesteps the problem of 
duplicate patent counts (awarded in the UK and in the U.S.) since the U.S. patents 
include global patents registered in the U.S. There are some caveats though: the low cost
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of taking out a patent in the US combined with the prevalence o f protective patenting 
even when the actual value o f a patent is uncertain might lead to frivolous patenting 
behavior in the US market and it is not clear that only the best patents are taken out in the 
US market.
Because of the way in which the patents are organized within the data base, matching the 
patents owned by a firm to firm level data is a challenging task. Firms patent under a 
variety o f names (their own and those of their subsidiaries) and the Patent Office does not 
use a unique identifier linking the disparate patentees. In order to obtain a clean dataset of 
patent ownership, I had to match names o f patent owners across a variety o f ownership 
structures. To do so, I used a variety o f sources; predominantly the FAME database but 
also the Who Owns Whom Directory of Corporate Affiliations (2002), in addition to 
referring to primary sources such as annual reports. O f the 113 firms in my dataset, I 
corrected ownership data to 67 o f them (over 50% of them). The mean number of patents 
without the ownership correction was 11.72, while the corrected mean stood at 3.321. 
This is a significant correction in the data and owes to the fact that without cleaning up 
the ownership data, patents are usually counted more than once as the same patent is 
shown to be owned by different entities which are really the same. Thus, this is a 
significant correction to the patent data used in my dataset.
5.5.2 Variables
Tables 5.1 provides a listing o f my analytical variables with a brief description o f their 
definitions. Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for my key variables.
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5.5.2.I. Market Value of Biotechnology Firms
The market valuation of biotechnology firms is my central variable of firm performance. 
From 1988-2001,1 obtained the daily market value o f a firm’s issued common stock for 
those firms that were listed on the London Stock Exchange (for the days the company 
traded) from the FAME database. O f a total of 113 firms that were originally in my 
database, I reduced the number o f firms to 87 resulting in a total of 1131 observations in 
order to obtain a balanced panel data for the entire period . I then found the average 
market capitalization o f its issued common shares over the year. To this number I add the 
market value o f the debt (extracted from annual reports) to arrive at an estimate o f the 
total market value o f a firm i in year t . (recorded as MKTVALit). O f the 1131 
observations in my dataset I corrected for various changes that could effect its market 
valuation. Particularly, important were stock splits, mergers and acquisitions. I did this by 
running simple tests on my dataset to record sustained dips or increases in market 
valuation and stock price in a single direction (to weed out the fairly high volatility 
prevalent anyway in biotech asset prices) . O f the 1131 observations there were around 
226 such incidents linked to 83 out o f the 87 firms in my dataset. I then matched the 
observations with the business press (using F.A.M.E, the Financial Times, the Wall Street 
Journal and other online sources) to take note o f mergers or acquisitions that could have
36 The results remain consistent when I run regressions for the entire panel using an unbalanced panel data 
specification. The key advantage in using a balance panel data is because is to avoid issues o f entry and exit 
entering into my analysis. I also m n my regressions for those firms that were in existence in 1988 between 
1992-2001, allowing for 5 years to build knowledge stocks. The results are broadly comparable and I retain 
my analysis at the level o f  the balanced panel. The results for these alternative specifications are available 
from the author upon request.
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impacted the stock. I found that of the 87 firms used in my observation, some 11 firms 
were acquired by other firms in my dataset. I adjusted my dataset to reflect this change. I 
also tracked another 114 observations to M&A activity related to firms outside my 
dataset. O f the remaining 101 observations, I tracked down 32 stock splits (these were 
easier to observe from the data as the stock price usually halved with the underlying 
market valuation staying the same) and adjusted for these well. The remaining 62 
fluctuations remain unverified but can probably be attributed to market volatility or 
market reaction to actions of biotechnology firms (for example, the success or failure o f a 
drug in the FDA approval process).
§.§.2.2. M easures of Scientific Knowledge
The innovative capability o f a biotechnology firm is proxied by three separate measures: 
R&D investments, patent counts and citation-weighted publication counts. The 
constructed variables are described below:
R&D Investments. In my sample, R&D investment makes up 40% of a firm’s operating 
expenditure. R&D expenses are an expression o f the technical aggressiveness o f these 
firms, which is an important strategic attribute in this industry. For example, the term 
“bum rate” is used by venture capitalists and industry analysts to describe the high rate o f 
R&D spending per month which is then used to calculate the number o f months the firm 
can survive. Further, in asset light biotechnology firms, firms’ R&D investments are its
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most visible asset and therefore play a dominant role in its market valuation (Chan et al., 
1999).
R&D expenditures are obtained from the FAME database and verified by cross checking 
against a firm’s annual report (disclosure of R&D expenditures is compulsory according 
to U.K. company law). I record the variable R & D jt as the R&D expenditure o f firm i in 
year t.
Paten t Counts and C itation-W eighted Patent Counts. As seen earlier, the use of patent 
data in economic analysis stretches back to the work of Schmookler (1966) and Scherer 
(1965). The availability o f information from the U.S. patent office in machine-readable 
form in late 1987 spurred greater use o f patent information in the economic analyses of 
innovation and technological growth. Schankerman and Pakes (1986) provide a broad 
overview o f the use o f European patent data. A fuller review of the empirical work using 
patent data can be found in Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002).
I record variable PATit as the number of patents earned by firm i in year 1.1  weigh the 
raw patent counts by multiplying the individual patents by the number of citations 
(recorded as PATCITESjt) received by the patents from the date it is issued until five 
years after (i.e., if  a patent is issued in 1989,1 record all citations till the end o f 1994), 
and record this variable as PATWEIGHTEDi,37.
37 An alternative weighting scheme is used by Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2000) in which rather than 
arbitrarily truncating the citation distribution after a period o f five years, they use a weighting algorithm to 
estimate the “true” citation score over the lifetime o f an awarded patent. I run my results using both the
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Publication Counts and Citation-W eighted Publication Counts. The original key 
variable in my analysis is the citation-weighted stock of scientific papers produced by a 
biotechnology firm. My database includes all scientific papers published in the UK and 
Ireland, during the years 1988-2000 which include at least one biotechnology author in 
the address field (see Section 3.1). From this database, I construct a simple count o f all 
scientific papers authored by a biotechnology firm in a given year (denoted by 
PAPERCOUNTit). I then weigh this simple count by two different citation measures: 
first, a simple citation based count, and, secondly, a measure based on the prestige o f the 
journal in which a scientific paper is published. While both these measures capture 
research quality, they are based on slightly different logic, which is outlined later in the 
section.
First, I total the number o f citation counts to individual papers going forward five years 
from the date o f publication. I denoted this total number o f citations received as ClTESi r  
The citations are tracked across scientific publications present in the Science Citation 
Index (SCI). Only citations from original research articles were included, eliminating 
meeting notes, review articles and book reviews, to more accurately gauge genuine 
impact. I then weigh the publications by the logarithm transformation o f the raw citation 
score:
patent as well as the publication citations using this method and find no significant alternation to my results 
(available upon request) primarily because 80% o f the citations to both patents as well as publications are 
received within the first five years o f  their lifetime (Lewision et al, 2003) and thus the additional 
sophistication offers very little empirical traction.
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log citations = 1 + 2 log]0 (citations +1) (Equation 5.9)
where citations is the total raw citation count to an individual paper. I record this 
variable as LOGCITESit . Thus when a paper gets no citations, LOGCITESi t = 1, and 
when it receives 100 citations, LOGCITESn equals about 5. This roughly corresponds to 
the relative subjective weight that scientists and scientific administrators give to the
- lO
relative importance of the papers in the two instances, which is not 100:1 but 5:1 . Thus, 
I can then multiply PAPERCOUNTit and LOGCITESi t to obtain an accurate citation- 
weighted publication count. This variable is recorded as PAPERS_LOGCITESj t.
An alternate measure o f research quality uses the journal in which a paper is published as 
a proxy for the quality o f the article. Articles that are published in higher prestige journals 
(i.e., journals which contain articles that receive a higher than average number o f 
citations) are judged to be o f higher quality than lower ranking journals. It is important to 
note that the more direct measure o f citation counts and the second measure o f the journal 
quality to proxy for the quality o f the article are similar measures but not identical. The 
two measures reveal how the paper has been judged by two different readerships: the 
general body of researchers in the case o f direct citation counts, and, in the second case, a 
journal editor and a few specialized reviewers.
To create my research quality variable based on journal quality (denoted PIC standing for 
Potential Impact Category), I record the mean number of citations to papers published in
38 In two separate polls (Lewison et al., 2003), scientific administrators and researchers in the biomedical 
sciences voted the relative importance o f papers in “excellent” journals about four to five times that o f 
papers in “ordinary” journals, and that o f paper in “good” journals about two to three times o f the latter.
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the journal in a given year that are received in the year of publication through the fourth 
year after publication. The fortunes o f journals rise and fall and by capping citations to 
five years, an additional benefit is that the citation weight more accurately captures the 
relative quality of a journal during the time period an article is published. I then use the 
log transformation of Equation (5.9) on the mean journal citation scores to more 
accurately reflect the perceptions o f scientific administrators and medical researchers (see 
above). I record the variable PAPERS_PICit as PAPERCOUNTit times PICit as a 
measure o f scientific output controlling for quality as reflected by the relative prestige of 
the journal in which the article is published.
Constructing Stocks for R&D, Patents and Citation-W eighted Publications. To
estimate my market value equation, I calculate the “stock” o f R&D, patents and citation- 
weighted scientific publications accumulated by a firm at a given moment in time. To do 
so, I need to construct equations that capture the flow of R&D expenditures, patents and 
papers outlined earlier in a robust stock. I outline my methods below.
The following equation is used to approximate the stock o f R&D of firm i in year t 
(denoted by KR  & Di t):
KR & Dit = t R & D t_k( l - S ) k (Equation 5.10)
£=0
where t denotes the current time, t -  k  denotes past periods, 8  denotes the constant rate 
o f depreciation, and k  denotes the number o f compounding periods. I fix the rate o f 
depreciation at 15 percent keeping with many previous studies in the USA and UK, 
notably Ben Zion (1984) who uses UK data.
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I construct the patent stock variable of firm / in year t (denoted by KPATit) along 
similar lines as the R&D stock shown previously. Thus,
oo
KPATit = 'YJPATWEIGHTED,_k( \ -  8 f  (Equation 5.11)
*=0
where, as previously, t denotes the current time, t - k  denotes past periods, 8  denotes 
the constant rate of depreciation, and k  denotes the number o f compounding periods.
As above, the stock o f scientific publications o f firm i in year t is constructed using
KPAPERS_ LOGCITES,, = tPAPERS_LO G C ITES„k( \ - S)k (Equation 5.12)
*=0
(replacing PAPERS_LOGCITESit by PAPERS _PIC it , in my alternative estimation o f 
research quality.)
5.5.2.3. Control Variables
The empirical specification includes a host of financial and accounting measures as 
control variables in order to more completely isolate the impact o f firms’ knowledge 
assets on its market value.
To the extent that they are valuation-relevant, the inclusion o f control variables allows 
tighter inferences about the contributions that intangible assets make to market value. 
There is a number o f financial and accounting variables in which financial markets take 
an interest and which prove to be statistically relevant to firm performance. Information 
on these are easily found in the firms’ annual statements on income, cash flow, and the
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balance o f assets and liabilities as well as from the primary database FAME. The choice 
of control variables is based on both statistical relevance as evidenced in the dataset and 
theoretical consistency. A review of the corporate finance literature (see Ross, 
Westerfield and Jaffe 1996) led me to the following variables -  profit before tax, long 
term investments, equity and current assets.
5.6. Results
5.6.1. Baseline Estim ate
In my empirical model (Equation 5.7), market value is assumed to depend on three 
measures o f innovation: R&D expenditures, citation-weighted patent yield, and on the 
stock o f citation-weighted publications.
Table 5.3, Column 1 presents the estimation o f Equation 5.7 with only R&D and patent 
stocks. Table 5.3, Column 2 presents the full estimation with R&D and patent stocks and 
citation-weighted publications. I find that adding scientific citation stocks improves the 
predictive power (as measured by the R-squared) o f  the model.
Thus, it is clear that each of the measures -  R&D, patent counts and citation-weighted 
publications are not just interchangeable measures o f innovation but convey valuable 
information on the market valuation o f a biotech firm on top o f what could be inferred 
from the other variables. For a given level of R&D spending, firms that manage to patent
147
148
more will presumably have higher market valuations, and also for firms with similar 
patent portfolios, higher quality scientific research as measured by citation-weighted 
publications will generate higher market valuation.
In order to compare the coefficients of the three measures o f innovation, I compute the 
semi-elasticities of the various stocks as described in Equation 5.8 using the estimates 
((yi’h ’Yi) from Table 5.3, Column (2) and present the results in Table 5 .4 .1 find that an 
increase o f one percentage point in the R&D intensity of a firm (i.e., in the ratio o f 
R&D/Assets) leads to a similar increase in market value (about 0.8%, to be precise). An 
extra patent/million($) o f R&D boosts market value by about 2% and an extra citation to 
a scientific publication authored by an employee of the firm per patent by around 
0.013%. Thus, on average, 14 published scientific publications make approximately the 
same contribution to a firm’s market value as a single patented innovation.
This is a very interesting result, highlighting the importance o f scientific papers in the 
market value equation. It also confirms the working hypothesis o f my analysis; that 
scientific papers are an important signal o f scientific capability (a signal which is 
independent o f the information contained in patents and R&D expenditures) and will 
therefore be highly correlated with market value. It is also interesting to note that the 
statistics in Table 4 make it clear that the ratios (when computed at the mean, median 
and ratio o f totals) are far from normally or even symmetrically distributed, which 
suggests that some exploration o f the distribution o f the citations, such as the impact of
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highly cited publications might prove insightful. I proceed on this basis in the next 
section.
5.6.2. The Impact of Highly Cited Papers on Market Value
Table 5.4, which evaluates the impact of citation-weighted publications at the mean, 
median, and ratio of totals, alludes to the fact that the distribution o f citations is very 
skewed. In fact, about one quarter o f all scientific papers get zero citations, and only a
<5 Q
few dozen (out of tens of thousands) receive 100 citations or more . This suggests that 
the average effect that we get in my baseline regression (Table 5.3, Column 2) may not 
reveal the full extent o f the impact of the tail o f the citations distribution.
To explore the impact of the citations distribution on the baseline market value equation 
(Equation 5.7), I break the scientific citations/patents variable up into five groups, where 
the number o f citations received are < 5, 5-6, 7-10 (6 is the median), 11-20, > 20, and 
include dummy variables for each (the first serves as the base category). As shown in 
Table 5.5, Column 2, for firms with fewer than the median number of scientific citations 
per patent, it makes no difference how far below the median they fall: firms with 5-6 
citations per patent have only slightly higher value than those with less than 5. However, 
firms that average more than the median number o f citations per patent exhibit a very 
significant increase in market value: 10% higher if  having 7-10 citations per patent, and 
35% higher if  having 2-3 times the median (11-20 citations per patent). The most
39 The skewness o f  the citation distribution is consistent with bibliometric studies o f scientific research 
(Bosworth and Mahdian 1999).
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dramatic effect are for those scientific papers that receive more than 20 cites per patent: 
the market value o f these firms is 54% higher than if  the firm’s paper output had 
generated 4 or fewer citations.
These statistics are not as surprising as they appear. The role of “star science” in the 
success o f biotechnology firms has been well documented. Research by Zucker, Darby 
and Armstrong (2002) on the U.S. biotechnology industry for example found that a 
robust indicator o f firm’s tacit knowledge capture (and strong predictor o f its success) is 
the number of research articles written by firm scientists in collaboration with “star” 
scientists, usually working at top universities. Here I find that highly cited scientific 
publications are more strongly correlated with market success than mediocre ones, and in 
my previous work (Chapter 4) show that biotech firms have a greater chance o f 
producing highly cited papers by collaborating with “star” scientists, i.e., scientists with 
established research reputations and usually employed at top research universities. Thus, 
nurturing and maintaining links with public science such as universities and research 
institutes, appears to be crucial to the future financial success o f biotech firms.
5.6.3. The Impact of Citations by Pharmaceutical Firms on Market Value
Large pharmaceutical firms play a key role in the biotechnology industry. Research has 
shown that young biotechnology firms benefit greatly from collaborations with “big 
pharma” (Pisano 1991; Zucker and Darby 1998). These gains can be material, with large 
pharmaceutical firms making venture capital investments in promising young
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biotechnology firms, or, as is more often the case, relational, with young biotechnology 
firms working jointly on collaborative R&D with large pharmaceutical firms. Scientific 
citations are a mechanism of expressing intellectual debt and, therefore, I would expect a 
greater impact to a biotechnology firm’s market valuation from a citation by a 
pharmaceutical firm than from a more “generic” citation.
To capture the difference in these citations, I break up my citation stock into two 
categories -  citations received from large pharmaceutical firms40 (“big pharma”) and 
citations received from others. Table 5.6, Column 2 displays the results after splitting my 
citation stocks in this way. I find that the coefficient for pharmaceutical citations is higher 
than non-pharmaceutical citations by a ratio of nearly 10:1. This suggests that in terms o f 
market value, a pharmaceutical citation is worth nearly ten times more than a regular 
citation. Thus, my results agree with previous research on the role o f large 
pharmaceutical firms in mentoring smaller biotechnology firms, and that pharmaceutical 
citations are a strong signal of such activity41.
5.6.4. The Impact of Interaction Effects on Market Value
40 I collated a list o f  27 pharmaceutical firms from industry databases that I matched with the citation data. 
My database o f  scientific publications includes an address field that allows me to identify pharmaceutical 
citations from the others.
41 “ ...w e track our citations to keep a pulse on the evolving scientific frontier and when pharmaceutical 
firms cite our research, we approach them to see if  there is any commercial opportunity... in particular, i f  
our work is cited heavily by a particular pharmaceutical firm, a working relationship, either contract R&D 
or joint product development usually follow s...” (Interview with Dr. J. Blumenthal, Celltech, UK, Feb. 
2005).
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I include three interaction terms of (R&D * Citation-weighted Patents), (R&D*Citation- 
weighted Publications) and (Citation-weighted Patents*Citation-weighted Publications) 
in my market value estimation (Equation 5.7). The results are displayed in Table 5.7.
I find that the three interaction terms are positive and significantly correlated. From the 
coefficients in Col (2), Table 5.7, I find that the presence o f patenting and publishing 
significantly raises the impact o f R&D on market value. There are two possibilities, first 
that R&D acts as a complement to the joint activities of publishing and patenting and we 
would expect them to appear in a bundle with higher market value. Thus, there is a case 
to be made that firms that invest in R&D reap the greatest benefit by combining these 
investments with high levels o f patenting and publishing.
However, a weaker form of joint adoption could also originate from a common factor 
driving the adoption o f both -  for example, smart firms, those with higher market value, 
might learn how to manage how to juggle R&D, patenting and papers in an optimal mix. 
In this case, we would again expect R&D, patenting and publishing to appear in 
combination with each other, and firms that draw higher market value from the adoption 
o f one will also draw positive benefits from the other.
It is important to note that in the context o f the model used in this study, with R&D, 
papers and patents signaling the financial market o f the potential success o f the firm, the 
two observationally identical outcomes generate the same impact on market value.
5.6.5. Tests for Causality
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While the results show us that the stock of citation-weighted publications acts as a signal 
o f the quality of firms’ R&D, at this stage, the direction o f causality is unclear. Does 
publishing papers improve the quality of a firm’s R&D or does the stock o f published 
papers merely reflect the existing levels of R&D quality within the firm? If  the latter 
argument were true, it would suggest that publishing papers are a fundamental 
component of a firm’s innovative program42 and are a key knowledge asset in their own 
right.
One possible strategy to establish the direction o f causality would be to proxy the 
knowledge “capabilities” o f a firm by some variable and regress this measure against the 
stock of scientific publications. The simplest outcome o f innovative capability are 
citation-weighted patent counts. Another measure would be its ability to generate profits.
I regress the citation-weighted publication stock against both these variables43. In Table 
5.8, Column 1, I find that citation-weighted patent counts are weakly correlated with 
profitability and that citation-weighted publications are strongly correlated with 
profitability. Further, in Table 5.9, I find that the stock of published papers is weakly 
correlated with citation-weighted patent counts. As noted earlier in the chapter, because
42 Drawing upon Cohen and Levinthal’s (1989) “absorptive capacity” argument, Cockbum and Henderson 
(1998) suggest that firms use pro-open-science incentives to develop routines and skills that allow them to 
utilize effectively the advances in publicly funded research.
431 include a time lag o f three years to capture the gap in time between patenting and publishing activity 
and its impact o f profitability. A lag o f  three years gives me the strongest result and is consistent with 
previous results on R&D investments, patenting and profitability (reference).
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o f the skewness of patent value (even when weighted by citations), this result is not 
particularly worrisome44.
Thus publishing papers appears to be an activity that imparts distinct benefits from 
patenting but with an independent relationship on both market valuation as well as 
profitability. However, it may be that publishing good papers might allow a firm to signal 
that it provides a welcoming environment to do high quality scientific research and 
therefore attract and retrain high talent scientists to the firm. In other words, there could 
be a two-way effect between publishing papers and a firms ability to innovate. A true ex 
ante separation o f variables needed to establish causality is difficult to establish on purely 
empirical grounds and is beyond the scope o f my analysis. However, in subsequent work 
I explore the theoretical basis for firms participating in the world o f public science.
5.6.6. Tests for Robustness
5.6.6.I. Measuring Research Quality by Journal Prestige
Rather than using citation scores for individual papers, I can proxy the quality o f an 
article by the quality o f the journal in which it appears (See Section 5.5.2.2 for an account 
o f the construction o f this variable). This is not simply a “cruder” measure than raw 
citation scores, but rather captures a slightly different perception o f the article. It reflects 
an estimate o f its quality as judged by a smaller group o f peer-reviewers and journal 
editors. Also, often times, articles that appear in top ranking journals receive a fair share
44 A recent paper by Gittelman and Kogut (2003) that regresses high impact papers against high impact 
patents, indeed report a negative correlation between the two.
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of attention and deliver benefits to the authoring firm even though they do not gamer 
many citations.
I mn Equation 5.7 using journal quality instead of citation scores to individual papers and 
show the results in Table 5.10, Column 1 .1 find that while the R-square remains largely 
unchanged (see Table 5.3, Column 2), the coefficient of the publication stocks variable is 
higher. Thus, getting published in high prestige journals has a greater impact on the 
market value o f a firm than the total citations that a paper eventually receives. This is not 
surprising since investors and potential collaborators regularly scan top journals and by 
getting published in these journals, biotech firms can more convincingly signal the worth 
o f their ideas.
5.6.6.2. Multicollinearity
Table 5.11 reports the cross-correlation o f the key explanatory variables. Not 
surprisingly, I find that a firm’s R&D expenditure is correlated with the number o f 
patents that it might earn and the number o f publications that it produces. This result is 
reasonable and not particularly counter-intuitive. However, the first point to note is that I 
find that these variables are not perfectly correlated. Thus, while R&D and patenting 
activity are correlated, not all o f a firm’s patenting or publishing activity can be explained 
by its R&D expenditure. Thus, while there is an overlap between these measures, they 
still independently contain useful information.
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Second, I find that while R&D expenditure is strongly correlated with a firm’s 
publication output in numerical terms, it is less powerful as a predictor of the number of 
citations these publications receive. In other words, citation-weighted publications 
measure an aspect of innovation distinct from R&D expenditures, namely the quality o f a 
firm’s scientific innovative activities as perceived by a peer group o f experts.
Further, I find that while R&D expenditures (and patent counts) are not strongly 
correlated with profit before tax, citation-weighted publications are. This also supports 
the hypothesis that the information contained in the citation-weighted publication stock 
contains separate and useful information on firm performance, namely a signal of the 
quality of its innovative efforts.
5.7. Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research
My analysis uses new data on UK biotechnology research output from 1988 to 2001 to 
build an open-science model of innovation in biotech that argues that R&D expenditures 
reveal the commitment o f a firm’s resources to innovation, patents record its success at 
innovation, and a firm’s stock of citation weighted scientific publications signal the 
quality of its innovative efforts. The original contribution o f my analysis, beyond 
assembling a new dataset, is to include citation-weighted publications in a market value 
equation o f biotechnology assets and to analyze the strategic import of this variable.
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By publishing scientific papers subject to a peer review process, firms are able to 
convincingly signal the worth o f their ideas to investors and other interested third parties 
such as potential collaborators and employees. This is a valuable signal given the 
uncertainties o f biotechnology research and the findings indicate that publishing papers in 
academic journals provides real financial gains to firms. On average, publishing fourteen 
scientific papers in academic journals has approximately the same impact on market 
value as obtaining a patent. Further, highly cited papers and those papers that are cited by 
pharmaceutical firms have a much greater impact than average.
At a prescriptive level, then, the implications of these results are straightforward, with the 
old adage “Publish or Perish” applying equally to biotechnology firms as it does to 
academic environments. Biotechnology firms need to continually publish scientific 
papers in order to convince investors and potential collaborators o f the worth o f their 
ideas. A firm’s market valuation is inextricably linked with this public signal o f R&D 
efforts.
Previous research shows that biotechnology firms can boost their publication record by 
collaborating with “star” scientists and institutions (see Chapter 4). By star, I mean those 
institutions and individuals with particularly strong scientific track records. Collaborating 
with stars produces papers that are more highly cited and that appear in better quality 
journals. Thus forming links with top academic institutions is a strategic imperative for 
biotechnology firms. From a public policy perspective, developing and nurturing a strong 
independent scientific establishment is one of the key ingredients in fostering a
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competitive biotechnology industry. Further, arrangements that allow for the free 
mobility o f scientists across the private-public divide are a crucial requirement for 
ensuring that the private sector can then capitalize on the intellectual and human capital 
available in the public sphere.
It is important to note that previous research indicates great variance across industries in 
terms o f the propensity to patent and to cite patents (Levin et al, 1987), the count and 
citation weighted count o f publications (Narin and Rozek, 1988) and the economic value 
o f innovation (Acs and Audretsch, 1990) across industries, the findings may not be 
generalisable outside the high technology industry, or indeed even the biotechnology 
sector.
Finally, the question o f why firms make their private knowledge public is clear. They 
gain financially from it. Further research on the incentives and outcomes o f open-science 
innovation would be o f much practical and theoretical interest.
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Table 5.1. Definitions o f Key V ariables
Variable Name Definition
1. Market Value Algebraic sum of the market value o f a 
firm’s outstanding common shares and an 
estimation of the market value of its book 
debt.
2. Log Market Value Logarithm of Market Value.
3. R&D Expenditures R&D expenditure o f a firm as recorded in 
its annual report in a given year.
4. Patent Counts
5. Citation-weighted Publications 
Weighted By,
Total number o f patents awarded to a firm 
by the USPTO in a given year.
a. Log Citations Number o f scientific papers authored by a 
firm multiplied by a logarithm weighted 
(see Equation 5.1) citation score.
b. Log Pharma Citations Citations counted only as those received 
from pharmaceutical firms (using 
logarithm transform of Equation 5.1).
c. Log Citations to Journal Prestige Average citations o f journal used instead of 
citations to individual paper. Logarithm 
transform used (Equation 5.1).
6. Profit Before Tax Declared profits before tax.
7. Ordinary Dividends The dividends awarded by a firm to its 
shareholders the previous year (historic 
dividends).
8. Long-term Investments The long-term investments and receivables 
held by a firm. Strong signal of a firm’s 
cash flow in the absence o f regular profits.
9. Current Assets Firm’s current assets that indicate the 
short-term management of cash flow.
10. Shareholder’s Equity The equity of the firm held by 
shareholders. Representative o f exposure to 
capital markets and hence risk o f financial 
distress versus growth prospects.
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Table 5.2. Descriptive Statistics
V ariable name M ean SD M in Max Obs.
1. Market Value 117.45 0.034 10.092 4.732 1131
2. Log Market Value 2.069
(millions)
0.002
(millions)
1.004
(millions)
0.675
(billions)
1131
3. R&D Expenditures 11.532
(millions)
0.004
(millions)
1.782
(million)
1.84
(billions)
1131
4. Patent Counts 3.321 0.014 0 37 1131
5. Publication Counts 
Weighted by Citations as:
3.452 0.089 0 117 1131
5.1. Log Citations 7.112 0.321 0 202.708 1131
5.2. Log Citations By 
Pharmaceutical Firms
1.148 0.002 0 4.863 1131
5.3. Log Journal Quality 8.192 0.132 0 229.345 1131
6. Profit Before Tax
(millions)
8.783
(millions)
0.0019
(millions)
0
(millions)
432.34 1131
7. Ordinary Dividends 37.42 0.0048 0 732.12 1131
8. Long-term Investments 56.38 0.0061 0 234.32 1131
9. Current Assets 34.34 0.0043 0 261.32 1131
10. Shareholder’s Equity 22.39 0.011 1.932 940.34 1131
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Table 5.3. M arket Value Equation as a function of R&D, Patents & Scientific
Citations
Dependent variable: 
Log M arket Value
Column 1 
R&D and Patent 
Stocks
Colum n 2 
R&D, Patent, and 
Publication Stocks
R&D Stock 1.276*" 1.362***
(0.061) (0.068)
Patent Stock 0.027*** 0.030***
(0.006) (0.007)
Citation-weighted Publication 0.052
Stocks (0.004)
Control Variables
Profit Before Tax 0.343*** 0.353***
(0.015) (0.014)
Cash Flows for Investment 0.034** 0.025**
(0.002) (0.001)
Ordinary Dividends 0.049* 0.037*
(0.007) (0.005)
Long-term Investments 0.018* 0.016*
(0.001) (0.001)
Current Assets 0.014* 0.013*
(0.001) (0.001)
Shareholder’s Equity 0.135* 0.139*
(0.007) (0.008)
Adjusted R-squared 0.222 0.254
Number o f Observations 1131 1131
Note: 1. ***significant at 1-percent level; ** significant at 5-percent level; * significant 
10-percent level. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
2. Estimation method: Ordinary Least Squares.
3. Firm dummies, time dummies and control variables included in all estimations.
4. Stocks are computed using 15 percent annual depreciation rate.
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Table 5.4. Computing the Impact of Knowledge Stocks
Ratios
M ean
Ratios evaluated a t the: 
Median Ratio o f  totals
R&D 0.35 0.16 0.16
Patents 1.05 0.35 0.50
Citation-weighted 
Publication Stocks
Semi-elasticities*
7.95 6.33 7.46
diog MKTVAL 0.709*** 0.876*** 0.842
d ( R & D / A ) (0.206) (0.037) (0.036)
diog MKTVAL .  . .  ,*** 0.016 0.019*** 0.019
^ P A T  I R & D ) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
diog MKTVAL 0.0013*** 0.0033*** 0.0032***
^P A P E R S _  CITES/R & D) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
*Computed using the estimated coefficients in column (2) o f Table 3.
Note:
1 ♦♦♦significant at 1-percent level; ** significant at 5-percent level; * significant 10- 
percent level. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
162
163
Table 5.5. The Impact of Highly Cited Papers on Market Value
Dependent 
V ariable: 
M arket Value
Column 1 
R&D, Patent and 
Publication Stocks
Column 2 
Im pact of Highly Cited Papers
R&D Stock 1.362***
^  ,*** 
0.926
(0.068) (0.053)
Patent Stock
***
0.030 0.025***
Citation-weighted
(0.007) (0.004)
Publication Stocks
Dummies for # of 
scientific citations*
0.052***
(0.004)
[0-4] - -
5-6 - 0.006
(0.013)
7-10 - 0.097***
(0.018)
11-20 - 0.353***
(0.023)
>20 - 0.542***
(0.029)
Adjusted R-squared 0.254 0.255
Number of 
Observations
1131 1131
Note:
1 ***significant at 1-percent level; ** significant at 5-percent level; * significant 10- 
percent level. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
2. Estimation method: Ordinary Least Squares.
3. Firm dummies, time dummies and control variables included in all estimations.
4. Stocks are computed using 15 percent annual depreciation rate.
5. [ ] refers to omitted reference category.
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Table 5.6. The Impact of Citations by Pharmaceutical Firms on Market Value
Dependent variable: Column 1 Column 2
Market Value Without splitting Splitting stock into
stock into Pharma/Non-
Pharma/Non-pharma pharma
R&D Stock 1.362*** 1.261***
(0.068) (0.063)
Patent Stock 0.030
_  ...*** 
0.028
(0.007) (0.007)
Citation-weighted Publication Stock
***
0.052
(0.004)
-
Citation-weighted Publication Stock: - 0.431***
Only Pharma Citations (0.017)
Citation-weighted Publication Stock: - 0.046***
Only Non-Pharma Citations (0.006)
Adjusted R-squared 0.254 0.260
Number o f Obs. 1131 1131
Note:
1 ***significant at 1-percent level; ** significant at 5-percent level; * significant 10- 
percent level. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
2. Estimation method: Ordinary Least Squares.
3. Firm dummies, time dummies and control variables included in all estimations.
4. Stocks are computed using 15 percent annual depreciation rate.
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Table 5.7. Interaction Terms
Dependent 
V ariable: 
M arket Value
Column 1 
R&D, P aten t and 
Publication Stocks
Column 2 
Including Interaction Term s
R&D Stock 1.362"* ~  - * * *  0.926
(0.068) (0.053)
Patent Stock 0.030 0.025***
(0.007) (0.004)
Citation-weighted 0.052
Publication Stocks (0.004)
(R&D Stock*Patent 0.695***
Stocks) (0.112)
(R&D -
Stock*Citation- 0.474**
weighted (0.138)
Publication Stocks)
(Patent -
Stock*Citation- 0.015**
weighted (0.004)
Publication Stocks)
Adjusted R-squared 0.254 0.312
Number of
Observations 1131 1131
Note:
1 ***significant at 1-percent level; ** significant at 5-percent level; * significant 10- 
percent level. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
2. Estimation method: Ordinary Least Squares.
3. Firm dummies, time dummies and control variables included in all estimations.
4. Stocks are computed using 15 percent annual depreciation rate.
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Table 5.8. Do Papers Explain Profits?
D ependent Variable: 
Profit Before Tax (PBT)
Column 1 
R&D, Patent and Publication Stocks
R&D
* * #
0.452
(0.114)
Citation-weighted Patents 0.112*
(0.018)
Citation-weighted Publication Stocks 0.212
(0.079)
Adjusted R-Squared 0.225
Number of Observations 1131
Note:
1 ***significant at 1-percent level; ** significant at 5-percent level; * significant 10- 
percent level. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
2. Estimation method: Ordinary Least Squares.
3. Firm dummies, time dummies and control variables included in all estimations.
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Table 5.9. Do Papers Explain Patents?
Dependent V ariable: 
Patent Counts (PAT)
Column 1 
R&D and Publication Stocks
R&D 0.532
(0.102)
Citation-weighted Publication Stocks 0.115*
(0.008)
Adjusted R-squared 0.210
Number of Observations 1131
Note:
1 ***significant at 1-percent level; ** significant at 5-percent level; * significant 10- 
percent level. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
2. Estimation method: Ordinary Least Squares.
3. Firm dummies, time dummies and control variables included in all estimations.
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Table 5.10. Impact of Journal Quality on Market Value
Dependent Variable: 
M arket Value
Column 1 
R&D, Patent and 
Publication Stocks
R&D 1.452***
(0.044)
Patents
^  ^  *** 
0.033
(0.004)
Citation-weighted 0.066
Publication Stocks (0.007)
Adjusted R-squared 0.259
Number o f Observations 1131
Note:
1 ***significant at 1-percent level; ** significant at 5-percent level; * significant 10- 
percent level. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
2. Estimation method: Ordinary Least Squares.
3. Firm dummies, time dummies and control variables included in all estimations.
4. Stocks are computed using 15 percent annual depreciation rate.
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Tabl e 5.11. Cross Correlation of Key Explanatory Variables
R&D/
Assets
Patents/
Assets
Publications
/Assets
Citation-
weighted
Publications/
Assets
Profit
Before
Tax
R&D 1.000***
Patents 0 .4 8 4 " 1.000***
Publications 0.692*** 0.438*** 1.000
Citation-
weighted
Publications/
Assets
0.313* 0.293** 0.712** 1.000
Profit Before 
Tax
0.279* 0.242* 0.312* 0.438 1.000
Note: ***significant at 1-percent level; ** significant at 5-percent level; * significant 10- 
percent level.
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Appendix 5.A. Control Variables
Below is a detailed description o f the construction and use o f the control variables used in 
my analysis.
P rofit Before Tax. One of the classic accounting measures o f firm performance is profit 
before tax. Unfortunately, given the venture capital led growth of biotechnology firms, 
most firms in the data set did not record profits for most of their lifetimes and instead 
relied upon interest payments and venture capital. Despite this paucity o f profit figures, 
exceptions to the rule exist particularly as the younger firms enter maturity and the profit 
before tax is recorded and denoted by PBT. This variable captures the effect of appealing 
effect o f actual profits on the market value of biotechnology firms’. Closely allied with 
profits are ordinary dividends paid out by firms to their shareholders. According to the 
dividend discount model (Myers, 2000), a firm’s historic dividends are another important 
signal to its future performance, and are recorded as ORDIV.
Long T erm  Investments. In the absence of profits, the market looks for other cues to a 
firm’s future financial prospects. Particularly, shareholders seek an indirect measure of 
cash flow. In this context, a firm’s long-term investments and receivables (recorded as 
LTM) provide a valuable signal o f its current financial condition.
Equity. Models o f corporate finance (Myers 2003) demonstrate that equity, as an element 
o f a firm’s capital structure may embody useful valuation information abut its relative tax
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breaks, relative agency costs (of equity and debt), and risk o f financial distress and 
growth prospects. This variable, measured by shareholders’ funds, is recorded as 
EQUITY.
C urren t Assets. Finally, a firm’s current assets (recorded as CURA) can provide an 
indication of a firm’s short-term management o f cash flow and thus proxies factors such 
as risk of financial distress, and trade-off between liquidity and returns.
Aside from the impact of financial and accounting variables, the influence of unobserved 
factors is controlled by using firm-specific and time-specific45 dummies. The time- 
specific dummies are used to control for inflation, since the data are given in nominal 
terms and are not readily convertible into real terms. The inclusion of firm dummies 
controls for the presence of unobserved differences between firms not captured by the 
observed variables in the dataset (i.e., such as the presence o f superior management).
45 The use o f a time-based variable (such as day, month or year) instead o f time dummies is prone to some 
ambiguity. For example, the date at which a scientific paper is made public is noisy -  it may be presented at 
a conference, posted electronically as a working paper, and finally published formally as a journal article. 
For this reason, I chose to use time dummies. I also run regressions using a year variable instead o f time 
dummies and find no significant difference in my results (available upon request from the author).
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Chapter 6
Biotechnology Patents as Credence Goods: Implications for the Patent System and
Firm Behavior
6.1. Introduction
Consumers of organically produced vegetables, car mechanic services, and biotechnology 
patents all have something in common: even after they purchase or make use of their 
goods, it is often not possible to comment accurately on the quality o f what they just paid 
for. Such goods are often labelled “credence goods” (Leibi, 2002). This chapter is 
concerned with the unobservable quality of biotechnology patents, or their “credence 
good” nature. There are varying gradations o f information asymmetry associated with 
credence goods and I argue in this chapter that the asymmetry in information at the far 
end of the spectrum is an accurate model for biotechnology patents. In particular, I argue 
that this asymmetry in biotechnology patents is bome out o f three kinds o f uncertainity 
associated with patents -  “intrinsic” uncertainty that arises out o f legal complexity of the 
patent document, “extrinsic” uncertainty regarding the underlying technology the patent 
is meant to protect and lastly variable quality in issuing patents at the patent office. I 
examine each o f these later in the paper (See Box 6.1).
Credence goods by virtue o f their uncertainty require external validation in order to 
ascertain their quality. Previously in this thesis, I have found that biotechnology firms 
publish scientific articles in peer-reviewed journals in collaboration with university
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scientists and that by doing so they gain financially. This behavior seems irrational in 
classical models of patents and technology which assume that firms reveal as little 
information about their R&D activities as possible (see Chapter 4, and 5). In this chapter, 
I argue that conceptualizing biotechnology patents as credence goods interprets this 
“open” behavior o f biotechnology firms as rational and necessary. Firms are able to 
signal the quality o f their knowledge stock by publishing scientific articles in a peer 
reviewed journals which acts as an independent source o f verification (or a “credence 
filter”).
The rest o f the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 6 .2 ,1 discuss what it means for 
a good or service to carry credence attributes and indicate how biotechnology patents 
may fit this description. In Section 6 .3 ,1 examine the inadequacy o f the current literature 
in law and economics that views patents merely as a sharp proprietary right. In particular, 
I analyze the manner in which uncertainty and heterogeneity in quality associated with 
patents affects the proprietary value o f the right. I also look at some of the ways in which 
patents are valued and the difficult nature of this process which accounts for the virtual 
unobservability o f the quality o f the patent right. In Section 6 .4 ,1 discuss how credence 
mechanisms -  such as peer reviewed publications and collaboration with academia (see 
chapters 4 and 5) — might operate in the biotechnology marketplace. In Section 6.5, I 
discuss implications ef-that the credence view o f patents has for firms and the patent 
system. Finally in Section 6 .6 ,1 conclude with suggestions for future work.
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6.2. Credence Attributes and Patents
The problem of credence goods is a problem of unobservable quality, and typically 
occurs in medical, legal, and financial advice services as well as a wide variety o f repair 
professions. In most o f these cases the seller provides the goods or services and also acts 
as the expert who determines what and how much of the goods and services are required. 
Searching for information to verify the expert’s opinion is usually expensive 
(prohibitively so in certain cases), and creates opportunity for fraud on the part o f the 
expert46.
This problem o f information asymmetry between buyers and sellers has received 
considerable attention in economics following on from George Stigler’s classic paper on 
the economics o f information47 (Stigler, 1961). A transaction involves an asymmetry of 
information when one party to the exchange has more information (on quality o f goods or 
relative price) than the other, leading to opportunities for fraudulent behavior. Although 
considerable attention in the literature has been paid to the problem of asymmetric 
information between buyers and sellers, the theoretical literature on fraudulent experts is 
“fairly small” (Emons, 1997).
46Asymmetry o f  information gives sellers several opportunities to exploit consumers -  a problem that is 
dubbed “demand inducement” in the health economics literature. W inand Emons cites several examples 
where fraud was covered up. In Switzerland, for example, patients with the minimum level o f schooling are 
twice as likely to have their womb or gall stone removed than patients with a university degree. Further, 
children whose parents are doctors are five times less likely to have their tonsils removed as regular 
children (Emons, 1997).
47 Information is a valuable resource, yet “it occupies a slum dwelling in the town o f economics”. So starts 
the classic paper written by Stigler in 1961 that precipitated an explosion o f theoretical research on the 
economics o f information (Stigler, 1961).
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Stigler’s (1961) classic paper dealt with the problem of ascertaining “market price”. In 
his paper, Stigler analyzed search costs that arise when a buyer (or seller) seeking the 
most favorable price canvasses various sellers (or buyers). According to Stigler, a 
consumer searches for information until the marginal benefit o f additional information is 
equal to the marginal costs o f obtaining the additional information. As a result, there is 
willingness to pay for information and there is a marginal cost o f information. His central 
contribution lay in the conclusion that important aspects of economic organization take 
on a fresh meaning from the viewpoint of the search for information.
Following Stigler’s lead, Nelson showed that the problem o f determining quality o f 
goods and services is even more intractable than the problem of determining price 
(Nelson, 1970). Based on the quality level o f goods and services, Nelson distinguished 
between -  ‘search goods’ and ‘experience goods’. One can determine the quality o f 
‘search goods’ by searching; the quality o f ‘experience goods’ can be determined by 
experiencing taste, durability or maintenance needs. Also for any brand, search qualities 
can be determined prior to purchase and experience qualities only after the event.
Typically, it is more expensive to get information about quality than it is to get 
information about the price. For some low cost goods, purchasing the product may be the 
best way o f experiencing its quality -  cans o f tuna for example. I f  the purchase price is 
low enough, the consumer may prefer to get his information by way of ‘experience’.
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However if  the costs o f these procedures rises sufficiently high, the consumer will try to 
get the information in other ways.
Darby and Kami in a classic paper expand the categories to include ‘credence goods’ 
(Darby and Kami, 1973). They discuss how reputation, market conditions, and 
technological factors affect the amount of fraud. Credence goods constitute a category for 
which the non expert cannot verify the quality attributes of the good. For these goods one 
must rely on a third party to provide truthful information to the consumer about quality.
This discussion often provides theoretical backing for third party certification or 
introduction o f government regulations. For example, this is often cited as the underlying 
economic theory for the eco-labeling o f foods48. Research on consumer demand for 
credence products can be further unpacked as consumer demand for certain attributes o f 
the product. Kevin Lancaster’s framework in this context contends that the utility o f the 
good does not lie in the good itself but in the characteristics or attributes that create utility 
(Lancaster, 1971).
This theoretical background that casts the market o f goods as a search for information 
(for quality and price) has a unique resonance for biotechnology patents. The traditional 
view of patents has always regarded them as classic proprietary rights over information 
(Stigler, 1961; Fisher, 2001). However the credence attribute o f patents in biotechnology 
arises from uncertainty in the hue extent of information enclosed within such proprietary
48 As an illustration see Cathy Roheim ‘Early Indications o f Market Impacts from the Marine Stewardship 
Council’s Ecolabeling o f Food’ (Dec 26, 2002), at p 13 available at
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ccc_msc_e.doc
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rights. The nature of the problem at hand is made clearer with reference to two scenarios. 
One could have firm fencing around a few thousand acres o f land without knowing 
whether they enclose prairies, woodlands, arable land, wetlands or mining fields. A 
second uncertain scenario is represented by knowing what kind o f land is enclosed with 
informal fencing specified only with reference to certain landmarks. Both scenarios lead 
to uncertainty in the extent and nature of the property rights held. Although a certain 
amount o f uncertainty in property rights is to be expected, the uncertainty associated with 
patents in new technology is fundamental and crucial to an accurate understanding o f the 
role o f such rights in the market.
Immature technologies have particular characteristics that make them vulnerable to the 
credence good problem. These include, but are not restricted to, uncertain scope o f 
terminology used and uncertain attributes o f ‘the person skilled in the art’ -  the notional 
person through whom questions o f fact and law are often interpreted in patent law. The 
problem of uncertainty o f technological and commercial implications, which is a problem 
common to all patents, is thus greater in the case o f newer technologies. The utility o f a 
patent right is not the patent itself but the attributes and characteristics that create the 
utility. Therefore the credence nature o f the patents allows us to focus on the processes by 
which the attributes are valued and priced by the market.
6.3. Transcending the exclusivity view of patents
6.3.1. The Theory of Patents
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Patent law is home to a number o f seemingly freestanding theories that support and 
rationalize the need to give property rights over inventions49, and as William Fisher 
notes, ‘in law reviews and journals o f economics and philosophy articles deploying 
“theories” o f intellectual property proliferate’50. Nonetheless or perhaps because o f this, 
controversies over patentability and the scope of these property rights have been around a 
long time. Machlup and Penrose describe how ‘seesaw battles’ around the patent system 
have raged on and off since the 19th century. The chief opponents of the system down the 
ages have been staunch proponents of free enterprise; the debate for and against tends to 
follow classic lines o f argument. Indeed as the authors note, ‘little, if  anything, has been 
said for or against the patent system in the twentieth century that was not said equally 
well in the nineteenth’ (Machlup and Penrose, 1950).
Patents and the need for patents has also been subjected to all manner o f economic 
analysis. But in the classic sense there are four types o f arguments that support the 
granting o f exclusive property rights over inventions as the most appropriate response to 
the need for and creation o f inventions.
49 These theories often give one the feeling that no amount o f  effort at unraveling and understanding will 
suffice. Although active contradictions are rare, a number o f  gaps and ambiguities make the theoretical 
understanding o f intellectual property an elusive goal. With respect to economic analysis for example, 
Landes and Posner (2003) note that there is a tendency among economic analysts on intellectual property to 
reduce the entire problem o f  intellectual property rights to a trade-off between ‘incentive’ and ‘access’. 
They argue that to reduce the problem o f intellectual property to this trade-off is to oversimplify greatly; 
‘Not that the incentive-access trade-off is nonexistent or even unimportant; but there is much else to 
consider in an economic analysis o f intellectual property law’. Samuel Oddi (1996) in the course o f his 
economic analysis o f patents comes to the conclusion that it is not possible to have one single unified 
theory o f patents that can predict appropriate scope o f protection. See Samuel Oddi ‘Un-Unified Economic 
Theory o f Patents’ 71 Notre dame Law Review 267 (1996).
50 William Fisher ‘Theories o f  Intellectual Property’ in Stephen Munzer, ed., New Essays in the Legal and  
Political Theory o f  Property (Cambridge University Press, 2001). Fisher him self canvasses many o f these 
theories, evaluates them and considers the role they ought to play in law making.
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Type 1 says that a man has natural property rights in his own ideas; appropriation by 
others must be condemned as stealing. Type 2 says that inventors receive rewards for 
their services to society. The most appropriate way for society to reward them is by way 
of exclusive property rights. Type 3 says industrial progress is desirable to society and 
without incentives, inventors and capitalists will not endeavor to make those inventions 
that are central to industrial progress available. Exclusive property rights are the most 
appropriate way to ensure that they make profitable ventures and thereby avoid the ‘free 
riding problem’51. Type 4 argues that in the absence o f exclusive property rights, 
inventions that are essential for industrial progress, will have no protection against 
imitation and hence inventors will continue to keep these secret. Hence it is in the 
interests of society to induce the inventor to disclose his secret and the most appropriate 
way to do this is through exclusive property rights by way o f patent rights (Machlup and 
Penrose, 1950). Most of the strands within these broad arguments generally exhibit a 
striking polarity for or against exclusive property rights.
Economic analyses of the need for patents and indeed other intellectual property rights, 
often assumes as a starting point that property rights are necessitated by the nature o f 
information52. The standard economic rationale o f patents is expressed as an efficient 
method o f enabling the benefits o f research and development to be internalised, thus 
making innovation and technological progress possible. Landes and Posner in their
51 Consumers o f  a public good who do not contribute to the costs o f creation or maintenance get a ‘free 
ride’ when others pay for these costs. Classic illustrations o f such public goods include the police.
52 Kenneth Arrow for instance, resolves the ‘information paradox’ by assuming well defined property rights 
as his starting point (Arrow, 1962).
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classic account o f the economics o f patent law focus on another useful way o f thinking 
about patents, i.e., as a response to economic problems inherent in trade secrecy and the 
market structure (Landes and Posner, 2003).
One o f the more interesting strands within the economic analysis of intellectual property 
rights is their desirability based on their function as ‘information mechanisms’ -- 
illustratively, in the case of trademarks - the function of reducing consumers ‘search 
costs’. This is a specific approach within a broader utilitarian force shaping property 
rights in the legal field. Thus, the primary economic benefits of trademark, are (1) the 
reduction of consumers’ search costs (because it is easier to pick a box o f “Cheerios” off 
the grocery shelf than to read the list of ingredient in each container, and because 
consumers can rely on their prior experiences with various brands o f cereal when 
deciding which box to buy in the future. The second part to this view is that trademarks 
create an incentive for businesses to produce consistently high-quality goods and services 
(because they know that their competitors cannot by imitating their distinctive mark, take
c < j
a free ride on the consumer good that results from consistent quality) .
There are two distinct ideas about information within this description that are relevant to 
our analysis. Firstly the idea that the intellectual property right, in this case trade marks, 
are a proxy for the value (in terms o f quality and reputation) o f information. This view o f 
intellectual property right is uncommon in the case o f copyright and seldom applied with 
respect to patent rights. The reason being that as we move along the spectrum of 
intellectual property rights, from trade marks to patent rights, the right becomes less o f a
53 See Landes and Posner seminal work on the economics o f trademark law (Landes and Posner, 1987).
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proxy and is valued more for being a ‘proprietary’ right in itself that demarcates the 
subject matter for exclusive use. This is why patents are regarded as ‘stronger’ 
intellectual property rights than copyright or trademarks.
However, if  patents are indeed credence goods, as I argue here, then what is true for 
trademarks is also true for patents.54 Patent rights, as per our view, are but a proxy for 
the value o f the information they contains. However where trademarks typically code for 
‘search’ or ‘experience’, the costs of investigating the quality o f the information 
contained within patents (in newer technology) is prohibitively expensive.
Secondly, there is the question o f the ‘free rider’ problem. This is reflected in the analysis 
o f all of the intellectual property rights due to the non-rivalrous nature o f information. It 
is particularly acute in the case o f patent rights, where it might preclude the 
commercialization of inventions. Kenneth Arrow described this as a paradox in the 
valuation of information that stymies the free flow of information between inventors and 
producers (Arrow, 1962). Typically the inventor has many ideas but few resources, and 
the producer has the resources but few ideas. The close relationship between the two is 
played out within research, development and manufacturing. The relationship is a tense 
one as, minus property rights, the inventor is unlikely to want to disclose his invention in 
full and the producer is unlikely to want to invest in an ill defined idea55.
54 Perhaps to a lesser or qualitatively different extent but present nontheless.
55 Arrow states, ‘The value o f information for the purchaser is not known until he has the information, but 
then he has in effect acquired it without cost’ (Arrow, 1962).
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The key to resolving Arrow’s paradox then is treating patents as well defined property 
rights regardless of whether the invention is comparatively simple or complex. And such 
a view has allowed economists to focus on complex relationships among patents, 
innovation, competition and the diffusion of technology. Treating patents in 
biotechnology as credence goods means that Arrow’s paradox is not resolved merely by 
the granting of patents. Because of the inherent uncertainty with patents it then becomes 
necessary to investigate how value is attributed to the information contained within the 
patent. In the next section, I more fully account for the sources of uncertainty and poor 
quality in patents.
6.3.2. Accounting for Uncertainty and Variable Quality in Patents
Several scholars have turned their attention to analyzing patents as ill-defined rather than 
the sharply defined exclusionary rights they were once thought to be (Long, 2002; 
Lemley and Shapiro, 2004)). In the literature, there are essentially three separate sources 
o f uncertainty associated with patents which I classify as intrinsic uncertainty, extrinsic 
uncertainty and the uncertainty related to issues o f quality (see Box 1). I examine each of 
these in greater detail later in the section.
6.3.2.1 Intrinsic Uncertainty
When a patent is granted, an extensive public document is created with a wealth of 
technological and firm information The first source which I call intrinsic uncertainty 
arises from the very document of the patent. Patents are complex scientific and legal
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documents. Understanding the content o f patents is a highly skilled task the difficulties o f 
which are usually exacerbated in the case o f new or immature technologies due to 
unsettled technical terminology and evolving jargon.
Box 6.1. Sources of uncertainty in biotechnology patents
Instrinsic Uncertainty -  A patent application is a dense legal and scientific document 
where terminology acquires meanings based on state o f the art and practice among 
persons skilled in the art. Language often bears the burden o f immature technology that 
has to be interpreted in a specific to the legal context. To illustrate a recent case in the 
UK House o f Lords involved fixing the meaning o f ‘host’ cell. The essential question 
was whether the term ‘host cell’ commonly understood to refer to a cell that ‘hosts’ 
endogamous genetic material may include a cell with activated endogenous genetic 
material instead within its meaning.
Extrinsic Uncertainty -  It is notoriously hard to predict the technological and hence 
commercial worth o f a patent. Factors external to the patent such as cost and choice o f 
materials available, cost and availability o f complementary technologies, and the present 
or potential demand or market for a particular product or technology are decisive. 
Because o f these factors patent counts alone are an extremely volatile indicator o f a 
firm’s innovative success.
Variable Quality -  The patent systems in both the US and Europe have found it difficult 
to deal with rising numbers o f patent applications (Lemley and Shapiro, 2004). Patent 
examiners have often been criticized as being the last to know o f technological 
developments (Merges, 1999). Recently it was reported that as per staff surveys 
examiners at the EPO are losing confidence in their ability to ensure the quality o f the 
patents issued (Abbott, 2004). Institutional design and interest group politics ensure a 
steady expansion of subject matter eligible for patent protection increasing the pressure 
on patent offices. Anecdotal evidence o f ‘bad’ or ‘poor quality’ patents have contributed 
to a general mistrust o f the technological or commercial worth of the information 
enclosed in a patent. The problem of ‘poor quality’ can be particularly acute in the case 
o f immature technologies as patent examiners may have to rethink examination 
techniques quickly.
Source: Authors original contribution.
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Moreover, new technology creates a period o f doctrinal uncertainty that can colour the 
way the industry regards such rights. In the case o f interpreting biotechnology patents, an 
important clause is that o f non-obviousness and this is determined by the “notional 
person skilled in the art” which is a central concept in the law of patents and has been 
notoriously difficult to fix in the case of biotechnology both in Europe and the US 
(Cornish and Llewellyn, 2003). This notional person (or PHOSITA -  “person having 
ordinary skill in the art”) determines important claims such as obviousness and 
sufficiency o f disclosure when granting a patent. The level o f the skill in the art and the 
judgments the court makes about ordinary skill in the industry profoundly affects the 
scope o f the patents that issue. On a macro level it can take a few years for the 
uncertainty o f fixing notions upon which decisions are based to get converted to a more 
‘closed’ form of interpretation. On a micro level, this means patents are often o f uncertain 
validity and scope.
6.3.2.2. Extrinsic Uncertainty
A second source o f uncertainty, which I call extrinsic uncertainty, is caused by how 
patent value is perceived in capital and labor markets. Among other things, such markets 
have a compelling need for such information in order to value firms and the assets they 
hold, to employ ‘productive scientific groups’, and make investment decisions. Often a 
thorough investigation directed towards intellectual property is called for in business 
transactions involving biotechnology firms as they rely so heavily on proprietary 
information56. The basis o f the credence theory o f patents is that this information is
56 The wide ranging nature o f such investigations is noted in a two part article by Gogoris and Clarke 
(2002a, 2002b) A due diligence investigation with respect to IP is called for typically when a company is
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extremely hard to obtain in a credible way. Patents contain information in varying 
amounts and qualities, a result o f an attribute of knowledge that Clarisa Long refers to as 
‘lumpy’ (Long, 2002) . Patents can differ enormously in the value of the information they 
contain and hence patent counts are not in themselves proxies for the value o f underlying 
inventions. This is bome out by extensive work on the relationship between patents and 
market value. It is the extremely skewed nature of the value distribution o f individual 
patents ( that is some are very valuable, while many are worth almost nothing) that makes 
firm patent totals a very noisy indicator o f the underlying economic value of the 
innovations (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 200; Harhoff, Scherer and Vopel, 2003).
The biggest problem faced in valuing patents, which makes the intrinsic uncertainty 
described above qualitatively different from extrinsic uncertainty, is the persistent 
inability to quantify the effect o f novelty, inventive step, disclosure and breadth on a 
patent’s economic value. Often the literature centres around parameters such as the 
number of times a patent is cited (as an indicator of its quality), the length o f its renewal 
(renewing a patent costs money and therefore patent renewals are a proxy for probable 
value), or the number o f countries where it is taken (patent breadth) 57. Further, the 
methods outlined above are used by industrial economists and cannot easily be turned 
into handy predictors o f patent value for an individual case . Thus, we see that patent 
value hinges upon characteristics such as novelty and market potential, which are hard to 
quantify ex ante, thus leading to a source o f extrinsic uncertainty in valuing patents.
about merge with, acquire or invest in another company, business or technology. A diligence team 
composed o f at least one lawyer, one financial expert, one technology expert and a marketing professional 
conducts a thorough review o f assets and liabilities.
57For a more in-depth exploration, see Markus Reitzig (2003)
58 See for example, www.PatentValuePredictor.com
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6.3.2.3. Uncertain Quality in Issuing Patents
A third source o f uncertainty in patent quality stems from actions taken in the patent 
office. Recent empirical work shows that patent office examinations are increasingly 
recognized to be meaningless guarantors of the quality o f the underlying innovation59. 
Sometimes this is due to the lack of resources. More worryingly, it is also seen to reflect 
a change in objectives o f patent offices in many countries. As Lemley reports in the US, 
the patent office ‘reengineered’ itself, declaring its mission to be ‘to help our customers 
get patents’ (Lemley, 2001). This, as he says
‘is an indefensible position for a quasi judicial administrative agency that is 
trusted with representing the public interest in deciding whether to issue patents. 
While the job o f the PTO is certainly to issue good patents it is also to reject bad 
ones. The idea that applicants, rather than the public at large, are the intended 
beneficiaries o f the patent system, cannot help but contribute to the push to issue 
patents regardless o f quality’ (Lemley, 2001).
This situation is aggravated by evidence o f the seemingly systematic failings o f patent 
offices. The US patent office (USPTO) for example reported that a patent examiner in the 
US spends 18 hours on average reading the application, searching for and reading prior
59Patent offices are also not obliged to evaluate a patent for the kind o f  information that capital markets 
would find interesting or valuable. There is often a gap between assessing an invention for patentability 
(technological significance) and assessing an invention for value (commercial importance) in the capital or 
labor market. Thus there are many perfectly patentable inventions that are never commercialized. This is 
one reason why only 1.5 % o f  patents are ever litigated and only 0.1 % are ever litigated to trial (Lemley 
and Shapiro, 2004).
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art, writing one or more provisional rejections, reviewing responses and amendments, 
often conducting an interview with the applicant’s attorney and writing a notice o f 
allowance60. Against this backdrop there are constant demands to increase productivity 
often ensuing from the patent office itself. The 2004 USPTO Annual report sets itself the 
goal o f accelerated processing timing through ‘more focussed examination’61. Patent 
quality problems have also been experienced in the European Patent Office. Recently it 
was reported that as per staff surveys examiners at the EPO are losing confidence in its 
ability to ensure the quality o f the patents that it issues. It is a devastating indictment to 
have two thirds o f the 1,300 patent examiners to state that productivity demands within 
the EPO did not allow them ‘to enforce the quality standards set by the European Patent 
Convention’62.
Clearly the effect of performance reports like these adds strength to the perception o f 
‘poor quality’ patent rights with considerable implication for the system as a whole as 
well as the way the market values these rights. This information has to be internalised by 
the market which will either turn away from patents as a means to ‘protect’ inventions, or 
look for third party verifiers o f the quality o f a patent. The growing volume of patent 
applications indicates that the former has not taken place leading us once again to a 
‘credence’ model o f patents.
60 The requirement o f substantial examination o f a patent, is a relatively recent addition to a long history o f  
granting exclusive privileges to exploit new inventions. The examination process tries to assess the quality 
o f an invention and passes a verdict on the ‘patentability’ o f an invention. This verdict can be further 
litigated and even revoked in a court o f  law that examines, among other things the same evidence from 
prior art that the patent examiner has used.
61 http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2004/0402_performance.html
62 The survey also noted that 90% o f the patent examiners did not have time to keep up to date with 
advances in their scientific field (Abbott, 2004).
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6.4. How Credence Works in the Biotechnology Marketplace
In this chapter, I have built an argument for biotechnology patents as credence goods, by 
showing that biotechnology patents contain a strong degree of uncertainty associated with 
their economic value, and hence there exists a corresponding asymmetry o f information 
between buyers and sellers in the biotechnology marketplace. However, patenting 
continues unabated. Therefore it is likely? that like in the case of other credence goods, 
the market has developed its own mechanisms to mitigate the information asymmetries 
that exist in the case o f biotech.
Taking cues from the literature on credence goods, I feel it would be right to characterize 
most patent owners as credence good monopolists as no patent can be replaced by 
another patent63. Further most patent transactions are one-shot relationships where the 
threat o f future reputational sanctions may not have the expected effect64.
Winand Emons has presented a simple framework which allows one to identify 
conditions under which the market mechanism can bridge informational asymmetries in 
the case o f credence goods (Emons, 2001). In most cases o f credence good monopolists, 
according to his model, the market mechanism does a fairly good job o f mitigating the
63 It may be replaced on supplemented in some cases by lead mover advantage or trade secrecy -  this will 
also depend on whether the invention involved is a product or a process for example.
64 Clarisa Long recognizes the significant reputational threat a firm faces if  the information it sends out is 
inaccurate. Long believes that a patent itself is an investment in reputation that the firm makes. With 
patents some degree o f formal sanctions exists for is a patentee is found to have misrepresented information 
in his patent application the patent will be invalidated ex post. Given the imbalances o f  patent litigation it is 
not clear that the threat o f invalidation and consequent reputational loss may not necessarily address the 
information asymmetry between buyers and sellers in a patent transaction (Long, 2002).
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information asymmetry o f goods and services of credence quality. The market does so by 
creating incentives for behavior in ‘good faith’ and separates the ‘expert’ function into 
‘statement’ and ‘verification’ (Emons, 2001). Applying this model to biotechnology 
patents, the statement made by the patentee-expert in his patent application has to be 
verified by third parties for its value to be recognized by the market.
One obvious mechanism is the patent office itself. Its rejection rate is an indiocator of 
quality o f published patents. One other (less obvious) mechanism of third party 
verification is provided by the scientific peer review system. Firms regularly publish the 
results of their scientific research in peer-reviewed journals. Publishing peer-reviewed 
articles allows firms to convince investors and potential collaborators o f the worth o f 
their ideas. In my previous research, I found that these gains are indeed realized by 
biotechnology firms and that on average publishing fourteen scientific papers has the 
same effect on market value as obtaining a single patent (see Chapter 5). Further, viewing 
biotechnology patents as credence goods explains why biotechnology firms need to 
collaborate with academic institutions. In Chapter 4, I found that scientific papers that 
biotechnology firms co-author with academic institutions are more highly cited, and 
appear in more prestigious journals. In particular, the greatest gains are to be had with 
collaborating with academics with established research reputations (or “research stars” in 
the vocabulary o f Zucker and Darby (1995)). Collaborating with academics give 
biotechnology firms the crucial “credence value” necessary to convince investors and 
other interested third parties such as pharmaceutical firms that the knowledge that they 
have is robust and valuable.
189
190
In Emons’ model o f a credence good market, consumers attempt to infer the quality from 
capacity alone and/or prices (Emons, 2001). Given that we cannot effectively ‘price’ 
patents, capacity could become a big factor in influencing decisions to buy. One such 
mechanism of adding capacity is that of patent portfolios. A recent paper by 
Parchomovsky and Wagner throws considerable light on why single patents can derive 
value from being part o f a group o f patents that are commonly controlled (Parchomovsky 
and Wagner, 2005). The authors propose a ‘new theory of patent value’, and argue that 
firms will typically seek to obtain a large quantity o f related patents, rather than 
evaluating the actual worth of individual patents. This is a more accurate description o f 
the reality o f patenting behavior65 and the explanatory power o f the theory is further 
increased when viewed via the credence good aspects emphasised here.
In particular, Parchmovsky and Wagner (2005) argue that ‘by distributing the importance 
o f the total portfolio across constituent individual patents, a patent portfolio allows 
holders to significantly hedge against aspects o f risk and uncertainty that are endemic to 
innovation in the modem economy’ (p 35, Parchmovsky and Wagner, 2005). Thus a large 
enough portfolio will address uncertainty related to future market conditions (not just 
technology but changing cost or availability o f materials for example). A large patent 
portfolio also addresses uncertainty related to future competitors. This seem to square 
with some o f the concerns related to extrinsic uncertainty. Furthermore, a healthy patent 
portfolio can also address uncertainty in patent law (intrinsic uncertainty). That is,
65 See Donna M Praiss (2001) arguing that ‘a strong patent position is not only an important goal for a 
successful biotechnology business, but also the primary asset by which a company will be valued during all 
stages o f  its development’.
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because no single individual patent conclusively determines the value of a portfolio, any 
uncertainty in the law that could alter the value of individual patents will have less 
impact.66.
Thus, we see that patent portfolios function as a ‘third tier information mechanism’ 
(Long, 2002) or what I call a ‘credence verifying’ mechanism. On the one hand the 
market, based on the evidence, distrusts the quality o f patents being granted and may be 
unwilling (or incapable) o f an opinion on the long term viability o f any firm based on 
individual granted patents. On the other hand, credibility cumulates over a patent 
portfolio and adds to the reputation o f the firm, much like the stock o f publications adds 
to the market value o f a firm’s intellectual property (see Chapter 4).
6.5. Implications for Firms and the Patent System
For firms, my research shows that simply owning patents is not enough. The patent 
holder also needs to signal to investors that the information enclosed with the patent is of 
credible value. This is not easy, particularly in relatively new industries with immature 
technologies. A metaphor used earlier in the chapter is particularly apt in the case of 
biotechnology patents. Taking the case o f an enclosed piece o f land, we find that there 
are two kinds o f uncertainty associated with its property right and value -  the quality of 
the land enclosed and uncertainty associated with the boundary o f the land. Both kinds of
66 Among other works the authors cite to support this is a previous paper by W agner and Petherbridge that 
shows that determination o f claim construction issues is highly variable, and dependent upon the identity of 
the judge hearing the case (Wagner and Petherbridge, 1999).
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uncertainty exist (quality o f the patent itself and the property right that it supposedly 
represents) with biotechnology patents (see Box 1).
Fortunately, publishing papers in peer-reviewed journals is one way uncertainity can be 
mitigated. Publication can offer a credible signal of the quality of the patent because the 
peer-review system acts as an external verifier o f the knowledge owned by a firm. Thus, 
firms not only have to patent but also publish and make public otherwise proprietary 
knowledge. Particularly, I found that firms are able to produce better quality research 
output (scientific papers) as measured by citation counts and journal prestige by 
collaborating with academics established in well regarded research institutions. Also, 
bundling a patent within a portfolio o f patents ameliorates uncertainty associated with 
the technological and legal boundaries of a single patent by diversification and strategic 
patenting.
For policy makers, it is important to note that the market for biotechnology patents is 
supported by both public (peer review publications) and private mechanisms (patent 
portfolios). Thus, ultimately, we find that public and private incentives are deeply 
intertwined in biotechnology innovation. This is why fostering a strong scientific 
establishment with a clear and transparent system of peer review is an essential ingredient 
in creating and maintaining a successful biotechnology industry.
Also, poor patent quality continues to be a problem. While the market has evolved 
mechanisms to screen out low quality patents (by disciplining the fraudulent patentee),
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poor quality patents generate wasteful transaction costs in the economy. Merges (1999) 
suggest greater administrative and patent office review as a means of identifying ‘bad’ 
patents. There seems to be increasing awareness of the need to maintain the ‘quality’ 
filter role that patents play. The US for example is poised to adopt a ‘European’ style 
post-grant opposition procedure. Three recently issued reports in the US from the 
USPTO (United States Patent Office), the Federal Trade Commission and the National 
Academy o f Sciences have all called for a post grant review process to provide a forum 
for validity challenges. They have all recognized the damage that questionable patents 
can cause and the limited options available in the existing system (Apple, 2005). There 
are considerable doubts as to how effective this procedure has been within the European 
system, but a number of recent high profile oppositions filed against controversial patents 
seem to have increased general confidence in this system (OECD, 2002).
There are also clearly markets and market conditions under which ex ante information 
gathering does not solve the potential problem o f fraud. Emons (2001) refers to cases 
where prices are set by a regulator rather than by the seller, ‘insurers pay for the services, 
distorting consumers’ incentives to gather and process the necessary information’. This 
seems to indicate that greater third party regulation o f the ‘quality’ o f patents or the 
mechanisms that identify the ‘quality’ o f patents would lead to a reduced incentive on the 
part of ‘buyers’ to decrease the informational asymmetry. Hence measures such as 
introduction o f a post grant review process in the US may fail fundamentally to decrease 
the information asymmetry and further distort the process o f gathering information about 
the quality o f patents. Thus, further research is needed to precisely quantify the
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transaction costs generated by low quality patents on the economy and the effect greater 
investments by the patent office to increase quality would have on the biotechnology 
marketplace.
Despite these concerns, clearly my own conclusions echoe those o f Emons (1997, 2001) 
who observes that a more thorough understanding o f these markets will be helpful for 
public policy purposes. Clearly studying how the market ascertains the value of patents 
has profound implications to the theory and reality o f patenting behavior; and the work 
done here presents a step in this direction.
6.6.Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown that biotechnology patents can be treated as credence goods 
insofar as the market for biotechnology patents is characterized by an asymmetry o f 
information between buyers and sellers o f publicly issued shares. This informational 
asymmetry is a result o f uncertainty associated with biotechnology patents. The chief 
causes of uncertainty reside with the legal substance o f the patent document itself, the 
technological and commercial uncertainty associated with patent value and poor quality 
in screening new innovations at the patent office when granting patents (see Box 1).
Despite these limitations, firms continue to patent in increasing numbers. Thus, the 
market has evolved mechanisms to “discipline” the fraudulent patentee and ascertain 
more accurately “true” patent value. These mechanisms, that I label credence verifiers,
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include collaborating with academic scientists (private-public collaboration seen in 
Chapter 4), publishing scientific papers in peer reviewed journals and the practice o f 
clubbing patents in patent portfolios. My research also suggests that despite these market 
mechanisms to verify value, the patent office needs to invest in screening out low quality 
patents that generate wasteful transaction costs in the economy.
It is hoped that the analysis presented in this chapter will stimulate further research into 
the credence good nature of biotechnology patents. The framework used in this paper 
was intended to extend our understanding of the incentives that drive innovation and the 
creation o f intellectual property. Still more work is needed and shall be pursued by this 
author in subsequent research.
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Following the opening three chapters which survey the literature related to knowledge, 
economic growth and firm behavior, I focus on the biotechnology industry to understand 
how firms translate basic scientific ideas into profitable ventures. I found that this 
industry is characterized by two unique stylized facts: first, firms publish the results of 
their scientific research openly in peer reviewed journals, and two, they collaborate with 
universities quite intensively. I explored this private-public nature o f biotechnology 
innovation in three separate papers.
In my first paper (Chapter 4), I found that collaborative research with academics 
improves research quality for biotechnology firms. My results indicated that 
biotechnology firms should seek alliances with high status academics with established 
research reputations. One o f the major policy implications o f my paper was the 
recommendation to strengthen support for public science and encourage collaboration 
across the private-public divide.
The results o f my first paper posed another question -  namely, why should firms publish 
the results o f their research openly in the first place? I address this question in my second 
paper (Chapter 5), by developing an open-science framework o f innovation which argues 
that while R&D expenditures reveal the commitment o f a firm’s resources to innovation 
and patents record the completion of R&D activity, a firm’s stock o f scientific papers 
signals the quality o f its innovative efforts. In biotechnology, quality o f research is a
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valuable signal and publishing peer-reviewed articles allows firms to convince investors 
and potential collaborators o f the worth of their ideas. This proposition is tested using 
unique data of U.K. biotechnology firms during the years 1988-2000. The findings 
indicate that research publications bring real financial gains to biotechnology firms and 
that, on average, publishing fourteen scientific papers in academic journals has 
approximately the same impact on a firm’s market value as obtaining a single patent. 
Furthermore, papers which are highly cited, particularly by pharmaceutical firms, have a 
greater impact on market value.
In a third theoretical paper (Chapter 6), I show that biotechnology patents can be treated 
as credence goods insofar as the market for biotechnology patents is characterized by an 
asymmetry o f information between buyers and sellers. This informational asymmetry is 
a result o f uncertainty associated with biotechnology patents. The chief causes o f 
uncertainty are the legal substance of the patent document itself, the technological and 
commercial uncertainty associated with patent value and variable quality in screening 
new innovations at the patent office when granting patents. Despite these limitations, 
firms continue to patent in increasing numbers. Thus, the market has evolved 
mechanisms to more accurately ascertain “true” patent value. These mechanisms, that I 
label, credence verifiers, include publishing scientific papers in peer reviewed journals 
and the practice of clubbing patents in patent portfolios. Studying how the market 
ascertains the value of patents has implications for the theory and reality o f patenting 
behavior; and by conceptualizing biotechnology patents as credence goods, this paper
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makes an interdisciplinary contribution (combining law and economics) to understanding 
the incentives that drive innovation.
In this thesis, I have made original contributions on three levels: methodological, 
empirical and theoretical. I list these below.
Methodological contribution
[1] In this thesis, I have constructed an original database o f firm performance and an 
extensive array o f variables that capture innovative capabilities o f U.K. biotechnology 
firms between 1988-2001. This is the first time such an extensive dataset has been 
collected on innovation and firm performance o f the U.K. biotechnology industry.
[2] The central methodological contribution o f this thesis is to introduce bibliometric 
measures o f scientific knowledge in the study o f innovation. As noted earlier (Chapter 3 
and Chapter 5), a study of traditional measures o f innovation such as R&D and patents 
which have given us a great deal o f knowledge about innovation have several 
inadequacies in usage. In particular both R&D and patents (as well as weighted measures 
o f patent data) are not accurate measures o f quality o f scientific innovation. In this thesis, 
I have argued that bibliometric measures of innovation act as a signal o f quality and thus 
provide a more complete picture o f the innovation process.
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[3] In Chapter 5 ,1 use a firm’s financial performance as a proxy of its success following a 
strong empirical tradition started by Griliches et al (see Chapter 5). I have extended this 
study of innovation and performance by including bibliometric measures (publications 
weighted by citations, publications weighted by journal prestige) in a market value 
equation for the first time.
Empirical Contribution
Chapter 4. Do firm s produce better quality research with greater academic 
collaboration?
[1] While previous research has focused on the importance o f private-public partnership 
for success in biotechnology innovation, my research is the first empirical research to 
study the effect o f private firms collaborating with public institutions on research quality.
[2] I conclusively found that research quality o f private-public research output (as 
measured by scientific publications weighted by citations or journal prestige) is improved 
by increased academic input. I find clear evidence for this in the data that is robust to the 
inclusion o f control variables, firm fixed effects and different model specifications. To 
some extent, my results mirror studies in the US in which star scientists have been found 
to impact firm research productivity (Zucker and Darby, 1995). In particular I confirmed 
the following empirical facts that characterize the effect o f private-public collaboration 
on research quality:
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a. The greatest impact o f collaboration is felt in “basic” research although the 
results hold across the “basic-applied” spectrum.
b. Further, the research indicates that these quality gains are accentuated by 
collaborating with more than one laboratory and across disciplines.
c. The strongest gains are to be had in collaborating with academics with 
established research reputations (“star scientists”, Zucker and Darby (1995)).
Chapter 5. Why Do Biotechnology Firms Make Private Knowledge Public?
[3] The key original empirical contribution o f this chapter is to include citation-weighted 
publications in a market value equation o f biotechnology assets and to analyze the 
strategic import o f this variable. To the extent o f knowledge o f this author, this is the first 
time such an analysis has been carried out.
[4] I found that, on average, publishing fourteen scientific papers in academic journals 
has approximately the same impact on market value as obtaining a patent.
Further,
a. Highly cited papers have a much greater impact than average on market value.
I find that firms that average more than the median number o f citations per patent exhibit 
a very significant increase in market value: 10% higher if  having 7-10 citations per 
patent, and 35% higher if  having 2-3 times the median (11-20 citations per patent). The 
most dramatic effect are for those scientific papers that receive more than 20 cites per
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patent: the market value of these firms is 54% higher than if the firm’s paper output had 
generated 4 or fewer citations.
b. In terms of market value, a pharmaceutical citation is worth nearly ten times 
more than a regular citation.
Theoretical contribution
[1] The central contribution o f this thesis is to establish that public-private incentives 
drive innovation in biotechnology research. While a growing body of evidence (see 
Chapter 3 and 4) point to the importance of the role played by non-private institutions in 
high technology innovation, this thesis presents a significant step in more fully 
integrating public as well as private incentives in a single innovation framework.
[2] In Chapter 5, I develop a single public-private framework that integrates citation- 
weighted publications with more traditional measures o f innovation such as R&D and 
patents. I argue that while R&D expenditures reveal the commitment of a firm’s 
resources to innovation and patents record the completion o f R&D activity, firms’ 
publication o f scientific papers signals the quality o f its innovative efforts. To the extent 
o f knowledge of this author, this is the first time such a framework has been developed 
and tested.
[3] The question of why peer-reviewed publications acts as an accurate signal o f quality 
is posed by my thesis. I argue that biotechnology patents can be treated as credence goods
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insofar as the market for biotechnology patents is characterized by an asymmetry o f 
information between buyers and sellers. Collaborating with academics (Chapter 4) and 
publishing scientific papers in peer-reviewed journals (Chapter 5) bridge this 
informational asymmetry because the scientific community and the peer-review process 
acts as a “credence verifier” in ascertaining value in the biotechnology marketplace. The 
credence good framework which I develop (Chapter 6) integrates perspectives from both 
law and economics is a new one and provides a strong theoretical basis for understanding 
the incentives that drive the behavior of biotechnology firms. The standard reference for 
the use of credence good models is Emons (1997) in which Emons demonstrates how the 
market for medical services is characterized by credence properties. There is an 
asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers in this market which require third 
parties, usually government accreditation to bridge the gap. While, models such as these 
have been applied in other markets (accountants, university education for example), this 
framework has not been applied in the context o f knowledge signalling in science-based 
firms (such as biotechnology firms).
In my thesis, I show that the stock of scientific papers published by biotechnology firms’ 
signal the worth o f their knowledge to financial markets.
This has implications for both firm behavior and public policy. For firms, it validates the 
use o f an “open-science” framework thereby encouraging firms to share the results o f 
their research with a peer scientific community. From a policy perspective, it strengthens 
the need for a strong independent peer-review system separate from industry. The stock
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of scientific papers act as credible signal of knowledge, insofar as the peer-review system 
remains an impartial and independent judge of content. Thus, to maintain this 
independence and autonomy is crucial for the smooth functioning of the biotechnology 
industry.
In summary, this thesis presents a view o f biotechnology innovation which integrates 
both public as well as private incentives and develops the literature along this basis on 
both empirical and theoretical fronts. I intend to further this research on the incentives 
and outcomes of public-private innovation in my future work.
*
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